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Answers are always anywhere anyone asks.
—Tony B. Anderson (Anderson 2007, p. 6)
What, in terms of a brief synopsis, were Volume 1’s key arguments 
and conclusions? At the expense of repeating what I said at the end of 
Volume 1, this book set out by presenting a resilient conundrum in 
Holocaust studies. That is, considering that many specialist historians 
agree that during the Nazi era most Germans were only moderately anti-
semitic,1 how during the Holocaust did they so quickly prove capable of 
slaughtering millions of Jews? I argued that social psychologist Stanley 
Milgram’s Obedience to Authority experiments may hold key insights 
into answering this perplexing question. Milgram’s main discovery was 
that 65% of ordinary people in his laboratory willingly, if hesitantly, 
followed an experimenter’s commands to inflict seemingly intense—
perhaps even lethal—electrical shocks on a “likable” person.2 When par-
ticipants were asked why they completed this experiment, much like the 
Nazi war criminals, they typically said they were just following higher 
orders.3 There is no shortage of scholars who, like Milgram, sensed sim-
ilarities between the Obedience studies and the Holocaust.4 These par-
allels have so frequently been drawn that Arthur G. Miller collectively 
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termed them the Milgram-Holocaust linkage.5 An increasing number 
of scholars, however, have challenged the validity of these similarities by 
demonstrating how the Obedience studies differ to, or conflict with, the 
Holocaust’s finer historical details. One of many possible examples is that 
unlike during the Holocaust, Milgram’s participants were clearly con-
cerned about the well-being of their “victim.” Despite this trend, Miller 
notes one behavioral similarity that I believe merits further attention: 
“Milgram’s results could be likened to the Holocaust itself. Both scenar-
ios revealed ordinary people willing to treat other people with unimag-
inable cruelty…”6 Extrapolating from this observation, I suggest that if 
it was possible to delineate Milgram’s start-to-finish inventive journey in 
transforming most of his participants into compliant inflictors of harm 
on a likeable person, perhaps the insights gained might shed new light 
into how only moderately antisemitic Germans so quickly became willing 
executioners.
So how then was Milgram able to quickly transform most ordinary 
people into torturers of a likeable person? I argue he did so by deploying 
formally rational techniques of discovery and organization. To be clear, 
what exactly did I mean by the term formal rationality?
formaL rationaLity
Max Weber conceives formal rationality as the search for the optimum 
means to a given end—the “one best way” to goal achievement. Weber’s 
model of a formally rationalized strategy was bureaucracy, an organiza-
tional process designed to find the one best way to goal achievement. To 
construct the “one best” bureaucratic process, managers break an organ-
izational goal into a variety of discrete tasks, the achievement of which 
they allocate to different specialist functionaries or bureaucrats. Using a 
predetermined sequence, each bureaucrat performs their specialist task 
by following certain rules and regulations, after which the next bureau-
crat in the organizational chain performs their specialist task until the 
goal is achieved.
The specific rules and regulations each bureaucrat follows are deter-
mined by what “past history” has suggested to managers is probably the 
one best way to goal achievement.7 That is, as bureaucrats perform par-
ticular tasks, over time a manager’s intuitive feel, previous experiences, 
and observations of the process in action lead them to the incremen-
tal discovery of even better strategies, generating new and even more 
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efficient rules and regulations for their bureaucrats to follow. Weber’s 
characteristics of bureaucracy (as an ideal type) include specialized labor, 
a well-defined hierarchy, clearly defined responsibilities, a system of rules 
and procedures, impersonality of relations, promotion based on qualifica-
tions, the centralization of authority, and written records.8
Building on Weber’s legacy, George Ritzer argues that organizational 
strategies like bureaucracy have four main components: efficiency, pre-
dictability, control, and calculability (E.P.C.C.).9 Efficiency is the pursuit 
of a shorter or faster route to goal achievement—the optimal means to 
a desired end. Predictability is the preference that all variables operate 
in a standardized and thus foreseeable way, thereby enabling managers 
to steer an organization toward future beneficial outcomes. Control is 
greater manipulative command over all factors and therefore the elimina-
tion of as many uncertainties as possible. Greater control enables greater 
predictability (especially as human labor is, over time, replaced by more 
controllable, predictable, and efficient non-human technologies). Finally, 
calculability involves the quantification of as many factors as possible. 
Advances in calculability enable greater measurement, which extends 
control over more variables and in turn improves the predictability of 
future outcomes. The greater the degree of formal rationality (advances 
in E.P.C.C), the greater the chance of discovering the “one best way” of 
arriving at organizational goal achievement, whatever it might be.
The one best way of producing motor cars over the past century or 
so provides an excellent example of advancing E.P.C.C. The production 
of the first-ever motor cars involved a few skilled engineers and trades-
people laboriously constructing and then attaching handcrafted parts to 
a stationary vehicle frame. This technique was not only slow (inefficient) 
but also unpredictable as the variable, non-standardized car parts ensured 
an equally variable end-product. Furthermore, because the engineers and 
tradespeople’s skills were rare, they could resist management’s coercive 
attempts to make them work faster by, for example, threatening to quit 
or go on strike (uncontrollable). Because control and predictability were 
low, management struggled to calculate daily, monthly, and annual pro-
duction outputs. Thus, E.P.C.C. in relation to the one best way of man-
ufacturing motor vehicles was low.
Henry Ford then invented the inherently bureaucratic motor 
car assembly-line production process. In Ford’s factory, a line of 
vehicle frames moved along a conveyor belt. The frames moved past 
many specialist assembly workers, each of whom sequentially attached 
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a standardized car part. At the end of the moving line, a constant flow 
of assembled vehicles emerged. Ford’s moving line caused production 
efficiency to greatly increase. The standardized car parts meant identical 
end products, and thus predictability also increased. The set speed of the 
moving line enabled Ford to quantify daily, monthly, and annual output, 
thus increasing calculability. But it was control perhaps that advanced the 
most. If one worker failed to keep up with the speed of the moving line, 
to the frustration of other workers and management alike, a bottleneck 
might form. Therefore, the set speed of the moving line in conjunction 
with a fear of falling behind pushed workers to perform their tasks faster 
than they probably would have on their own accord. The assembly line 
is therefore an early example of a more efficient non-human technology 
capable of imposing greater workforce control—all felt pushed by an 
unsympathetic machine into working quickly.10 And if workers resisted 
the set speed of Ford’s moving line (by quitting or going on strike), 
because they were unskilled, he could more easily replace them. Ford’s 
“one best way” of producing motor vehicles increased all four compo-
nents of a formally rational system. It transpires Ford developed this 
revolutionary system by relying on his intuitive feel of what might work 
best, his previous life experiences, and his real-time observations of the 
emerging production process. Thus, it was past history that supplied him 
with new and potentially more effective “one best ways” of ensuring goal 
achievement—improved rules and regulations for his workers to follow. 
Ford was repeatedly supplied with new ways of producing motor cars, 
and eventually, he settled on what he believed to be the one best way.
But rationalization did not stop there. Because workers’ tasks were 
purposefully simple, advances in technology eventually rendered their 
labor susceptible to replacement. By the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, the automation of the motor vehicle industry had taken Fordism 
to new heights, substituting (where possible) human labor with com-
puter-guided, high-tech robots. These robots could be programmed 
(greater calculability) to perform the same tasks without variation 
(greater predictability), with no risk of labor disputes (greater control), 
and without a break at higher speeds (greater efficiency).
As the history of motor vehicle production illustrates, formally 
rational organizational processes have gained greater and greater control 
over employees. These organizational processes modified human behav-
ior in Ford’s factories to the point that workers’ movements started to 
resemble machine-like actions. And the closer human actions resembled 
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those of machines, the easier it became to eventually replace them with 
actual machines—what Ritzer terms “the ultimate stage in control over 
people…”11 Ritzer implies here that perhaps the greatest threat to a 
desired end is human labor—that is, people. Humans are notoriously 
unpredictable, because, unlike non-human technology, they have proven 
very difficult for goal-directed managers to control.12
So how, then, did Milgram deploy formally rational techniques of discov-
ery and organization to convert (ostensibly) most of his ordinary participants 
into torturers of a likeable person? Documents obtained from Milgram’s 
personal archive held at Yale University reveals this transformative journey.
the invention of the obedienCe studies
Volume 1 illustrated that throughout and beyond his formative years, 
Milgram took an uneasy yet keen interest in the Holocaust. Around 
the time Milgram was completing his Ph.D. in social psychology, Nazi 
bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann was captured, put on trial, and executed. 
Like many Nazis before him, Eichmann justified his actions by arguing 
that he had only followed higher orders to send millions of Jews to the 
Nazi death camps. The Nazi perpetrators’ favorite justification caused 
Milgram to wonder if most ordinary (albeit American) people in a social 
science experiment would also follow orders to inflict harm. For such an 
experiment to garner scholarly attention, Milgram knew it would have 
to obtain eye-catching results (nobody would be surprised by a low 
rate of obedience to hurt an innocent person). So Milgram’s research 
was founded on a preconceived goal: to run an experiment that would 
“maximize obedience.”13 Because Milgram did not have an experimen-
tal procedure capable of generating such a result, in the role of project 
manager, he had to invent a means capable of achieving his preconceived 
end. At some level, he obviously sensed that inventing such a procedure 
might be possible.
His first attempt at developing a basic procedure was—as first 
attempts usually are—rudimentary. Drawing on his previous experi-
ence as an observer of Nazi war crimes trials and what he thought had 
caused the Holocaust—small steps toward a radical outcome, pledges of 
allegiance, group pressure, and strict obedience to harmful orders—he 
 envisioned a procedure where participants pledged to obey orders to 
“Tap” and eventually “Slug” an innocent person. During this experi-
ment, Milgram planned to insert a participant among a group of actors 
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who all happened to be in favor of inflicting harm on an innocent per-
son. He also envisioned a control condition: A higher authority figure 
was to instruct a singular participant to inflict harm on an innocent per-
son. By inserting into his experimental program what he then thought 
were the Nazis’ most effective techniques of coercion, Milgram aimed 
to simulate the Holocaust in a laboratory setting. Despite his ambi-
tions, however, he soon sensed his initial idea would fail to maximize 
obedience. With one eye on his end goal, Milgram developed a new 
idea drawing on his previous experience as a psychologist and an intu-
itive feel of what he thought was more likely to work. He sensed par-
ticipants would be more likely to inflict harm using a shock machine 
than by engaging in direct physical violence. Effectively, he substituted 
human labor with a more predictable, controllable, calculable, and effi-
cient source of non-human technology. Rather than relying on a pledge 
to obey, Milgram furthermore sensed participants would more likely 
inflict harm on an innocent person if doing so was morally inverted into 
a social good. More specifically, participants were told that the purpose 
of the experiment was to “scientifically” determine if their infliction 
of “punishment” on a learner would affect this person’s ability to learn 
(Milgram’s so-called persuasion phase). Although his emerging pro-
cedure aimed to ensure that most ordinary people inflicted harm, the 
basic idea also started to look a little less like the Holocaust captured in 
the laboratory setting. Nonetheless, to determine if the procedure was 
indeed capable of generating the results he desired, Milgram tasked his 
students at Yale with running the first series of Obedience study pilots.
By late November 1960, the class was ready to run variations on both 
the participant among a “group” condition and participant “alone” (con-
trol) condition. Throughout the student-run pilots, participants could 
see the “shocked” learner through a translucent screen. The “group” 
experiment confirmed Milgram’s prediction that some people would fol-
low along with the crowd. It was the results from the “alone” (control) 
condition, however, that caught Milgram by complete surprise: About 
60% of the participants willingly administered the most intense shocks 
when an actor dressed as an experimenter instructed them to do so.
During this first series of pilots, Milgram also observed an unexpected 
behavior: Some participants refused to look at the learner through the 
translucent screen, yet they continued to inflict every shock asked of them. 
Similarly, in subsequent variations, other participants attempted to antic-
ipate when exactly the learner was likely to react in pain to the “shocks,” 
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and then, they would try to neutralize these stressed verbal reactions by 
talking over the top of them.14 Milgram termed all such behavior “avoid-
ance,” whereby “the subject screens himself from the sensory conse-
quences of his actions.”15 In doing so, participants did “not permit the 
stimuli associated with the victim’s suffering to impinge on them […] In 
this way, the victim is psychologically eliminated as a source of discom-
fort.”16 Thus, for participants, avoidance seemed to make it psychologically 
easier for them to do as they were told and deliver more shocks. Avoidance 
behavior intrigued Milgram because it raised an interesting question: What 
would happen if, during future pilots, he substituted the translucent screen 
with the non-human technology of a solid wall? Would doing so make it 
even easier for participants to inflict every shock? Would introducing a par-
tition perhaps increase the completion rate above the first pilot’s 60% fig-
ure, thus edging Milgram ever closer to his preconceived goal “to create 
the strongest obedience situation”?17 Milgram intended to find out.
What becomes apparent is that during the invention of the Obedience 
studies, Milgram’s basic strategy to improve his emerging official baseline 
procedure was to retain those innovative ideas that helped “maximize 
obedience” and abandon those that didn’t. For example, he replaced his 
idea that participants physically assault the victim with one where they 
use a shock generator. And he dropped the pledge to obey in favor of 
an experiment where the infliction of harm was morally inverted into a 
social good. Finally, although before running the first pilots Milgram 
intended for the single-participant variation to serve as the control exper-
iment for what he thought would be the more coercive (and success-
ful) group variation, after running the first pilots, the single-participant 
experiment’s auspiciously high completion rate led him to make it the 
central concern of the entire experimental venture.
Milgram ended up terming his more effective manipulative techniques 
either strain resolving mechanisms or binding factors. Strain resolving 
mechanisms are techniques designed to reduce the tensions normally 
experienced by a person inflicting harm. Examples of strain resolving 
mechanisms include the emotionally distancing shock generator and 
the participants’ comforting belief that their infliction of harm would 
(apparently) contribute to a greater (scientific) good. Binding factors 
are powerful bonds that can entrap a person into doing something they 
might otherwise prefer not to do. Examples of binding factors include 
the experimenter’s $4.50 payment to participants (which likely promoted 
feelings of being contractually obligated to do as they were asked); the 
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experimenter’s coercive prods that it was “absolutely essential” partici-
pants “continue”; and the shock machine’s gradual escalation in shock 
intensity that drew many participants into “harming” an innocent per-
son. It seems the more strain resolving mechanisms and binding factors 
Milgram added to his emerging procedure, the cumulatively stronger his 
so-called “web of obligation” became.18
On completing the first pilots, Milgram did “not believe that the 
students could fully appreciate the significance of what they were view-
ing…”19 He knew, however, that the first pilots tested a variety of situ-
ational forces he suspected may have played some role in producing the 
Holocaust. In other words, what the students regarded as a fascinating 
spectacle, Milgram suspected, might provide insight into the perpetra-
tion of the Holocaust. It was probably then that Milgram sensed the 
enormous potential of his research idea.
More than half a year later, in late July and early August 1961, 
Milgram, in an attempt to iron out the kinks of his research idea,20 
completed a second and more professional series of pilot studies. In 
the final variation of these trials, Milgram ran the “Truly Remote Pilot 
study,” wherein having introduced a solid wall into the basic proce-
dure, participants could neither see nor hear the learner’s reactions to 
being “shocked.” Milgram’s hypothesis about the effect of a wall proved 
correct, because in this pilot “virtually all” participants inflicted every 
shock.21 The leap from a 60% completion rate in the student-run pilots 
to something approaching 100% in the Truly Remote Pilot saw Milgram 
achieve his preconceived goal of maximizing obedience.
So, as shown, before running both pilot series, Milgram relied exclu-
sively on his past experiences and intuitive feel of what strain resolving 
mechanisms and binding factors he imagined might aid his quest to 
maximize the emerging basic procedure’s completion rate. But during 
the pilots Milgram clearly relied on his skills of observation. For exam-
ple, Milgram’s suspicion (correct, as it turned out) that substituting the 
translucent screen with a wall might increase the emerging procedure’s 
completion rate beyond 60% was stimulated by the participants in the 
first pilot series who turned away from their victim but inflicted every 
shock. Thus, Milgram’s real-time observations of the pilots led him to 
a very powerful strain resolving idea—one that was clearly beyond his 
undeniably impressive powers of imagination.
After completing the second pilot series, the Truly Remote Pilot 
study’s maximized completion rate signaled to Milgram that he had 
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likely developed a basic procedure that, should he use it as his first offi-
cial baseline, nearly all participants would complete. That is, his lat-
est procedure was very likely to generate the high rate of obedience he 
had all along desired. Using Ritzer’s terminology, over time Milgram 
had gained so much “control” over his participants’ likely behavior that 
should he make his next trial the official baseline, he was able to roughly 
“predict” that it would obtain a high (“calculable”) completion rate. 
Thus, he had found the most “efficient” means of arriving at his pre-
conceived end.22 A new one best means to his end had emerged. And it 
was past history—Milgram’s intuitive feel, past experiences, and real-time 
observations of the pilot studies—that had, through a process of trial and 
error, gradually led him to the Truly Remote Pilot study’s new and more 
effective “rules and regulations.” If Milgram wanted to achieve his pre-
conceived goal in the first official trial, all his helpers—his research assis-
tants (Alan Elms and Taketo Murata), actors (John Williams and James 
McDonough), and participants—just needed to follow the latest and 
most effective “rules and regulations.”23
However, running an official baseline experiment that nearly every 
participant completed raised an unanticipated problem: Such a result 
would deprive Milgram of any way of identifying individual differ-
ences between them.24 Consequently, Milgram deemed it necessary to 
introduce a strain inducing force to the official baseline procedure—
an alteration that he anticipated would slightly increase the proportion 
of disobedient participants. With the intention of reducing (slightly) 
the basic procedure’s probable completion rate by increasing partici-
pant stress, Milgram decided that the first official baseline experiment 
would include some auditory perceptual feedback. That is, after the 
participant inflicted the 300- and 315-volt shocks, Milgram instructed 
the learner McDonough to kick the wall and then fall silent. In con-
trast to Milgram’s repeated approach across the pilots to reduce partic-
ipant tension (and increase their probability of inflicting every shock), 
the intention behind this procedural addition was obviously to increase 
slightly their stress levels. Having increased participants’ stress levels, 
he presumed a small proportion would refuse to complete the exper-
iment. Clearly, Milgram had gained so much “control” over his par-
ticipants’ likely reaction to being in the experiment that he was able 
to guess (“predictability”) that this latest procedural alteration would 
likely send his otherwise rising completion rate into a sudden (albeit 
sight) reverse.
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Indeed, on 7 August 1961, Milgram ran his first official baseline 
experiment, producing a 65% completion rate. Milgram was probably 
expecting a slightly higher completion rate considering he made only 
subtle changes (infrequent wall-banging) to the Truly Remote Pilot. 
Nevertheless, the still surprisingly high completion rate, which garnered 
much media attention, became his “best-known result” and thus had its 
intended effect.25 This was the rationally driven and somewhat circuitous 
learning process that guided Milgram during the invention of his “one 
best way” to preconceived goal achievement.
In an attempt to develop a theory capable of explaining this baseline 
result, Milgram then undertook twenty-two slight variations, the fifth of 
which he made his “New Baseline.” Unlike its predecessor, in the New 
Baseline, the learner’s intensifying verbal reactions to being “shocked” 
could be heard by the participant up until the 330-volt switch (thereaf-
ter becoming silent). The more disturbing (eye-catching) New Baseline 
(or cardiac condition) also obtained a surprisingly high 65% completion 
rate and went on to serve as the basic model for all subsequent variations. 
One of the most interesting of these many variations was, in my view, the 
Peer Administers Shock condition where the experimenter only required 
the participant to perform the subsidiary (although necessary) task of pos-
ing the word pair questions, while another participant (actually an actor) 
administered shocks for any incorrect answers. In comparison with the 
New Baseline, this variation ended in a much higher completion rate—
92.5% continued to perform their subsidiary role until the three consecu-
tive 450-volt “shocks” had been inflicted. Participants who completed this 
variation revealed in post-experimental interviews that they did not believe 
their involvement made them in any way responsible for the learner 
being shocked—they asserted that only the shock-inflicting peer was at 
fault (although, of course, if the participant refused to ask any questions, 
the peer would have been deprived of their rationale for “shocking” the 
learner). Interestingly, as the results of the other official variations demon-
strated, even when participants had to shock the learner themselves, those 
who completed the protocol were more inclined than those who refused 
to shift the blame to either the experimenter or learner.26
Another particularly interesting variation was the Relationship condition 
where the participant was earlier told to bring to the laboratory someone 
who was at least an acquaintance. One of this pair became the teacher, the 
other the learner. Once the learner was strapped into the shock chair and 
the teacher and experimenter left the learner’s room, Milgram appeared 
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and informed the learner that the experiment was actually trying to deter-
mine if their friend would obey commands to shock them. Then, Milgram 
trained the learner how to react to the “intensifying shocks” (so that their 
reactions were similar to those of the usual New Baseline learner). This 
incomparably unethical condition obtained a 15% completion rate.
Milgram also ran a New Baseline variation where all the participants 
were women and it too obtained a 65% completion rate. With both male 
and female participants, something selfish seemed to lie behind the indi-
vidual decision to fulfill their specialist role in the experiment, as the 
pseudonymous participant Elinor Rosenblum perhaps best illustrated. 
That is, after completing the experiment, Rosenblum met her actually 
unharmed learner and explained to him: “You’re an actor, boy. You’re 
marvelous! Oh, my God, what he [the experimenter]  did to me. I’m 
exhausted. I didn’t want to go on with it. You don’t know what I went 
through here.”27 Upon it being revealed that the experiment was a ruse, 
she interpreted this new reality to mean that she was in fact the only vic-
tim of the experiment. And since she was now the victim, Rosenblum felt 
the learner should be informed about her painful experience—one which 
it should not be forgotten ended in her deciding at some point to per-
haps electrocute an innocent person.
Milgram anticipated (incorrectly as Volume 1 shows) that his many 
variations would eventually isolate what caused most participants to com-
plete the New Baseline condition, and thus lead him to a comprehensive 
theory of obedience to authority. What Milgram overlooked, however, 
was not only the omnipotent strain resolving power of his shock gener-
ator, but also the formally rational and inherently bureaucratic organiza-
tional machine that unobtrusively lay behind it.
miLgram’s reLianCe on formaLLy rationaL teChniques  
of organization
In conjunction with the above learning process, Volume 1 also revealed 
how Milgram, again in the role of project manager, recruited his many 
specialist helpers. To achieve his preconceived goal and collect a full set 
of data, he required institutional and financial sponsors, along with the 
aid of several research assistants, actors, and technicians. All, it will be 
noted, agreed to become complicit in the unethical infliction of poten-
tially dangerous levels of stress on innocent people. Milgram obtained 
their consent much as the experimenter did with the participants: He 
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convinced them that despite any ethical reservations they might hold, 
in order to “conquer the disease” of “destructive obedience…”28 it 
was necessary they fulfill their specialist roles. That is, by contributing 
to the infliction of harm, they would help bring about a greater good. 
On top of morally inverting harm into a social good, Milgram further 
tempted all his helpers into performing their specialist roles by appealing 
to their sometimes different self-interested needs or desires: the provision 
of financial reimbursement, the prospect of organizational prestige, the 
offer of article co-authorship, and other material benefits. Eventually, a 
cognitive thread of personal benefit connected every link in the emerg-
ing Obedience studies’ organizational chain. Thus, as Milgram antici-
pated and then applied the most effective motivational formula for each 
of his helpers, the non-human technology of bureaucracy started to take 
shape. In turn, the division of labor inherent in this organizational sys-
tem inadvertently ensured that every functionary helper could, if they so 
chose, plead ignorance to, displace elsewhere (“pass the buck”), or dif-
fuse (dilute) responsibility for their contributions to a harmful outcome. 
As Milgram and his helpers made their fractional contributions to organ-
izational goal achievement, a physical disjuncture arose between individ-
ual roles and any negative effects. And this disjuncture could stimulate 
responsibility ambiguity among functionaries. Responsibility ambigu-
ity is, as outlined in Volume 1, a general state of confusion within and 
beyond the bureaucratic process over who is totally, mostly, partially, 
or not at all responsible for a injurious outcome.29 When the issue of 
personal responsibility becomes debatable, some functionaries may 
genuinely believe they are not responsible for the harmful end result. 
Responsibility ambiguity, however, can also encourage other function-
aries to sense opportunity amid the confusion: They realize they can 
continue contributing to and personally benefiting from harm infliction 
safe in the knowledge they can probably do so with impunity. In this 
case, the responsibility ambiguity across the bureaucratic process likely 
provided potent strain resolving conditions that made it possible, even 
attractive, for every link in the Obedience studies’ organizational chain 
to plead ignorance to, displace, or diffuse responsibility for their harmful 
contributions. Because Milgram and his helpers either genuinely didn’t 
feel responsible for their eventually harmful contributions or (more 
likely) realized that even if they did they at least probably didn’t appear 
so, individual levels of strain subsided, clearing the ethical way to remain 
involved in the personally beneficial study.
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At the end of the organizational chain, however, where voluntary par-
ticipants were burdened with the specialist task of (ostensibly) inflicting 
harm on the learner, Milgram’s first idea that they engage in a direct 
physical assault ensured for an undeniable connection between cause 
and effect. For the participants in such an experiment, the compart-
mentalization inherent in the division of labor could not protect them 
from knowing—in both concept and perceptual reality—about their 
harmful actions. For participants who might inflict this assault, respon-
sibility clarity, not ambiguity, awaited them. Achievement of Milgram’s 
preconceived goal therefore necessitated the inclusion of something 
sufficiently capable of separating cause from effect. The solution came 
when Milgram, as he frequently did, from the top-down of his (loosely) 
hierarchical organizational process (first link Milgram instructed second 
link experimenter to pressure the final link participant into harming the 
learner) introduced the emotionally distancing and inherently strain 
resolving “shock” machine (along with his subsequent idea to separate 
participants from the learner with a translucent screen, or even better, 
a solid wall). It is important to note that the idea to introduce a wall 
was, as just mentioned, actually initiated by bottom-up forces within 
the Obedience study’s wider organizational process: Some participants 
during the student-run pilots looked away from the person they were 
“harming.” Interestingly, on their own accord, these participants were 
effectively inventing and then applying their own strain resolving means 
of better ensuring they could do as they were told. Participants, how-
ever, were not the only low-ranking innovators: As Volume 1 shows, the 
experimenter quickly sensed what his boss Milgram likely desired and, 
in the hope of maximizing the completion rate, he (Williams) started 
inventing his own highly coercive binding prods.
Nonetheless, once Milgram introduced the combination of the strain 
resolving, non-human technologies of the shock machine and wall into 
the Truly Remote Pilot, the participant became physically and emo-
tionally disconnected from their victim, and suddenly, a strong dose 
of responsibility ambiguity became available to participants (a sud-
denly more ambiguous situation that would not have been possible in 
the absence of these non-human technologies). In fact, as I argued in 
Volume 1, no other combination of variables could stimulate respon-
sibility ambiguity like the shock generator when combined with the 
wall—they were the most powerful strain resolving elements in the entire 
experimental paradigm.30 And when participants, as they did during the 
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Truly Remote Pilot, could no longer hear, see, or feel the implications 
of their actions, their specialist contributions to the wider process now 
more closely resembled the unemotional, technocratic, seemingly inno-
cent, and somewhat banal contributions of all the other functionary 
helpers further up the organizational chain. The combination of these 
two strain resolving mechanisms effectively injected the indifference into 
Chester Barnard’s Zone of Indifference, which is where a functionary’s 
higher “orders for actions” are sufficiently inoffensive to the point that 
they become “unquestionably acceptable.”31 With responsibility ambi-
guity thereby available to every link in the chain—where all functionary 
helpers felt or appeared to be mere middle-men—it suddenly became 
much easier to persuade, tempt, and, if necessary, coerce “virtually” 
everybody involved into performing their specialist harm-contributing 
roles.
And as responsibility ambiguity structurally pulled every functionary 
into performing their specialist roles, simultaneously the coercive force of 
bureaucratic momentum—where to avoid criticism for not doing one’s 
job and/or to receive whatever personal benefits happened to be associ-
ated with goal achievement—structurally pushed all into following their 
“rules and regulations.” An excellent example of bureaucratic momen-
tum was initiated when, to sign up to partake in one of the Obedience 
research program’s many variations, prospective participants had to select 
from Milgram’s preconceived research schedule, one of the 78032 availa-
ble 60-minute slots. And when they arrived at the laboratory to fill their 
particular slot, participants were then—much like a car frame in Ford’s 
factory—moved briskly along Milgram’s data extraction assembly-line 
process. That is, within the tight one-hour timeframe, various members 
of Milgram’s team sequentially engaged in specialist tasks that, among 
others, included training participants, running the experiment, collect-
ing data, and undertaking debriefings. And much like on Ford’s assembly 
line, because time was limited—another unsuspecting person was due at 
the top of the hour—all helpers felt the push of the non-human technol-
ogy of Milgram’s participant-processing schedule to quickly fulfill their 
specialist roles. Participants, located at the last link in this organizational 
assembly line, were also pushed into performing their specialist task by 
the force of bureaucratic momentum, more specifically in the form of 
the experimenter’s seemingly unrelenting prods—“Please continue” 
and “It is absolutely essential that you continue.” On top of the partic-
ipant-processing schedule imposing greater “control” over all involved, 
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the schedule’s inherent characteristic of “calculability” also meant, some-
what like with Ford, the young psychologist was able to “predict” when 
data collection would likely end (correctly as it turned out, at the end of 
the 1962 spring term).33
As Milgram drove his organizational machine toward collecting a full 
set of data, any links in the organizational chain who may have experi-
enced second thoughts about continuing to make their eventually harm-
ful contributions likely found themselves trapped—both pushed and 
pulled—into fulfilling their specialist roles. This organizational machine 
rather effectively attempted to subvert all helpers’ basic humanity, their 
personal agency, in favor of Milgram’s preconceived and overarching pol-
icy objective: maximization of “obedience.” Thus, Milgram’s inadvert-
ent construction of and reliance on an inherently problem-solving and 
formally rational bureaucratic organization was, I believe, an essential 
structural contributor to his high baseline completion rate. More gener-
ally speaking, in my view, some admixture of Weberian formal rational-
ity, Ritzer’s McDonaldization, Luhmann’s sociological systems theory,34 
Russell and Gregory’s responsibility ambiguity, and Bandura’s moral dis-
engagement are all likely to lead one to a stronger comprehension of the 
undeniably complex Obedience studies (see Volume 1).
The key, it would seem, to Milgram’s “success” in achieving his pre-
conceived goal of maximizing obedience was that every functionary link’ 
contribution across and especially at the harm-infliction end of the chain 
felt (personally) or appeared (to others present) sufficiently banal and 
innocent, when in reality they were neither. In fact, as the Truly Remote 
Pilot best illustrated, the more pedestrian and colorless every helper’ 
piecemeal contributions felt or appeared, the greater all his helpers’ (and 
his own) violent capabilities became, and thus the higher the completion 
rate. To optimally maximize participation across the organizational chain, 
every functionary helper’ contributions needed to be, as was the case 
during the Truly Remote Pilot, reduced to the “mere” shuffling of paper 
or pressing of switches—an Arendtian-like banality of evil.
So at the end of this formally rational journey, what Milgram seems to 
have discovered was how best to socially engineer his preconceived goal 
from that of mere concept to disturbing reality. The Obedience studies 
are therefore a frightening “demonstration of power itself…”35—“the 
inexorable subordination of the less powerful by the powerful.” Edward 
E. Jones, it would seem, was right all along: The baseline condition was 
at best a “triumph of social engineering.”36 As a powerful person with all 
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the social, prestige, and financial capital of a fully funded Yale professor, 
Milgram’s preconceived desires were achieved by him imposing on the 
less powerful “a calculated restructuring of the informational and social 
field.” His organizational process proved more than capable of shunting, 
among most of those involved, all “moral factors…aside…”37
moving to a new miLgram-hoLoCaust Linkage
In my quest to develop a new and stronger Milgram-Holocaust linkage, 
the remainder of Volume 2 argues that certain Nazi project managers 
deployed similar Milgram-like formally rational techniques of discov-
ery and organization to reach their same preconceived goal of converting 
most ordinary people into willing inflictors of harm. As I will show, the 
project managers that came closest to overarching goal achievement 
were those that most rationally utilized bureaucratic organizational 
techniques and, after running numerous pilot studies, went on to dis-
cover and then attach to the last link in their organizational chains, the 
most remote non-human harm-inflicting technologies. And the physi-
cally and emotionally more remote these harm-inflicting technologies—
the less touching, seeing, and hearing experienced by those at the last 
of the perpetrator links in the wider organizational chain—the easier it 
became for the Nazi leadership to persuade, tempt, or, if needed, coerce 
their subordinates into exterminating other human beings. My justifi-
cation for undertaking this journey is, as Alex Alvarez notes about the 
Holocaust, although “We know the history…our understanding of the 
means by which participants overcame normative obstacles to genocide is 
lacking.”38
As the reader will discover, Volume 2 centers mostly on the evolution 
of the omnipotent strain resolving means of inflicting harm. In my view, 
when one pays close attention to the Nazi’s various and eventually pre-
ferred means of inflicting harm, the insights gained are, much like with 
Milgram’s own research, revelatory. This destructive and depressing jour-
ney of discovery demonstrates what I believe to be the most important 
Milgram-Holocaust linkage of all: formal rationality. I thus conclude 
that the means of inflicting harm at the last link of the Nazi’s inherently 
problem-solving malevolent bureaucratic process played a central role in 
quickly transforming many only moderately antisemitic Germans into 
willing inflictors of harm.
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In terms of what follows, Chapter 2 explains how the Nazi party rose 
to power and how their destructive ideology spread among the German 
masses. This chapter delineates the Nazi regime’s “calculated restruc-
turing of the informational and social field”—their promulgation of an 
“institutional justification” among ordinary and, for the most part, only 
moderately antisemitic Germans that eventually led to the widespread 
infliction of harm on Jews and others. Both just before and soon after 
the start of World War Two, Chapter 3 details the Nazi regime’s first 
forays into the killing of civilian populations. Then, during the Soviet 
invasion, Chapter 4 presents what, in my view, were the SS leadership’s 
most salient top-down strain resolving and binding forces used to encour-
age their ordinary and only moderately antisemitic underlings to par-
ticipate in the so-called Holocaust by bullets.39 Also in relation to the 
killing fields of the Soviet Union, Chapter 5 details what I suspect were 
the ordinary German’s most important bottom-up strain resolving and 
binding forces. With a particular focus on Operation Reinhard, Chapter 
6 explores the rise of what evolved into the large-scale industrial gassing 
programs in the East. Chapter 7, then, delves into the Nazi regime’s final 
solution to the Jewish Question: the rise and domination of Auschwitz-
Birkenau. Chapter 8 clarifies what the Nazis meant by what I show 
was, before and during World War Two, their ongoing pursuit for a 
“humane” means of exterminating the Jews and other so-called sub-hu-
mans. The concluding chapter provides a brief summary of my thesis 
along with some thoughts on its potentially wider applicability beyond 
the Holocaust.
In the following chapters, I regularly make behavioral comparisons 
between those involved in the Obedience studies and those who perpe-
trated the Holocaust. This seems incredibly unfair considering the for-
mer was a fake experiment and the latter involved the murder of millions 
of innocent people. It is important to note that although I think these 
analogies demonstrate a similarity in kind, I also believe they differ enor-
mously in terms of degree.40 Some readers may deem these comparisons 
completely odious, and if so, they will be on firm ground: The industri-
alized aims of the Holocaust remain unprecedented in human history. 
However, this does not mean that analogies cannot be drawn between 
Milgram’s project and the Nazis’ “Final Solution.” As the Welsh writer 
Dannie Abse put it when reflecting on the Obedience studies, “in order 
to demonstrate that subjects may behave like so many Eichmanns the 
experimenter had to act the part, to some extent, of a Himmler.”41
18  N. RUSSELL
notes
 1.  See, for example, Bankier (1992, pp. 72, 84), Bauer (2001, p. 31), 
Browning (1998, p. 200), Heim (2000, p. 320), Johnson and Reuband 
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277), Merkl (1975), and Mommsen (1986, pp. 98, 116).
 2.  Milgram (1974, p. 16).
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 4.  See Bauman (1989), Blass (1993, 1998), Browning (1992, 1998), 
Hilberg (1980), Kelman and Hamilton (1989), Langerbein (2004), 
Miller (1986), Russell and Gregory (2005), and Sabini and Silver (1982).
 5.  Miller (2004, p. 194).
 6.  Miller (2004, p. 196).
 7.  Ritzer (2015, p. 30).
 8.  Gerth and Mills (1974, pp. 196–204) and Russell (2017).
 9.  Ritzer (1996).
 10.  Ritzer (2015, p. 37).
 11.  Ritzer (2015, p. 120).
 12.  Ritzer (2015, p. 128) and Russell (2017).
 13.  Quoted in Russell (2009, pp. 64–65).
 14.  SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2301.
 15.  Milgram (1974, p. 158).
 16.  Milgram (1974, p. 58).
 17.  SMP, Box 46, Folder 165.
 18.  Quoted in Russell and Gregory (2011, p. 508).
 19.  Quoted in Blass (2004, p. 68).
 20.  Blass (2004, p. 75).
 21.  Milgram (1965, p. 61).
 22.  Russell (2017).
 23.  Russell (2017).
 24.  Milgram (1965, p. 61).
 25.  Miller (1986, p. 9).
 26.  Milgram (1974, p. 203).
 27.  Milgram (1974, pp. 82–83).
 28.  SMP, Box 62, Folder 126.
 29.  Russell and Gregory (2015, p. 136).
 30.  So although the efficacious effect of strain resolving mechanisms and 
binding factors appears to have been cumulative (the more the Milgram 
added, the higher the completion rate), it is important to note that 
some of these individual forces were far more powerful than others. And 
although it was not a sufficient cause of the baseline result, as illustrated 
in Volume 1, none was singularly more powerful than the shock genera-
tor when used in conjunction with a wall.
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 31.  Barnard (1958, pp. 168–169).
 32.  Perry (2012, p. 1).
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 35.  Stam et al. (1998, p. 173).
 36.  Quoted in Parker (2000, p. 112).
 37.  Milgram (1974, p. 7).
 38.  Alvarez (1997, p. 149).
 39.  Desbois (2008).
 40.  Any reader unsettled by my comparisons should keep in mind that, as 
Volume 1 shows, although Milgram’s experiments were a ruse, for par-
ticipants there was a real-time possibility that the shocks were real (the 
experimenter could have been, as some participants noted, a rogue mad 
scientist pursuing an actually harmful experiment). And had the exper-
iments been real, the learner could have been critically injured. Also, 
although early on at least one participant later informed Milgram that his 
experiments placed the lives of participants with heart problems in great 
danger (implying thereafter medical screening should be introduced), 
Milgram chose to ignore this warning. It should be remembered that this 
negligence really could have cost somebody their life.
 41.  Abse (1973, p. 29).
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This chapter delineates the Nazi regime’s construction and promulgation 
of an ideology that saw many ordinary and mildly antisemitic Germans 
condone or feel indifferent about the infliction of harm on Jews and 
other “sub-humans.” Much like the Obedience study’s persuasion 
phase (see Volume 1), I argue that, mostly at the hands of the Nazi 
regime, Germany’s “informational and social field” underwent a “calcu-
lated restructuring,”1 the consequence of which saw the harming of oth-
ers morally inverted into a social good.
the origins of nazi ideoLogy and their rise to Power
In the sixteenth century, the German Protestant reformer Martin Luther 
reflected on how Christians in Europe should deal with the small Jewish 
communities living in their midst. After vilifying the “rejected race of 
Jews” as liars and blasphemes, he recommended a “merciful severity”: 
burn down their synagogues, destroy their homes, appropriate their val-
uables, and stamp out their proselytizing—so “we may all be free of this 
insufferable devilish burden – the Jews.”2 To this point, terrifying vio-
lence of the sort Luther recommended had not been a major threat to 
the survival of European Jews. Attacks on Jews (pogroms) were more 
typically fueled by emotion and were, by nature, too disorganized to sys-
tematically wipe out entire and multiple Jewish communities.
Indeed, from the seventeenth century onward, the Enlightenment—
the spread of humanist rationalism and secularism across Western 
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The Nazi Regime—Ideology, Ascendancy, 
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Europe—coincided with a sharp decline in pogrom violence.3 Beginning 
in the late eighteenth century, and especially throughout the nineteenth 
century, the most progressive European nations including Germany, 
Holland, Denmark, France, and Great Britain all granted their Jewish 
communities equal rights. Many Jewish communities thrived socially, 
culturally, and economically. But many Christians also continued to har-
bor animosity toward their Jewish neighbors. The German composer 
Richard Wagner said in 1881:
I hold the Jewish race to be the born enemy of pure humanity and 
everything noble in it. It is certain that it is running us Germans into the 
ground, and I am perhaps the last German who knows how to hold him-
self upright in the face of Judaism, which already rules everything.4
In 1899, Englishman Stewart Chamberlain expressed similar views in his 
best seller The Foundations of the 19th Century, which had run into its 
tenth edition by the early twentieth century.5
A few decades earlier in 1859, Charles Darwin published his semi-
nal work On the Origin of Species. Darwin’s book had a profound effect 
on his cousin Francis Galton, who applied the basic tenets of Darwin’s 
new theory to human beings. Galton’s efforts led to a new field of aca-
demic inquiry—eugenics, defined by the twentieth-century Harvard 
biologist Charles B. Davenport as, “the science of the improvement of 
the human race by better breeding.”6 Eugenics, as a field of study, split 
into two main schools: positive and negative. Positive eugenics calls for 
adding so-called desirable human characteristics to what then becomes 
a stronger gene pool. For example, a government might allow certain 
immigrants to enter their country because they believe them to have cer-
tain desirable genetic characteristics. Negative eugenics, however, aims 
to remove “undesirable” genetic characteristics from the gene pool, 
for example by sterilizing citizens with apparent genetic predispositions 
toward, say, alcoholism or drug addiction. Influential supporters of neg-
ative eugenics included prominent German scholars like Ernst Haeckel 
who in the early twentieth century argued in favor of the ancient Spartan 
strategy of eliminating any weak or sickly babies from their communi-
ties in order to strengthen the wider gene pool.7 Around the same time, 
Karl Pearson, an early twentieth-century English mathematician, argued 
that nations should be “kept up to a high pitch of external efficiency by 
contest, chiefly by way of war with inferior races, and with equal races 
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by the struggle for trade routes and the sources of raw materials and 
food supply.”8 It was easy for those from the upper class like Pearson 
to espouse such destructive beliefs because when nations went to war—
as they did during World War One (1914–1918)—their lives were rarely 
put in harm’s way. It was the proverbial working-class “cannon fod-
der,” structurally excluded from the distant safety of the officer ranks, 
who almost exclusively paid the price for the decisions by elites to go 
to war and expend, as it turned out, millions of genetically healthy lives 
in the trenches. This class bias extended to Germany’s home front. For 
example, during the British Naval blockade (1915–1919), more than 
400,000 mostly working-class German civilians starved to death.9 Such 
class iniquities before and leading up to Germany’s eventual World War 
One defeat ensured the Reich’s brief experiment with democratic gov-
ernance—the ill-fated Weimar Republic (1919–1932)—was marred by 
political instability frequently fueled by lower-class demands for a fairer 
and more egalitarian German society.10
Soon after the Weimar Republic came to power, in 1920 the publi-
cation of Binding and Hoche’s The Destruction of Life Unworthy of 
Life saw the popularity of negative eugenics grow.11 This book claimed 
that during World War One, as the strongest Germans were dying 
in droves on the frontlines, the lives of the apparently weakest genetic 
stock (those ineligible for military service) were safely preserved back 
in Germany. This preservation of the inferior over the superior was, 
they argued, weakening Germany’s wider gene pool. A year later, Baur, 
Fischer, and Lenz published what became the leading German text on 
negative eugenics, Outline of Human Genetics and Racial Hygiene.12 
Those convinced by this increasingly popular literature started appeal-
ing to the country’s political elite. For example, in 1923 the director of 
a Saxony health institute tried (unsuccessfully) to convince a minister in 
the Weimar government that, “what we radical hygienists promote is not 
at all new or unheard of. In a cultured nation of the first order, in the 
United States of America, that which we strive toward was introduced 
and tested long ago.”13 Indeed, Germany trailed behind the USA, the 
world’s leader in negative eugenics, which, first in Indiana in 1907, and 
then in half of all the states by the 1930s,14 became “the first country to 
pass laws calling for compulsory sterilization in the name of racial purifica-
tion” [italics original].15 Having said this, the sterilization of Americans 
was, relative to the country’s population, a seldom applied policy.16 
Elsewhere, Switzerland and several Scandinavian countries introduced 
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laws in the 1920s aimed at the sterilization of certain institutionalized 
peoples.17 Although across the early twentieth century the German med-
ical profession tended to favor the far less radical field of positive eugen-
ics, the tide was starting to change. For example, in 1932, just before 
the Nazi Party took power, the Weimar government drafted a voluntary 
sterilization law aimed at those with disabilities.18 The law introduced on 
1 January 1934 prompted Joseph S. DeJarnette, the superintendent of a 
hospital in Virginia, to claim in frustration, “The Germans are beating us 
at our own game.”19
For the wider German public, awareness of negative eugenics came 
through sources more mainstream than medical treatises, including Adolf 
Hitler’s 1925 autobiography, Mein Kampf (My Battle or My Struggle).20 
Hitler, a decorated World War One veteran and disgruntled leader of the 
right-wing Nazi Party, wrote this book while serving a prison sentence 
for a failed attempt in 1923 to overthrow the Weimar government. As 
early as 1920, the Nazi Party capitalized on the widespread postwar class 
tensions by advocating for “the uniting of all Germans within the one 
greater Germany…” They added, however, one caveat: Only “persons 
of German blood” could be nationals.21 Hitler was basically advocating 
in favor of a race-based welfare state where greater class equality would 
be offered to all genetically healthy true-blooded Germans.22 All out-
siders, however, were to be excluded from receiving any Nazi welfare— 
particularly Germany’s Jews, a group Hitler frequently dehumanized 
using terms like “bacilli,” “spongers,” “parasites,” “poisonous mush-
rooms,” and “rats…”23 As Götz Aly notes, here “Nazi ideology con-
ceived of racial conflict as an antidote to class conflict”—a predictably 
popular political strategy because it propagated “two age-old dreams of 
the German people: national and class unity.”24
Then again, not everybody across early twentieth-century Germany felt 
as Hitler and the Nazi Party did toward the Jews. For example, Jewish 
political candidates during Germany’s 1912 election won one-seventh of 
the seats in the Reichstag. This was an impressive feat since Germany’s 
Jews made up only 1% of the national population. Success at the polls saw 
some in conservative political parties bitterly dub this election the “Jewish 
elections.”25 Putting the pockets of dissent aside, this electoral success 
clearly indicates that many non-Jewish Germans must have felt quite posi-
tively toward their Jewish political representatives.
Although some believe the origins of Hitler’s intense antisemitism 
can be traced back to his more formative years,26 others suspect it was 
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largely stimulated by his post-1919 belief that Germany’s Jews were 
to blame for the Reich’s loss of World War One, along with the great 
loss of German lives and land this defeat entailed.27 Hitler believed 
Germany had not been defeated militarily (which in fact it had),28 but 
instead lost the war and, as part of the Treaty of Versailles, almost one-
eighth of its territory because Jewish leaders had treasonously stabbed 
their own nation in the back by submitting to the Allies. Germany’s Jews 
did so, according to Hitler, with the sole intention of advancing their 
own social and economic position, pursuits that only highlighted their 
moral inferiority. Much like Wagner, Hitler also believed there existed 
a cunning group of international Jewish financiers whose machinations 
involved aspirations of worldwide economic domination. His developing 
ideology amalgamated ideas from Baur, Fischer, and Lenz on negative 
eugenics with his own on German nationalism.29 This theoretical synthe-
sis cemented the structural foundations of what would become Nazism, 
which according to Müller-Hill:
claimed that there is a biological basis for the diversity of Mankind. What 
makes a Jew a Jew, a Gypsy a Gypsy, an asocial individual asocial, and the 
mentally abnormal mentally abnormal is in their blood, that is to say in 
their genes. All…are inferior. There can be no question of equal rights for 
inferior and superior individuals, so, as it is possible that inferior individuals 
breed more quickly than the superior, the inferior must be isolated, steri-
lized, rejected, and removed, a euphemism for killed. If we do not do this, 
we make ourselves responsible for the ruin of our culture.30
Clearly, Nazi ideology was not singularly concerned with Jews— 
something would also have to be done about other threatening and 
“inferior” groups. Having said that, there is no doubt Hitler had an 
incomparable and singular hatred of Jews, a group he believed posed a 
great moral and genetic threat to the Western world. In fact, not long 
after the formation of the Nazi Party, Hitler threatened:
As soon as I have power [he said in 1922] I shall have gallows erected, 
for example in Munich in the Marienplatz. Jews will be hanged one after 
another and they will stay hanging until they stink … then the next group 
will follow … until the last Jew in Munich is exterminated. Exactly the 
same procedure will be followed in other cities until Germany is cleansed 
of the last Jew.31
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Whether rich or poor, powerful or powerless, inferior or cunning, cap-
italist or communist, German or otherwise, if they were Jews then they 
were to blame. As Browning put it, for Hitler “the ‘Jewish question’ was 
the key to all other problems and hence the ultimate problem.”32 Much 
of the disdain traced back to plan old jealousy. That is, because within 
Jewish culture there has long been a deeply rooted dedication to studi-
ous habits and the pursuit of higher learning, in a modern meritocracy 
like Germany where opportunity (relatively speaking) abound, German 
Jews punched well above their weight. In terms of conventional meas-
ures of success, across the first third of the twentieth century, German 
Jews were disproportionately represented in the legal and medical pro-
fessions. But perhaps most impressively, although German Jews only 
made up 1% of the population, between 1905 and 1937 nearly 37% of 
all German Nobel Laureates had Jewish ancestry.33 Particularly among 
the many disaffected non-Jewish Germans who, like Hitler, failed to 
measure up, the scapegoat of blaming a visibly successful minority for all 
their own personal failures proved all too tempting. Importantly, Hitler’s 
views conflicted with Christianity’s traditional solution to the apparent 
threat of Judaism: religious conversion and assimilation. As far as Hitler 
was concerned, converting Jews into Christians would not eliminate the 
risk they posed to the “superior” Germanic bloodline. Assimilation, for 
Hitler, was tantamount to collective Germanic suicide.
On the other side of Nazi ideology’s application of negative eugen-
ics lay Lebensraum, the imperial quest to obtain more land or “liv-
ing space…”34 This notion drew on the tenets of positive eugenics. 
According to Hitler, if the “Germanic race” were indeed to thrive, 
then the ten million or so “high grade”35 ethnic Germans living abroad 
in Eastern Europe needed to be repatriated. Together, Germany and 
Germans from near and far would become stronger. To accommodate 
this influx, however, Germany (apparently) required more land. It was 
this need for more living space that the Nazi regime used to bolster the 
necessity of going to war.36 As far as Hitler was concerned, this land 
would best come from beyond the Reich’s eastern national border—
Poland and the Soviet interior. Annexing other nations’ sovereign lands 
and unavoidably decimating large numbers of the native populations 
of those countries hardly bothered Hitler who saw Lebensraum as just 
another chapter in Western European colonialism.37 Western nations like 
France, Holland, Britain, Italy, and indeed nineteenth-century Germany 
had all colonized other lands—why shouldn’t modern Germany do so 
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too. Hitler himself referenced Britain’s empire when he said, “The 
Russian space is our India.”38 With a tip of his hat to formal rationality, 
why bother inefficiently traveling halfway across the world when a colo-
nial empire so conveniently lay next door? While colonization awaited 
victory in war, removal of Germany’s Jews offered a more immediate 
solution to freeing up living space in Germany itself. If the Nazis ever 
came to power, removing Germany’s Jews would be a priority.
From 1924 onward, the popularity of the Nazi Party increased, par-
ticularly among young, unemployed working-class men who, for rea-
sons just mentioned, reveled in Hitler’s uncouth tirades against the Jews. 
Appealing only to this demographic, however, was no road to polit-
ical power. The Nazi Party won only 12 of 608 electoral seats in the 
1928 election.39 For subsequent elections, most obviously from 1930 
onward,40 the Party adopted a new strategy. It tailored its nationalistic 
message to appeal to all Germans, only emphasizing their hatred of the 
Jews in the presence of antisemitic audiences. Increasingly, a new, subtle, 
seemingly less radical, and more presidential Hitler emerged.41 As a fear-
less crusader in pursuit of righting widely shared nationalistic wrongs—
like the unpopular Treaty of Versailles—a new Hitler spoke largely of 
“honor, struggle, glory, and morality.”42 The Nazi Party’s new and more 
appealing nationalistic campaign strategy also focused on “[e]motion-
ally powerful but programmatically vague slogans such as ‘Freedom and 
Bread!’ and ‘Order at Home and Expansion Abroad…’”43 During his 
now broadly alluring feel-good speeches, Hitler reinforced this politi-
cal ambiguity, advocating in favor of “Volk and fatherland … the eternal 
foundation of our morality and our faith” along with “the preservation 
of our Volk.”44 While other politicians talked of tax reform and eco-
nomic policy, Hitler’s affective, yet pragmatically empty, orations saw his 
popularity among many German patriots soar. Much has been made of 
Hitler’s spellbinding hypnotic charisma. Although he was undoubtedly a 
gifted public speaker, the success behind his rising appeal was less myste-
rious. In terms of his ability to bring many within the crowd to his side, 
like the consummate salesperson, Hitler:
would begin by acquainting himself with his audience and studying 
their reactions to several topics. When he had identified their desires, he 
would explain confidently why only his Nazi movement could fulfill them. 
Listeners would say to themselves, ‘Of course, that’s just what I have 
always believed.’45
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The Nazi Party’s strategic move away from mere Jew-baiting and toward 
their more upbeat formula of populist patriotism may have been timely 
because by the late 1920s one indicator at least suggests that for the first 
time since the defeat of 1918, German nationalism was undergoing a 
revival. More specifically, by the late 1920s German war memorials had 
changed from typically conveying grief over the enormous loss of (work-
ing-class) lives to instead emphasizing Germany’s World War One battle 
victories, glorifying individual acts of bravery, and promoting awareness 
of wars that advanced German unification.46 Those critical of the jingo-
istic folly of this shift were, as they usually are, criticized and then dis-
missed as unpatriotic.47 Perhaps the Weimar Republic supported this 
stylistic change in war commemorations because, as the start of World 
War One showed, when class relations were tense nothing united all 
Germans quite like militant Prussian nationalism.48 Obviously, the Nazi 
Party also sensed this cultural shift, but unlike other political parties, 
none were led by a fiercely passionate war veteran with oratorical skills 
so perfectly suited to capitalizing on a rising wave of nationalistic fer-
vor. Then, in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash, Hitler moved 
on to politically exploiting the miseries of the Great Depression: Weimar 
democracy, he argued, was clearly failing poor Germans; however, his 
Nazi welfare state promised to provide for all [healthy Aryan] citizens. 
During the 1930 election, rising nationalism and the Great Depression 
saw the Nazis experience a phenomenal ninefold improvement at the bal-
lot box. However, even this success only translated into 107 parliamen-
tary seats, leaving the Nazis a minority political party.49
As the Nazi Party’s star rose, Hitler asked fellow World War One vet-
eran Ernst Röhm in 1930 to increase the dwindling ranks of the Nazi SA 
(the Nazi Party’s paramilitary arm—the so-called Stormtroopers). The 
SA formed in 1921 and consisted mostly of disaffected working-class war 
veterans. Hitler promised that for his services, if the Nazi regime came 
to power, Röhm would be granted the authority to pursue a revolution 
against wealthy Jews. This deal made sense to Hitler because if the Nazis 
ever governed Germany, he intended to fund his Aryan welfare state by 
exploiting the Jews and other “subhumans…”50
Meanwhile, the Nazis continued to pursue their winning politi-
cal strategy of appealing to the widest possible audience.51 Finally, the 
election of 1932 bore real fruit: The Nazi Party won 230 parliamen-
tary seats or 37.3% of the national vote.52 The political might that came 
with obtaining just over a third of the national vote was accentuated by 
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the emergence of cracks within the left-wing parties, whose otherwise 
greater collective power was diminished due to internal squabbling.53 
The Nazi Party, therefore, emerged from the election as the single largest 
party in the Reichstag.
President Paul von Hindenburg, however, refused to support 
Hitler’s bid for the chancellor’s seat, but the Reichstag rejected von 
Hindenburg’s preferred candidate, Franz von Papen, the leader of the 
conservative Catholic Center Party. New elections were set for the end 
of the year, the result of which saw support for the Nazi Party slip to 
around 33%. Paul von Hindenburg again overlooked Hitler as chancel-
lor, this time favoring Kurt von Schleicher, but he too proved unpopular 
with the Reichstag. After some political wrangling, von Papen suggested 
a compromise: make Hitler chancellor but only on the condition that 
the Nazi Party obtain just two of the remaining eleven cabinet seats. 
Furthermore, Röhm was to be estranged from the Nazi Party, and Hitler 
would cede to the dictates of those who would become his new friends—
conservatives in big business. Von Papen added that should Hitler 
fail to abide by these conditions, von Hindenburg could instruct the 
Wehrmacht (the Germany army) to remove the entire Nazi Party.54 Von 
Papen’s underlying intention, it transpires, was to provide Hitler with 
the image of political power while his fellow members of the Catholic 
Center Party dominated the cabinet, structurally retaining all power for 
themselves (and their arch-conservative party colleagues). With the Nazi 
Party’s recent slip in the polls, a more desperate Hitler accepted von 
Papen’s conditions, thus obtaining the coveted chancellor’s seat. This 
is not, of course, how the sanctimonious Hitler publicly presented his 
accent—morally transcending politicians’ usual desperation for power, 
his acceptance of the chancellorship had apparently “been the most diffi-
cult decision of my life.”55 With Vice Chancellor von Papen by his side, 
these conditions, at least in the short term, largely moderated Hitler’s 
more covert political agenda: purging Germany’s Jews, rampant military 
conquest, and pan-European Lebensraum.56 Indeed, many around this 
point in time thought that Hitler—once renowned for his antisemitic 
tirades—had mellowed.57
Then in February 1933, the Reichstag was struck by arson—per-
haps a Nazi orchestration58—and subsequent events took an even more 
favorable turn in Hitler’s direction. The Nazi Party blamed the fire on 
the revolutionary communists, a political group that just so happened 
to be in direct competition with the Nazis because they too promised 
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to address Germany’s long-standing class inequalities. Many Germans, 
Hitler among them, believed something had to be done to restore polit-
ical stability and relieve the state from the threat of communist revolu-
tion. Whatever Hitler and the cabinet decided to do, von Hindenburg, 
the Wehrmacht, and Hitler’s new friends in big business were unlikely to 
interfere—they too despised the communists. On 24 March 1933, the 
increasingly senile von Hindenburg supported the cabinet’s introduc-
tion of the Enabling Act, an emergency law designed to protect the state 
against future communist threats. This act enabled the new chancellor to 
rule by decree for four years, thus setting the legal foundations of what 
would become a Nazi dictatorship.59 Having helped draft the decree, 
von Papen was not concerned by the Enabling Act’s long-term impli-
cations, probably because his party dominated the all-powerful cabinet. 
However, as Saul Friedländer notes, although the Enabling Act required 
that all new legislative and executive decisions be discussed with the cabi-
net, real power fell increasingly to Hitler alone.60 For so-called protective 
reasons, Hitler’s henchmen began rounding up, detaining, and occasion-
ally killing suspected communists in hastily constructed concentration 
camps. The mistreatment of these “terrorists” was widely supported61—
only those within communist circles seemed concerned.
Not everything, however, went the Nazi’s way. Although across the 
early 1930s Röhm successfully increased the SA membership to around 
four million,62 because von Papen pushed Hitler to estrange Röhm, the 
SA leader soon discovered he had been denied his revolution against 
rich Jews. An impatient Röhm and his SA leadership started initiating 
their own actions—the so-called second revolution—in the form of ran-
dom acts of violence against wealthy Jews.63 These attacks, and Röhm’s 
unwillingness to stop them, signaled to others that Hitler perhaps lacked 
control over factions within his own party. Before long, the increasingly 
rogue SA started to pose a threat to Hitler’s tenuous hold on the chan-
cellor’s seat. Hitler, who believed the SA were acting like “fools and 
destroying everything…”64, needed to demonstrate to his new, yet wary, 
conservative friends that he retained total control. But to achieve this, 
Hitler also needed to show at least some support for the disgruntled 
Röhm. Hitler’s fine balancing to resolve this problem involved his sup-
port for an SA-led nationwide boycott of Jewish businesses. The plan for 
this initiative was that the SA rank and file would inform prospective cus-
tomers that the stores they were about to enter were owned by rich Jews. 
This information, the SA assumed, would discourage patronage and, 
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starved of income, these businesses would be forced to close. Although 
Hitler’s conservative coalition partners were not as radically opposed 
as he was to the Jews, they were still antisemitic.65 Thus, Hitler antici-
pated that von Papen and his powerful friends were unlikely to oppose 
a nationwide boycott of Jewish businesses, an initiative that might also 
placate the discontented Röhm.
Nazi Party radical Julius Streicher organized the boycott but failed to 
anticipate or did not care about its broader economic ramifications. The 
boycott, which began on 1 April 1933, precipitated a sudden slide in the 
German stock exchange. Most of the targeted businesses were financed 
by German banks, businesses that were themselves financed by national 
and international investors. Furthermore, because Germany’s Jews only 
made up 1% of the national population, most of those working within 
these Jewish-owned businesses were non-Jews. As Jewish owners suf-
fered, so too would their far more numerous employees. On the day of 
the boycotts, the public—to the surprise of the Nazi Party—reacted with 
a general indifference and occasionally obstinacy to the SA’s informa-
tion campaign.66 Not only did the boycott damage Germany financially, 
it had little impact on its target. In frustration, some zealous SA mem-
bers responded violently to public obstinacy, but even these actions only 
served to harden the public’s resolve. As the boycott began to have an 
effect on the broader economic structures, the Nazis’ conservative allies 
became concerned—those people Hitler could least afford to rile. All 
plans for future initiatives were immediately and permanently shelved.67 
For the Nazi regime, the boycott was a dismal and embarrassing failure.
This political blunder confirmed to Hitler that the most effective and 
realistic solution to “the Jewish question” lay not in violence, but in the 
gradual introduction and accumulation of antisemitic laws that, with 
time, would make daily life for Germany’s Jews increasingly unbearable. 
If Jews encountered legally enforced discrimination at every turn, they 
might abandon all they owned and move elsewhere. A legal solution 
would sufficiently placate Hitler’s most antisemitic supporters because it 
showed at least something was being done to remove Germany’s Jews. 
And because mass Jewish emigration would open up new and lucrative 
business and employment opportunities, the Nazis’ powerful conserv-
ative allies and many other Aryan welfare beneficiaries were unlikely to 
express any reservations.
On 7 April 1933, the Nazi Party introduced the Re-establishment of 
the Career Civil Service Act. This act determined that all German civil 
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servants with at least one Jewish grandparent were to be dismissed.68 
However, because von Hindenburg demanded the new law included 
exemptions for all Jews who had participated in or had family mem-
bers killed during World War One, many Jewish civil servants managed 
to retain their government posts. Once again, Nazi attempts to under-
mine Germany’s Jews had failed.69 Moreover, factions within the SA 
expressed their dissatisfaction with what seemed to them to be Hitler’s 
soft legal solution. The SA continued to engage in sporadic acts of 
violence against Jews,70 and this hooliganism generated great unease 
among both Hitler’s powerful conservative allies and the general pub-
lic. And because these assaults typically traced back to Hitler’s own 
inner ranks, the Führer decided to purge the more uncontrollable ele-
ments of the SA’s leadership. In June 1934, inner-circle Nazis includ-
ing Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and SS-Reichsführer Heinrich 
Himmler organized to have Röhm and other rogue SA leaders assassi-
nated during what has become known as the Night of the Long Knives. 
These assassinations—“the Third Reich’s first mass murder”71—were in 
part designed to send a stern law-and-order message to the remaining SA 
rank and file.72 But this political purge extended into a broader power 
grab: Some of the targets included von Papen’s own colleagues. The bra-
zen plan worked. Soon afterward von Hindenburg died, Hitler pushed 
a nervous von Papen out of national politics. If the public was startled 
by these criminal acts of violence, leading political theorist and jurist(!) 
Carl Schmitt helped calm their nerves by arguing that actually might-
makes-right: “The Führer’s deed was…not subordinate to justice, but 
rather it is itself supreme justice.”73 Schmitt, it transpires, was far from 
the only prominent academic figure to provide reckless early support for 
Hitler and his clearly criminal regime—philosopher Martin Heidegger 
also helped the Party attain a level of high-society respectability.74 After 
Hitler himself successfully spun the murders in the media into an unfor-
tunate yet morally necessary act,75 he then merged the offices of chan-
cellor and president, assuming the new dual position himself. From this 
point, the Nazi Party held total dictatorial control of Germany. Claudia 
Koonz captures both the speed and enormity of Hitler’s achievements:
In just over a year, he had mobilized ethnic populism to replace a constitu-
tional democracy with a regime that could murder in the name of moral-
ity—and make its justification credible in the eyes of most Germans.76
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With the removal of Röhm and other obstacles, Hitler was able to lay 
the foundations of what was at the time a politically more acceptable, 
legal-based solution to his Party’s “Jewish question”—forced emigration. 
In September 1935, Hitler introduced the Nuremberg Laws, which, 
among other things, attempted to both define the Jews and prohibit 
their marriage to, and extramarital relations with, non-Jewish Germans.77 
According to this hastily introduced law, a Jewish person was anyone 
with three or four Jewish grandparents.78 And because the Nazis had 
no definitive biological marker of Jewishness, the defining measure of a 
Jewish grandparent ended up being determined by baptismal records.79 
Although clearly aimed mostly at the Jews, this law also applied to 
Germany’s Gypsies.80
A year later, Göring was appointed to head the Four Year Plan (a national 
strategy of rearmament and self-sufficiency), a time frame that hinted at 
when Hitler intended to go to war in the pursuit of Lebensraum.81 The 
massive military preparations, in conjunction with the construction of 
about 1000 kilometers of Autobahn highway and numerous major public 
building projects in Berlin and Nuremberg, saw the rate of unemployment 
decrease.82 The ensuing economic recovery—financed by what Aly describes 
as “fiscally irresponsible” decisions to increase the national debt83—boosted 
the German public’s confidence in their increasingly beloved Führer. As one 
passionate supporter, Helga Schmidt said, Hitler:
got rid of unemployment. Just about everybody had a job. He helped 
poor families with lots of children [who received] preferential coupons 
for foodstuffs, for clothing. They could buy them for less. Security for 
the population was restored. Crime disappeared completely. And, finally, 
the cultural amenities [also contributed to Hitler’s popularity], like the 
Strength through Joy Program, inexpensive visits to the theater, and things 
contributing to the population’s cultural life in general. That won a lot of 
support for him.84
In fact, from November 1933 the Nazi’s Strength through Joy Program 
offered “deserving German workers” something never previously heard 
of before: cheap holidays abroad.85 Also new was that the Nazis made 
May Day, a springtime celebration honoring workers, a paid holiday.86 
Middle- and upper-class Germans also did well: Between 1937 and 
1939, the ownership of tens of thousands of cut-price Jewish businesses 
was transferred into the hands of no doubt delighted Aryans87—some 
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of whom did not even belong to the Nazi Party.88 Another first was 
that Hitler promised that automobiles would become affordable for all 
German families.89 With increased opportunities like these, it is perhaps 
of little surprise that Hans Dieter Schäfer argues that in the first six years 
of the Nazi regime, Gentiles were twice as likely to move up in German 
society as they had during the last six years of the Weimar Republic.90 By 
1939, there were more jobs than Germans could fill and 200,000 for-
eign workers were brought in to cover the shortfall.91 With things going 
so well under a strong dictator who genuinely seemed to care about 
every class of (Aryan) German, why bother going back to Weimar-like 
democracy marred, as it was, having emerged from a humiliating mili-
tary defeat, followed by widespread (lower) class dissension, hyperinfla-
tion, political instability, and a crippling economic depression?92 This is 
why so many non-Jewish Germans described the peace period under the 
Nazis (1933–1939) “as a ‘great time.’”93 Too busy reveling in their own 
windfall, few if any of these lower- to upper-class Nazi welfare recipients 
stopped to contemplate who exactly was subsidizing their great times.94
The success of these and other achievements were also, in part, due to 
Hitler’s management style. As Browning observes:
the Nazi system was composed of factions centered around the Nazi chief-
tains, who were in perpetual competition to outperform one another. Like 
a feudal monarch, Hitler stood above his squabbling vassals. He allotted 
‘fiefs’ to build up the domains of his competing vassals as they demon-
strated their ability to accomplish the tasks most appreciated by the 
Führer.95
Those who succeeded in converting Hitler’s desires into reality were 
rewarded with larger projects and more power. And the fierce compe-
tition to please Hitler saw some of his more entrepreneurial underlings 
attempt to anticipate the Führer’s desires and then, through their own 
great initiative, convert these suspected wishes into reality.96 As early as 
1934, Werner Willikens, a state secretary in the Agriculture Ministry, 
realized how the new system worked:
everyone with a post in the new Germany has worked best when he has, 
so to speak, worked towards the Führer. Very often and in many spheres 
it has been the case…that individuals have simply waited for orders and 
instructions…but in fact it is the duty of everybody to try to work towards 
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the Führer along the lines he would wish […] But anyone who really 
works towards the Führer along his lines and towards his goal will certainly 
both now and in the future one day have the finest reward in the form of 
the sudden legal confirmation of his work.97
The German Foreign Office’s Martin Luther provides an exem-
plary model of someone working toward the Führer’s probable goals. 
Luther’s meteoric rise up the Nazi ranks was, in part, due to his deploy-
ment of Carl Friedrich’s rule of anticipated reactions (see Volume 1), 
where subordinates ask themselves “how would my superior wish me to 
behave?” Luther had an ability to anticipate from the bottom-up what 
his immediate superior, von Ribbentrop, needed before anyone else. And 
Luther was able to do so because, compared to his fellow subordinates, 
he could more accurately sense what Ribbentrop’s boss—the Führer—
probably top-down desired.98 During the Obedience studies, Williams, 
the experimenter, tended to engage in a similar “seizing the initiative 
from below in response to vague signals emanating from above…”99 As 
the also “successful” Gestapo head Heinrich Müller explained to his men 
during World War Two, in the absence of written orders, they had to 
“get used to reading between the lines and acting accordingly.”100 The 
consequence was the introduction of a more modern horizontal, rather 
than top-down vertical, chain of command, where talented individu-
als from the lower ranks were free to pursue initiatives that could end 
up having a major influence on future policy.101 And the Führer greatly 
relied on the rule of anticipated reactions, as he said himself:
Where would I be…if I would not find people to whom I can entrust work 
which I myself cannot direct, tough people of whom I know they take the 
steps I would take myself. The best man is for me the one who bothers me 
least by taking upon himself 95 out of 100 decisions.102
Is it possible that Milgram, who was frequently absent from his labora-
tory, felt the same way about Williams? It transpires that Hitler’s hands-
off management style could also prove politically expedient. Should any 
of his underling’s initiatives fail or even end up embarrassing the party, 
the Führer could always distance himself from personal responsibility 
because he never explicitly made such demands. And if Hitler (appar-
ently) had no knowledge of such initiatives, he could rather conveniently 
claim plausible deniability, thus evading any political fallout.103
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One area where competition in anticipating the Führer’s desires 
remained intense was in the resolution of the all-important “Jewish 
question.” On this issue, two main factions existed. On the one hand, 
there were those termed the “realists” who favored legislative changes 
that promoted forced emigration104 and on the other were those 
termed the “strong believers,”105 including party radicals like Julius 
Streicher (editor of the antisemitic publication Der Stürmer—The 
Stormtrooper) and Joseph Goebbels (head of the Ministry of Public 
Enlightenment and Propaganda). The strong believers thought that 
emigration of so-called inferiors to just beyond the Reich’s geograph-
ical border would only enable them to reproduce and would do noth-
ing to eliminate their potential future threat. Thus, when it came to 
the “Jewish question,” they believed sterilization or even extermination 
was the only permanent solution.106 At this early stage, Hitler favored 
a policy of forced emigration, probably because it had already shown 
itself to be more “realistic.” Two particular events, both in 1938, rein-
forced this preference: the Kristallnacht pogrom and the annexation of 
Austria.
During the summer of 1938, the Évian Conference was held in 
France. The aim of this meeting of political heads and various non- 
governmental organizations was to explore the possibility of other 
 countries accepting Germany’s unwanted Jews. However, the talks soon 
stalled because the German government refused to give assurances that 
Jewish refugees could migrate with sufficient capital with which to start 
new lives abroad.107 So, even when Jews were willing to leave Germany, 
without capital—which the Nazi regime had frozen—most other nations 
in the wake of a post-1929 financial crisis refused to accept them or, at 
best, only small numbers. The failure of this conference ensured that 
most German Jews found themselves stuck in a country whose govern-
ment did not want them. In frustration, the Nazi regime forced some 
Polish-born Jews living in Germany back to their homeland. However, 
the Polish government refused to accept them, arguing that because 
they had lived in Germany for so long, they were now German nation-
als. This border dispute rendered these Jews stateless refugees. On 7 
November 1938, a desperate Jewish teenager, whose parents happened 
to be caught in this border dispute, reacted by assassinating a German 
embassy official in Paris. In revenge, Goebbels convinced Hitler to allow 
him to organize a nationwide pogrom aimed at Germany’s Jews.108 
Goebbels was probably trying to capitalize on the assassination as a 
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means of promoting antisemitic sentiment within Germany and to 
claw back some of the power he and other “strong-believers” had lost 
to the “realists.” The pogrom became known as Kristallnacht (night of 
crystal, or the “Night of Broken Glass”). Largely at the hands of Nazi 
Stormtroopers, on 9–10 November nearly 300 synagogues were burned 
down, hundreds of Jewish-owned businesses were vandalized and 
looted, and, like the communists before them, thousands of Jews were 
rounded up and sent to concentration camps. The pogrom ended in 
about one hundred Jewish fatalities.
Because pogrom-like violence of this scale had not been seen in indus-
trialized Western Europe for such a long time,109 Kristallnacht was a 
watershed event. But the pogrom also generated a variety of unforeseen 
problems for the Nazi regime. First, it led to the destruction of Jewish 
property that happened to be insured by German and international firms. 
Second, the chaos surrounding the pogrom sent more shock waves of 
fear through the volatile German stock exchange. And finally, again to 
the regime’s surprise, the ensuing disorder disgusted significant sec-
tors of German society.110 These problems rendered Goebbels’ pogrom 
a complete political disaster and thus further reinforced the realist 
position.111
Simultaneously, another major event bolstered Hitler’s view that mass 
emigration offered the most likely “successful solution” to his Party’s 
“Jewish problem.” In pursuit of Lebensraum and to unify “all per-
sons of German blood,” the Wehrmacht annexed Hitler’s homeland of 
Austria on 12 March 1938. Doing so meant Germany inherited Austria’s 
200,000 Jews112—even more Jews than the Nazis had been able to push 
out of Germany.113 Soon afterward, one of Himmler’s low-ranking Nazi 
bureaucrats, Adolf Eichmann, developed an “assembly-line technique” 
to increase the efficiency of the Austrian government’s Jewish emigra-
tion application process.114 As Eichmann explained after the war, “an 
idea took shape in my mind: a conveyor belt. The initial application and 
all the rest of the required papers are put in at one end, and the pass-
port falls off at the other…”115 Within six months, Eichmann’s organiza-
tional process resulted in the deportation of one-quarter of all Austria’s 
Jews. Eichmann’s “realist” superiors could boast of this great success 
in contrast to the disastrous Kristallnacht pogrom. According to Karl 
Schleunes, the simultaneous failure of Kristallnacht and Eichmann’s suc-
cess caused a pivotal power shift within the upper echelons of the Nazi 
hierarchy:
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The year 1938 is marked…by…a trend towards centralization of control 
over Jewish policy. In part this trend reflected the newly found powers 
of Goering, Heydrich, and Eichmann; in part it reflected the final fail-
ure of the emotional antisemitic wing of the Nazi movement to produce 
a solution to the Jewish problem through pogroms. The failure of the 
November pogrom finally discredited the impulsive radicals and strength-
ened the hand of the realists whose work in 1938 promised a more 
effective solution through bureaucratic means. Most important of all, 
Hitler finally made a choice between these two approaches to the Jewish 
issue.116
As efficient organizational means to the desired political end were 
introduced, the “hoodlums were banished and the bureaucrats took 
over.”117 The “Göring-Himmler-Heydrich alliance,”118 with the sup-
port of Eichmann’s effective organizational skills, gained suprem-
acy in dealing with the “Jewish problem,” wherever it might lead. 
Once Göring had been placed in charge, he delegated responsibility 
to SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, who, on 24 January 
1939, authorized the opening of the Reich Central Office for Jewish 
Emigration.119 Heydrich instructed that Eichmann’s more efficient 
approach to mass emigration was to be applied in all of Germany’s larger 
cities.120
While Hitler’s actions signified his support for the “realists,” however, 
his rhetoric still tended to reflect the views of the “strong believers.”121 
In a 30 January 1939 speech, he stated:
In my life I have often been a prophet, and I have mostly been laughed 
at. At the time of my struggle for power, it was mostly the Jewish people 
who laughed at the prophecy that one day I would attain in Germany the 
leadership of the state and therewith of the entire nation, and that among 
other problems I would also solve the Jewish one. I think that the uproar-
ious laughter of that time has in the meantime remained stuck in German 
Jewry’s throat. […] Today I want to be a prophet again: If international 
finance Jewry inside and outside Europe again succeeds in precipitating the 
nations into a world war, the result will not be the Bolshevization of the 
earth and with it the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish 
race in Europe.122
Because of Hitler’s circa 1930 public relations makeover from vitriolic 
Jew baiter to reflective political visionary, the above statement was 
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actually one of only three occasions between 1933 and 1939 where 
the Führer publicly expressed his racial hatred of the Jews.123 Then, 
just over a month later in March 1939, Hitler certainly did his bit to 
encourage such a war when his troops annexed all of Czechoslovakia 
(including the Sudetenland). Because, in this case, the Nazis could not 
rely on their usual late 1930s justifications for annexing other nations’ 
territories—like their repossessing of land “stolen” as a result of the 
Treaty of Versailles or coming to the aid of German settlers  “suffering” 
at the hands of nations just beyond Germany’s border—Hitler’s 
 actually far broader covert ambitions to annex more living space 
became, for the first time, undeniable.124 On a pan-European scale, it 
was clear that Hitler was, first and foremost, aggressively in pursuit of 
Lebensraum.
When Hitler made his threat to annihilate European Jewry, it prob-
ably appeared to inner-circle Nazis as pure posture. His actions clearly 
supported the “realist” policy of forced emigration (and he had pre-
viously threatened the lives of German Jews, obviously with no fol-
low-through). However, such threats were in all likelihood both posture 
and genuine. Posturing, because even if the Nazis gained total control 
of Europe sometime in the future, they had neither the strategy, nor the 
infrastructure, nor the technology—no procedure—to render them capa-
ble of exterminating such massive numbers of mostly women and chil-
dren. Hitler’s position here in some ways resembles Milgram’s before the 
pilot studies: The Führer had a preconceived goal but, at that point in 
time, no procedure capable of converting it into a reality. Nonetheless, 
the point is that for Hitler, annihilation was and would remain for some 
time impossible.
Even so, his threats were not completely hollow. Although a means of 
massacring massive numbers of civilians did not then exist, Hitler’s past 
experience hinted at the possibility that, with time, it could possibly be 
invented. As a courier in the Wehrmacht during World War One, Hitler 
had participated in about fifty battles.125 He had experienced trench 
warfare firsthand during the Battle of the Somme, which had killed or 
wounded more than a million men in less than six months.126 Many 
other high-ranking Nazis had also experienced the incredibly destructive 
power of modern warfare. If death on such a massive scale were possible 
in one context, why not in another—just change the target and obtain 
the same end result? Bartov argues:
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while there is clearly a distinction to be made between the mutual killing of 
soldiers and the wholesale massacre of defenseless populations, it is crucial 
to realize that total war and genocide are closely related. For modern war 
provides the occasion and the tools, the manpower and the organization, 
the mentality and the imagery necessary for the perpetration of genocide. 
With the introduction of industrial killing to the battlefield, the systematic 
murder of whole peoples became both practical and thinkable: those who 
had experienced the former could imagine and plan, organize, and perpe-
trate the latter.127
In fact, almost two decades earlier in Mein Kampf, Hitler had envis-
aged the application of the then-latest military technology to resolving 
his score with the Jews, suggesting that 12,000–15,000 “Hebrew cor-
rupters” be “held under poison gas…”128 And historical events informed 
Hitler that other nations during wartime had managed to exterminate 
massive numbers of unwanted civilians. As we shall see, just over six 
months after making the above (January 1939) threat, Hitler acknowl-
edged awareness of the Armenian genocide by the Turks and had long 
“admired” the US extermination of its indigenous population.129 As 
Germany, perhaps the most technically advanced nation in the world,130 
approached the mid-twentieth century, who really knew what might 
be possible under the cover of war. Perhaps war and genocide could be 
part of a single Nazi ideological program. Just as Milgram would use the 
Holocaust as an initial guide to envisage a basic experimental procedure, 
Hitler used previous genocides and wars to image exterminating the 
Jews.
Nevertheless, until 1939 all signals suggested to the “realist” in 
Hitler that extermination remained impossible and Jewish emigration 
the more practical alternative. But the “strong believer” in Hitler knew 
that displacing “inferiors” beyond the border would not eliminate their 
perceived threat. And therefore a realistic strategy capable of mass exter-
mination is, in all likelihood, what he ultimately desired. After all, under-
lings referred to the annihilation of European Jewry as “the Führer’s 
wish”—something desired but like most wishes, probably unobtain-
able.131 For “realist” bureaucrats—Eichmann, his superior Reinhard 
Heydrich, and his superior Heinrich Himmler—who all worked competi-
tively on the Jewish question, more power awaited those who could con-
vert the Führer’s wish into reality.
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the Change from ConventionaL Positive to radiCaL 
negative eugeniCs
How, it must be asked, could Hitler have felt so comfortable publicly 
threatening all of European Jewry just two months after many German 
“onlookers” had shunned the violent Kristallnacht pogrom? Perhaps 
these onlookers were more disgusted with the disorder than the terri-
fying experiences of the Jewish targets.132 Somewhat related to this, it 
is fairly clear that by the eve of World War Two, public support for or 
indifference to Nazi ideology and negative eugenics had increased. And 
it appears that the German public’s increasing sympathy for or gen-
eral indifference to the Nazi’s radical worldview can, as the following 
argues, largely be attributed to systemic forces—the Nazi ascendency to 
power, and more specifically, their total control over state finances. That 
is, after the Nazis rose to power, they gained monopolistic control over 
Germany’s “informational and social field.”
On assuming power, and especially after the formalization of the 
1935 Nuremberg Laws, the Nazi regime instituted a policy to fund 
the research only of those members of the German intelligentsia— 
academics and scientists—who were willing to become National 
Socialists.133 This contractual clause inadvertently ensured that those 
most likely to obtain government funding were sympathetic to Nazi 
ideology or careerists who, concerned with their financial or social secu-
rity, would tow the party line.134 Both groups could be counted on to 
provide the Nazi regime with scholarly data that at least did not con-
flict with or, even better, bolstered the party’s radical belief system. 
Beyond funding, other benefits for producing ideologically congruent 
research included rapid promotion, new employment opportunities, fel-
lowships, lecture tours, accolades, press conferences, intensified media 
coverage, and selection to sit on prestigious editorial boards.135 In fact, 
to uncover the latest findings in racial research, throughout Germany 
five multi-disciplinary antisemitic research institutes were created—
what we today would call think tanks.136 A number of German biolo-
gists, theologians, psychiatrists, and anthropologists—for example, Max 
Hildebert Boehm, Paul Brohmer, Eugen Fischer, Gerhard Kittel, Robert 
Ritter, Carl Schneider, Peter-Heinz Seraphim, and Otmar Freiherr von 
Verschuer—not only politically supported the Nazis, most if not all 
ended up producing research that reinforced the party’s racist and ableist 
ideology. While this “veritable academic industry” thrived,137 it was no 
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coincidence that all of these figures, to some degree, personally bene-
fited.138 Although the ideologically congruent researchers only made up 
a minority of the academy, because the regime tended to shower them 
with attention, they appeared to be far more representative than they 
actually were.139 Thus, not only did most tenured professors refuse to 
play ideological ball, as long as they kept their criticisms to themselves, 
they were not punished. They were, however, excluded from receiving 
all the benefits that happened to be on offer.140 As the scholarly silent 
majority sat back and watched some of their colleagues rewarded for 
publishing fraudulent and grossly flawed research, their resentment must 
have been palpable. Although the Nazi regime injected large amounts 
of funding into discovering an irrefutable physiological means of distin-
guishing Jews from others, no robust marker—blood type, nose shape, 
skull size, or fingerprint pattern—was ever found.141 As scholars in the 
natural sciences quickly tired of ever finding such a marker, a small yet 
influential group of social sciences and humanities researchers contin-
ued to unravel the (apparently) latest distinctive characteristics of Jewish 
culture.142
Another understandably very small group of scholars were distin-
guishable because they not only vociferously challenged their colleague’s 
pro-Nazi research, they also attacked the intellectual foundations of Nazi 
ideology. For this, their career trajectories, relative to the ideologues, 
moved in the very opposite direction. Consider, for example, Karl Saller, 
an anthropologist at the University of Munich, who “attacked the con-
cept of a fixed Nordic race and said that modern Germans were racially 
mixed. Reinhard Heydrich banned him from teaching. Saller lost his chair 
at Munich. His fellow university teachers did not protest, instead they 
started to avoid him.”143 Those scholars who refused to join the Nazi 
Party, or worse, like Saller, publicly challenged the regime’s beliefs, were 
forced to take their dissenting voices elsewhere or were silenced through 
imprisonment or execution.144 The insights of these critics, as Glover 
notes, “spread round the world, sometimes posthumously, sometimes 
through their writing and teaching in exile.” Most importantly, “they 
were no longer there, in German and Austrian universities, to ask the 
necessary questions.”145 Germany as a whole was thereby diverted from 
exposure to these alternative and intellectually more rigorous perspec-
tives.146 Sustaining the Nazi’s blinkered worldview was that between 1933 
and 1934 about 1600 Jewish academics were fired and replaced with no 
doubt grateful and predictably compliant “Aryan” professors.147 For both 
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the new and remaining non-Jewish scholars, the message was clear: Hitler 
refused “to accept disagreeable information” and this intransigent world-
view would be “a dominant feature of his style of government.”148
Germany’s police, whose job it was to uphold the barrage of new and 
intensifying antisemitic laws, underwent a similar but probably intensi-
fied ideological filtering process.149 In fact, during recruitment drives, 
prospective officers who had joined the Nazi Party before 1933 were 
deemed preferable over those who had not.150 The effects of this filtering 
process accelerated greatly when in 1936 the uniformed police were sub-
sumed by Himmler’s Nazi SS—Hitler’s elite paramilitary guard. The ide-
ologically driven merger also saw the militarization of law enforcement 
across Germany.151
The primary and secondary teaching professions were also purged 
of all “undesirables”—Jews and critical Leftists.152 There too, career 
advancement became near impossible without party membership.153 
Although only a third or quarter of teachers were ardent Nazis,154 by 
1936 all teachers working for the German government had joined the 
Nazi Party,155 and more than two-thirds of them started attending “two-
weekly ‘retreats’” where they were familiarized with the application of 
Nazi ideology.156 Because only a minority of them were strong believers, 
Koonz notes that the means of advancing Nazi doctrine at these teacher 
retreats was purposefully subtle—less explicitly racist and ableist, and 
more about promoting a positive affect toward “national pride,”  “ethnic 
solidarity,” and [healthy white] egalitarian “we-consciousness…”157 The 
broad and insidious consequence of this multi-pronged employment 
process across the academic, police, and teaching professions was that 
only committed ideologues, opportunists, and those fearing conflict with 
the party ended up filling the most influential leadership posts. Despite 
the varied approaches of these different professional groups when dealing 
with the Nazi party, the outcome was the same: All their overt criticisms 
against the regime essentially evaporated.
For Aryans, more employment and advancement opportunities fol-
lowed when Goebbels eliminated all Jewish influence from the press, 
radio, publishing houses, and film industry.158 This policy stripped 
Germany’s Jews of any opportunity to publicly respond to their mis-
treatment or to appeal to the sympathies of the wider public. Then 
again, it was not as if the Jews or anyone else for that matter could com-
plain because as early as 1934 the Nazis had introduced laws like the 
Heimtückegesetz, which banned all political slander and critical dissent 
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against them.159 And as early as 1933, Party headquarters started send-
ing infringement notices to non-Jewish Germans observed maintaining 
social relations with Jews. As one person who had received three such 
infringement notices told a friend married to a Jewish woman, their 
“pleasant chats…must unfortunately cease.”160 Nor were these threats 
empty: It got to the point where just showing kindness to Jews could 
result in arrest.161 Some people who were previously “anything but a 
Nazi” started, for example, wearing swastika lapel pins. They did so not 
because they had been politically converted, but because doing so cir-
cumvented suspicions of them being political agitators.162 Fearful or sim-
ply jaded into submission, the socially easiest path for those personally 
critical of the Nazi’s discriminatory measures was silence.
Drawing on Luhmann’s scholarly legacy, Stefan Kühl argues that 
most Germans’ silence to the Nazi’s antisemitic legal assault generated 
an antisemitic “fictional consensus…”163 This antisemitic fictional con-
sensus was the false perception among most Germans that—because 
Goebbels flooded the media with images of massive crowds of Germans 
captivated by Hitler’s every word164—the Nazi’s racial policies must 
have been unanimously popular. The perception surrounding the pop-
ularity of the Nazi’s discriminatory policies also had a powerful con-
trolling influence on most German’s everyday social interactions. That 
is, with time Germans assumed that their fellows would react with uni-
versal approval to their overt support for the Nazis and universal disap-
proval to any criticism they might have of the regime. So those Germans 
who personally disagreed with the regime’s treatment of “inferiors” 
felt an intensifying pressure to keep such views to themselves, thereby 
securing their critical silence.165 Importantly, Kühl adds that the critical 
silence, however, only ended up fueling the antisemitic fictional con-
sensus because this apparent consensus was founded on the “untested 
assumption” that everybody else agreed with the Nazi’s legal assault.166 
Others, like Uwe Storjohann, captured the essence of this fictional con-
sensus, describing Germany under the Nazis as a “nationally stable union 
of non-understanders, keep-quieters, head-nodders, deaf-ear- and blind-
eye-turners…”167 And if the Jewish community themselves never com-
plained about their advancing social and legal isolation (they of course 
couldn’t), perhaps, in the minds of the unreflective majority, the Jew’s 
hardships were perhaps not all that harsh after all.
Anyway, across the second half of the 1930s the Nazi intellectu-
als’ (pseudo) scientific research, in conjunction with additional Nazi 
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spin, was injected into the national educational curriculum,168 news-
papers (particularly Streicher’s “semi-pornographic” Der Stürmer and 
Walter Gross’s more “breezy middlebrow” Neues Volk (New Volk)),169 
Nazi youth organizations,170 exhibitions,171 and movie productions. 
Consider, for example, the National Socialist Office of Racial Politics 
and their mid-1930s production of a variety of documentary films with 
titles like The Sins of the Fathers, Sins against Blood and Race, and Palaces 
for the Mentally Ill, all of which subtly contrasted “degenerate[s]” with 
healthy athletic Nordic types.172 Then in 1940, the German film indus-
try released their two most infamous antisemitic movies: Jud Süss (Jew 
Suess) and Der ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew). As Friedländer notes, the 
aim of these subsidized films was the same, “to elicit fear, disgust, and 
hatred.”173 Although Der ewige Jude was a flop,174 in just a few years 
Jud Süss, a movie that repeats verbatim Martin Luther’s violent solution 
to the “Jewish question” had been viewed by 20.3 million Germans.175 
As one viewer noted, “The Jew is shown here as he really is […] I would 
have loved to wring his neck.”176 For some viewers, the movie clearly 
had its intended effect. The fact that criticizing Jud Süss was illegal makes 
Goebbels’ reaction to its launch somewhat farcical: “The film is a wild 
success. One hears only enthusiastic comments” and “Everybody praises 
the film to the skies…”177
So around the start of World War Two, it appears a relentless propa-
ganda machine in the near absence of any conflicting information per-
suaded many ordinary Germans that a society without “inferiors” would 
probably be good for the Reich.178 As Oskar Gröning, an SS administrator 
later stationed at Auschwitz, put it, “We were convinced by our worldview 
that there was a great conspiracy of Jewishness against us…”179 Therefore, 
during the early 1940s, Gröning “carried on working at Auschwitz not 
just because he was ordered to but because, having weighed the evidence 
put before him, he thought that the extermination program was right.”180 
As the more directly involved perpetrator, Kurt Möbius admitted:
We police went by the phrase, ‘Whatever serves the state is right, what-
ever harms the state is wrong.’ I would also like to say that it never even 
entered my head that these orders could be wrong. Although I am aware 
that it is the duty of the police to protect the innocent I was however at 
that time convinced that the Jewish people were not innocent but guilty. 
I believed all the propaganda that Jews were criminals and subhuman 
[Untermenschen] and that they were the cause of Germany’s decline after 
the First World War.181
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Because, as we shall see, the Nazi regime socially constructed Jews as 
partisans and crooks, morally self-righteous killers like Möbius really did 
perceive “themselves as the executors of state measures taken against 
killers, murderers, and criminals.”182 For Möbius and many others, the 
German people were (apparently) victims of various injustices, and it was 
these kinds of iniquities that helped fuel what developed into an unwa-
vering and unreflective pursuit of self-righteous revenge. Although the 
Nazi’s insidious social engineering program aimed to, at least, secure 
the wider German public’s indifference to the fate of German Jewry, 
for some, as the above comments illustrate, it potentially paved the way 
for something proactively far more radical. And this purposefully calcu-
lated (mis)information campaign also went further than converting the 
removal of Jews and other inferiors into a social good—those Germans 
who chose to maintain friendly relations with so-called inferiors would, 
as Müller-Hill implied earlier, be responsible for destroying advanced 
Germanic civilization.183 So not only was previously bad behavior mor-
ally inverted into a social good, what was once considered good was 
reconfigured into something really bad.184 One of the Nazi’s great-
est obstacles during their intense propaganda campaign was that, as 
De Swaan points out, many Germans had been exposed to other reli-
gious, educational, and familial moral codes. Consequently, “[t]hey 
were not completely devoid of a moral sense…” And, much like during 
the Obedience studies, when insufficiently indoctrinated people were 
faced by intense moral dilemmas, “inner conflict[s]” could plague their 
conscience.185
In summary, the cumulative consequence of the Nazi’s social engi-
neering program was that over time sectors within the German intelli-
gentsia, teaching profession, and entire security apparatus (among other 
groups) contributed to and helped reinforce the regime’s self-imposed 
“ideological echo chamber…”186 From every direction within this cham-
ber, German society was encouraged to believe that they were the master 
race and that in order to save advanced Germanic civilization, something 
monumental needed to be done about the impending threat posed by 
those of inferior blood. Again, because all the normally credible and 
authoritative societal voices explicitly or passively seemed to agree with 
Hitler, then, in the eyes of ordinary Germans, perhaps Nazi ideology was 
not all that radical after all. In fact, for many Germans the Nazis pro-
vided a unique form of political leadership: Only they were willing to 
stand up and protect all that was good and great, unlike all those “lib-
eral-pacifist” fools elsewhere in the world who not only paved the way 
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for the destruction of superior Aryan blood, but had even been duped 
into spending “great sums of money” to protect “criminals and men-
tally deranged” inferiors.187 It was for this reason, as Neitzel and Welzer 
astutely observe:
the entire collection of events known as the “Third Reich” and the vio-
lence it produced can be seen as a gigantic experiment, showing what sane 
people who see themselves as good are capable of if they consider some-
thing to be appropriate, sensible, or correct.188
As Roy Baumeister argues, when the world is viewed through the aver-
age German’s eyes during the lead up to World War Two—we are morally 
good, others are degenerate and evil189—Nazi ideology no longer appears, 
as many see it today: the epitome of evil. Instead, when German citizenry’s 
carefully manufactured and purposefully blinkered worldview is considered, 
their movement toward an increasingly violent solution becomes both terri-
fyingly logical and comprehensible.190 Led by an apparent “fearless crusader 
for justice,” many of those working within the Nazi regime genuinely came 
to believe they were pursuing the morally right, even righteous path.191 
And if there had been some potential merit to this inherently supercilious 
belief system—those of the Jewish faith, Gypsies, Eastern Europeans, and 
those with disabilities really did pose a genetic, social, and cultural threat 
to “advanced” Western civilization—then in the name of free speech, per-
haps such issues merited public debate. But the problem was not just that 
they were wrong, the intractable Nazis had no interest in, and even actively 
went to enormous lengths to avoid, exposure to conflicting critical views. 
They simply could not bear to have the validity of their bigoted worldview 
challenged and then demolished by more informed critics like Karl Saller. 
And that most Germans were socially, financially, and materially doing so 
well under the Nazis only rendered this majority more receptive or at least 
amenable to Hitler’s covertly destructive political agenda. Thus, overar-
ching structural forces (the legal assault, selective employment practices, 
and the Nazi’s self-imposed “ideological echo chamber”) along with the 
showering of various self-interested benefits likely played a crucial role in 
many German’s avid support for or indifference toward the Nazi regime’s 
increasingly radical and destructive ambitions. Furthermore, because each 
change the Nazis introduced was, on its own, small and therefore seemingly 
insignificant, with time their many little changes added up to the point that 
German society was imperceptibly blunted to the reality that, in the spirit of 
shifting baselines, “fundamental change” had taken hold.192
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This was the subtle, creeping, and cumulatively effectual (mis)infor-
mation process that rendered many Germans in favor of or indifferent 
to the Nazi’s radical negative eugenics-based social policies, whatever 
exactly they ended up entailing. The key achievement of the Nazi’s social 
engineering was that many so-called inferiors were moved beyond “the 
boundaries of the universe of obligation…”193 It was therefore implied 
to the German citizenry that as far as their government was concerned, 
whatever hardships might befall the Jews and other “sub-humans,” they 
need not fret over it. These people simply no longer mattered. And 
should, in the near future, the Nazi regime instruct those in the German 
armed forces to harm these “inferiors,” by the late 1930s such a request 
was no longer outside but tentatively within the parameters of one’s 
expected duties. That is, as Kühl convincingly argues, as the start of 
World War Two approached, the Nazi propaganda machine ensured that 
many members in the German armed forces were likely to “view an order 
to kill as an expectation within the framework of their organizational 
zone of indifference.”194 Furthermore, because “the systematic disen-
franchisement of the Jews had” by this point in time, “progressed so far 
that not a single member” of the German armed forces in the soon to be 
occupied territories “had to worry about being punished by the author-
ities if they assaulted Jews in violation of the applicable laws and regu-
lations.”195 Thus, as the start of the war approached, these men would 
have sensed that if Germany proved victorious, they could—if they so 
chose—very likely assault “inferiors” with total impunity.
the nazi deCent into worLd war two
As mentioned, to reverse all those past injustices like the Treaty of 
Versailles and perhaps, in the process, make Germany even greater, cen-
tral to Hitler’s covert ideological vision was that Germany go to war. In 
pursuit of Lebensraum, in March 1939 Hitler started to plan an invasion 
of Poland. First, the Wehrmacht would attack Poland from the west, and 
by prior arrangement, the Soviet Union would invade Poland from the 
east. After defeating Poland, the invaders intended to split the spoils with 
the western half going to Germany and the Soviets gaining the eastern 
half. The Nazis anticipated that Poland’s leadership class—politicians, 
intellectuals, and government officials—were likely to encourage their 
citizenry to resist German hegemony. Hitler, therefore, believed that 
securing Polish docility necessitated this group’s elimination. Fearing 
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high-ranking members of the Wehrmacht might resist Hitler’s desires, 
Heydrich and others were charged with forming the Einsatzgruppen, a 
paramilitary force. The Einsatzgruppen consisted of about two thousand 
carefully selected SS men who, according to SS-Brigadeführer Werner 
Best, were chosen on the grounds that they were likely to work “ruth-
lessly and harshly to achieve National Socialist aims…”196 Lothar Beutel 
(one of the commanders) said that Heydrich told the Einsatzgruppen 
leadership on 18 August 1939 that as far as the Polish resistance move-
ment and its leaders were concerned, “everything was allowed, includ-
ing shootings and arrests.”197 Heydrich also supplied the Einsatzgruppen 
with a list of 61,000 Polish Jews and Christians who were believed to be 
members of “anti-German” groups.198 Four days after Heydrich’s speech 
to the Einsatzgruppen leadership and just over a week before the inva-
sion, on 22 August 1939, Hitler informed his top military commanders:
Our strength is in our quickness and our brutality. Genghis Khan had mil-
lions of women and children killed by his own will and with a gay heart. 
History sees only in him a great state builder. […] Thus for the time being 
I have sent to the East only my “Death’s Head Units” with the order to 
kill without pity or mercy all men, women, and children of Polish race or 
language. Only in such a way will we win the vital space that we need. 
Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?199
But why would Germans agree to pursue such premeditated plans 
to annex Polish territory and kill its citizenry—how could they sup-
port such blatant skulduggery that might put their own lives at risk? As 
Göring said after World War Two, kindling the German people’s support 
for the Polish invasion was, for the Nazi regime, a minor obstacle:
Why, of course, the people don’t want war […] Why would some poor 
slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get 
out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece. Naturally, the common 
people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, 
nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the 
leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a sim-
ple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist 
dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship. […] voice or 
no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. 
That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and 
denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to 
danger. It works the same way in any country.200
52  N. RUSSELL
Indeed, on Hitler’s orders, the SS intelligence service fabricated an attack 
by the Polish military on a German radio station proximate to the shared 
border.201 This pretense, as Göring put it, proved sufficient in securing 
public support for the Polish invasion. For the invading German forces, 
this attack secured “a belief in the justice of conquest…”202 Bolstering 
this pretense was the belief common among those like Hitler that when 
colonizing other nations it is “morally acceptable—especially in war-
time—to extinguish ‘lower’ civilizations that stood in the way of ‘pro-
gress.’”203 And should any of the inferiors prove lucky enough to survive 
the onslaught, the colonizer would then bestow on them the (appar-
ently) invaluable gift of a “higher” civilization. Whatever the outcome 
of the colonizing feat, the invaders would rather conveniently end up 
reconfiguring their destructive aggression into an all-round social good.
ConCLusion
This chapter outlined, within the democratic state of Germany, the dis-
concerting rise and increasing popularity of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi 
Party. The Party’s political ascendency was largely due to a combina-
tion of the cunning political strategy of appealing to the desires of all 
Germans and an uncanny ability to capitalize on every bit of luck that 
fell their way. Although already effective with so little, when the Party 
ascended to power and accessed the enormous resources of the German 
state, Goebbels seized this opportunity to promulgate the Nazi’s ideo-
logical vision by, as Milgram would put it, restructuring the social and 
informational field. The Nazis seductively appealed to the inferiority 
complex that happened to lie at the heart of the average  non-Jewish 
German: “Aryans” are genetically superior, a master race is entitled to 
more than others, and, in a quest to make Germany great, the Nazi 
Party intended on giving Germans all they (apparently) deserved. Across 
Germany, the Nazi’s expansionist ideology and contempt for so-called 
inferiors spread. This imperialist vision of grandeur and the general dis-
dain (or indifference) it engendered toward “subhumans” proved infec-
tious. Within many Germans, the dark side of this infection expressed 
itself in the form of vanity, hubris, and a militaristic yearning for a united 
omnipotent Germany to, much like during the nineteenth century, 
dominate.
The success of Goebbels’ social engineering program was largely due 
to the Nazi Party’s structural and systematic elimination of dissenting 
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and simultaneous concentration of consenting “expert” public voices. 
For many ordinary Germans, the Nazi Party seemed to know the best 
way forward—anybody who was somebody said so and nobody seems to 
disagree. And as the Nazi’s imperialist ambitions and their unrelenting 
disparagement of the infectious “other” spread, simultaneously the aver-
age German became socially, financially, and materially better off, albeit 
typically at the expense of those “others.”204 The prospect of reaching 
the top proved too irresistible for many. Blind faith in their intensely 
antisemitic Führer soared and many Germans, with a “well-developed 
calculating instinct for their private interests,”205 decided they would fol-
low him wherever he might lead them.
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On 1 September 1939, the Wehrmacht invaded Poland, an act that 
 initiated French and British declarations of war, and thus signaled the 
start of World War Two. With their massive numbers, superior weap-
onry, and Blitzkrieg tactics, the Wehrmacht quickly swept Polish defend-
ers aside. Then, on 17 September, the Soviets attacked Poland from 
the east. As anticipated, the Polish civilian population fiercely resisted 
the Germans, typically in the form of sniper attacks. The Wehrmacht’s 
usual wartime policy in dealing with civilian resistance was twofold. 
First, captured resisters were tried in a military court and if found guilty, 
executed. Second, if resisters evaded capture, community leaders were 
taken hostage and their lives threatened if the partisan activity contin-
ued.1 However, on 3 September Himmler provided the German armed 
forces with a third and much swifter option: a shoot-to-kill authoriza-
tion that allowed for the circumvention of a military trial.2 Some mem-
bers of the German armed forces interpreted the authorization as a 
right to kill whomever and whenever they wanted; indeed, this is what 
it was. Armed with such powers, sectors of the Einsatzgruppen occa-
sionally engaged in mob-like violence, acts which greatly concerned the 
Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief Walther von Brauchitsch.3 Brauchitsch 
was so angry that on 21 September Himmler had to send Heydrich to 
personally smooth matters over with the powerful chief commander. 
Brauchitsch demanded one thing, the removal of Himmler’s shoot-to-
kill order. In fear of having pushed influential figures in the Wehrmacht 
too far too soon, a few days later Himmler granted Brauchitsch’s 
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request.4 Although Brauchitsch’s resistance signaled to the Nazi lead-
ership that some of the Wehrmacht’s top brass was unwilling to flaunt 
international military law, they also noticed that some were.5
By early October, only five weeks into the campaign, Poland conceded 
defeat. Soon thereafter, the Germans divided their half of the new ter-
ritory into two: a western section, which they called the Incorporated 
Territory (annexed into Germany), and an eastern section called the 
General Government (a semi-independent zone occupied by Germany 
and governed by Nazi lawyer Hans Frank). Germany’s rapid expan-
sion had, however, exposed a flaw in Eichmann’s emigration model for 
dealing with the “Jewish problem”: The more nations the Wehrmacht 
conquered, the more Jews Germany inherited. There were 3 million 
Polish Jews,6 of which 600,000 to 700,000 lived in the now German 
Incorporated Territory. These numbers do not include the 18 million 
Christian Poles that the Nazi leadership would have to uproot when the 
time came to make room for in-coming ethnic German settlers. Before 
the new German/Soviet border tightened, the Germans tried to push as 
many of the unwanted Poles into the new Soviet territory. However, this 
was no long-term solution; it was only a matter of time before the Soviet 
authorities found out.
Eventually, the Nazi leadership decided to expel Poles from the 
Incorporated Territory and force them into the General Government. 
Polish Jews were to be sent to a reservation located near the General 
Government township of Nisko (in the eastern Lublin district). In an 
eager attempt to impress his superiors, on 17 October 1939 Eichmann 
tried to deport 912 Austrian Jews by train to the Nisko reservation. 
However, this attempt at mass deportation proved to be a more diffi-
cult exercise than he anticipated. Complicating issues included the higher 
priority authorities placed on housing the influx of ethnic German set-
tlers over relocating German Jews, along with other economic and logis-
tical issues.7 Amid the ensuing chaos, Eichmann’s display of initiative 
backfired and, as a result, most of the Jews were returned to Austria.8 
The problem of the Polish Jews remained, but soon after Heydrich 
announced a new policy: “in order to have a better possibility of con-
trol and later deportation,” Polish Jews across both the Incorporated 
Territory and General Government were to be concentrated in des-
ignated ghettos in all the major Polish cities.9 Implementation of this 
interim solution took place in 1940. Meanwhile, from early to mid-
1940, Arthur Greiser (Governor of the Wartheland, a province within 
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the Incorporated Territory) boasted in Nazi circles of his desire to ren-
der his fiefdom judenfrei (“free of Jews”). To fulfill this desire, Greiser 
requested Hans Frank in the more eastern General Government to 
accept a few hundred thousand Wartheland Jews. Frank, who also one 
day hoped to make the same claim about his territory, balked at Greiser’s 
demand. Adding to the ongoing complexities of what exactly was to 
be done with the Jews, Frank did not want his fiefdom to become a 
 dumping ground for others’ unwanted peoples.10
Once secured in the Polish ghettos, there remained much debate over 
where to relocate all of these Jews. The realist Nazi bureaucrats identi-
fied a few potential locations, the most popular of which became pos-
sible with the successful spring 1940 conquests of Denmark, Norway, 
Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France. Jews were to be deported 
by ship to the island of Madagascar, a French colony off the south east-
ern coast of Africa.11 According to Himmler, on 25 May, “The Führer 
read the six pages (of the plan) through and found them very good and 
correct…”12 Despite his strong threats, Hitler again revealed he was a 
realist. And, as Browning observes,
This episode is of singular importance in that it is the only firsthand 
account by a high-ranking participant—Himmler—of just how a Hitler 
decision was reached and a Führerbefehl, or Hitler order, was given in 
respect to Nazi racial policy during this period. The initiative came from 
Himmler. However, he did not present Hitler with a precise plan; it was 
rather a statement of intent, a set of policy objectives. The details of imple-
mentation would be left to Himmler. Hitler indicated both his enthusiastic 
agreement and the men with whom the information could be shared […] 
He simply allowed it to be known what he wanted or approved.13
Kershaw agrees: When it came to the Jews, Hitler set a “vicious tone” 
then sanctioned and legitimated what he sensed were his underling’s 
best—most realistically achievable—initiatives.14 However, access to 
Madagascar required naval dominance over Britain, something the 
Germans never achieved. Consequently, the Madagascar Plan was 
shelved pending a victory that never arrived. The Madagascar Plan might 
then have been the most realistic option, but as this solution stalled, 
Hitler went on to drop hints of his openness to supporting any solution, 
no matter how radical:
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Typical of Hitler’s stance was his wish, expressed towards the end of 1940, 
that his Gauleiter in the East should be accorded the ‘necessary freedom of 
movement’, to accomplish their difficult task, that he would demand from 
his Gauleiter after 10 years only the single announcement that their territo-
ries were purely German, and would not enquire about the methods used 
to bring this about.15
The message was clear: Most important for Hitler was that the Jewish 
problem be solved; he did not care how they got there.
One benefit stemming from the Nazi’s spate of military victories was 
that instead of funding their wars by shouldering more national debts 
or leveling unpopular taxes on the German public, they started financ-
ing subsequent military campaigns by plundering the economies of 
those they conquered.16 Consider, for example, France, who through 
increasing occupation fees ended up paying the Nazis about 900 billion 
francs17—money then invested into Hitler’s plans for eastern expan-
sion. But why did so many Germans support these acts of state larceny? 
There are probably several overlapping reasons. First, the Nazi regime 
made sure that every class of German both at home and abroad person-
ally benefited from Hitler’s military ambitions. For example, the Nazis 
used some of the occupation fees to increase their soldiers’ wages.18 
With more money in their pockets, the soldiers were then encouraged 
by both the regime and their families to purchase consumer items from 
the occupied territories and—to the detriment of the local economies 
and food supply—send their purchases back home. Herein lies the reason 
why between 1939 and 1945 Germany enjoyed the highest standard of 
living of any European nation in the war.19 As we shall see, this other 
form of Nazi welfare only drew the average German—who Aly describes 
as a “well-fed parasite…”20—a little further into turning a blind eye 
to some of the regime’s subsequent and even more unethical criminal 
ventures. A second reason for supporting the Nazi’s illegal occupation 
practices was that the soldiers’ purchases were preserved by a facade of 
legality: The men did (at least initially) not steal but paid for all their 
consumer items.21 This, however, did not stop some Germans from sens-
ing an injustice in their rising purchasing power. Consider, for example, 
the famous postwar writer and then Wehrmacht conscript Heinrich Böll 
who, despite the legal veneer surrounding his purchases, detected some-
thing unethical in his shopping sprees. In a letter dated September 1940 
to his family back in Germany, Böll conceded:
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The store shelves will of course now be emptied by soldiers…. I have 
 reservations about joining in the stockpiling; although everything is paid 
for, it reminds me of robbing a corpse.22
But it was Hitler who, a few months into the start of World War Two, 
perhaps best expressed a third reason why so many Germans repeatedly 
backed the Nazi’s ever-descending ethical bar: “No one will ask ques-
tions, once we’ve achieved victory.”23 In other words, as Nazi power 
rose with each victory, Germans everywhere sensed—much like every 
compliant link across the Obedience studies—they could unethically par-
ticipate in and personally benefit from the wider organizational system 
with probable impunity.
Spurred on by Germany’s initial military success, as early as 31 July 
1940 Hitler started seriously contemplating an attack on the Soviet 
Union.24 If indeed Hitler pursued this invasion, perhaps a territorial 
solution to the Jewish question could be found somewhere in the vast 
hinterlands of the Soviet Union. Around this time, the “Jewish ques-
tion,” however, was put aside in favor of tasks that demanded more 
immediate attention, such as the extraction of economic resources from 
the recently conquered Polish territories. One such venture involved an 
initially inconspicuous set of ex-army barracks near the Polish city of 
Krakow, which, during the spring of 1940, had been converted into a 
prison for German criminals and recalcitrant Poles.25 The Germans called 
the prison Auschwitz.
The strategic importance of what became known as Auschwitz I to 
the Nazi regime increased significantly after September 1940 when 
Oswald Pohl (Chief of the SS Main Administration and Economic 
Office) discerned in the surrounding area immense economic potential.26 
Pohl’s assessment was independently confirmed when officials from the 
German corporation IG Farben expressed an interest in the region’s nat-
ural resources, centrally located railway junction, accompanying Nazi tax 
exemptions and, of course, access to cut-rate prison labor. On the down-
side, however, the area lacked any basic infrastructure.
On 1 March 1941, Himmler toured Auschwitz I with some IG 
Farben officials. To attract corporate investment, he promised to 
greatly increase the size of the fledgling camp’s manual labor pool. 
Himmler ordered an expansion of Auschwitz I’s capacity to 30,000 
and the construction of a massive satellite camp nearby capable of hold-
ing 100,000 laborers.27 Himmler informed IG Farben officials that the 
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laborers—drawn from the local Jewish and non-Jewish populations—
would be tasked with building whatever infrastructure they desired. 
Himmler also likely had in mind a different and far more efficient source 
of slave labor. Even before he visited Auschwitz I, Himmler knew of 
Hitler’s secret intention in the coming months to invade the Soviet 
Union. The anticipated swift victory would mean a sudden flood of 
Soviet POWs. Soviet POWs were a much more attractive source of slave 
labor than the local Polish population, because nearly all would be strong 
young men capable of arduous labor, whereas many Poles would come 
with families, including the young and old who would require housing 
and feeding for nothing in return.28
the “twisted road” to “reaLizing the unthinkabLe”
Between the end of 1939 and mid-1941, as realist Nazi bureaucrats 
debated where to send Jews and other conquered peoples, events of 
central importance to the subsequent attempt to exterminate European 
Jewry took place elsewhere. Ordinary and arguably only moderately 
antisemitic Germans, who, according to Hilberg, came from a “remark-
able cross-section of the German population,”29 began demonstrating 
an uncanny ability to eliminate fairly large numbers of defenseless civil-
ians using what became by the war’s end the three most common killing 
methods: shooting, starvation, and gassing.
Shooting
During the invasion of Poland, as partisans did their best to 
resist the Nazi attack, the Wehrmacht were faced with orders to 
execute civilians—either those caught resisting or hostages taken in place 
of those still at large. A death sentence also awaited those on Heydrich’s 
list of anti-German agitators. To kill all of these civilians, execution squad 
commanders employed the only method of killing unarmed people they 
knew—death by military-style firing squad. Victims were shot facing the 
shooting squad, separated by ten or so meters. For photographic evidence 
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As discussed in Volume 1, firearms render killing psychologically easier for 
perpetrators than when using weapons like the bayonet. Guns make killing 
relatively easier for the same reason these weapons tend to reduce the pleas-
ure sexually motivated serial killers experience when killing: Firearms ensure 
the deathblow/s to victims need not be felt thus reducing the displeasure 
that more ordinary (typically squeamish) people would otherwise experience 
if they tried to kill with more tactile means. As Levin and Fox observe:
Among serial murders that are sexually inspired, the use of a gun is, in fact, 
remarkably rare. For those killers, physical contact is so crucial to satisfying 
their murderous sexual impulses that a gun robs them of the pleasure they 
receive from killing with their hands.30
Firearms also make killing physically easier, because, compared to other 
closer-range weapons and methods, they generate the force behind the 
lethal blow. In sum, firearms are comparatively more lethal than other 
more common tactile weapons or methods of homicide, because, as 
Egger and Peters succinctly put it, “a gun requires considerably less prox-
imity, strength, agility, skill and squeamishness, and offers less opportunity 
for self-defence…”31 Furthermore, it should be remembered that as mass 
shootings in US educational institutions repeatedly illustrate, when it 
comes to raw power, concealability, and rapid fire, not all guns are equal.
Having said all this, firearms might make killing easier, but they do 
not make killing easy. Shooters are still likely to experience high levels 
of visual and perhaps even auditory perceptual stimulation—they directly 
see and hear the destructive consequences of pulling the trigger. In fact, 
as the number of Polish hostages increased—with three or even up to 
ten Poles executed for every German life lost32—some execution squad 
members started experiencing what Lieutenant General Max Bock 
described as “vast agitation and powerful emotional stress…”33 Stress 
increased when shooting certain types of civilians—executing children 
was deemed a particularly repugnant task.34 During these early exe-
cutions, victims collapsed where they were shot (as shown in both the 
above links to photographs). Afterward, if nobody else could be found, 
the squad members had to dig graves to dispose of the bodies. Doing so 
meant that the shooters then had to directly confront the horrific human 
consequences of their actions. According to Grossman, confronting 
a person one has just killed significantly accentuates the initial trauma, 
“since some of the psychological buffer created by a midrange kill disap-
pears upon seeing the victim at close range.”35
72  N. RUSSELL
Although the German armed forces encountered some psychological dif-
ficulties when killing Poles in this way, they nevertheless managed to shoot 
approximately 16,000 civilians—about 5000 of whom were Jewish.36 Also, 
after the Poles conceded defeat, in the last months of 1939 the SS forces 
and ethnic German auxiliaries shot up to 50,000 members of the Polish 
intelligentsia and other civilian resisters (7000 of whom were Jewish).37
Starvation
Independent of Nazi officials in Berlin, local German authorities in 
the two largest Polish ghettos at Lódź (Incorporated Territory) and 
Warsaw (General Government)—which between them contained about 
one-third of all Polish Jews under Nazi control38—decided at different 
times and for different reasons to seal off their ghettos from the adja-
cent non-Jewish communities.39 Cut off from outside help, the poorest 
Jewish prisoners began to perish from starvation and associated diseases. 
The destructive effects of these policies were first observed in the Lódź 
ghetto, which, with 163,177 Jews40 crammed into a 2.6-square kilom-
eter sector of the wider city,41 was sealed in April 1940. That summer 
Governor Greiser reported that from the “point of view of nutrition and 
the control of epidemics” life in the Lódź ghetto had already become 
untenable.42 Between June 1940 and the end of January 1941, more 
than 7000 Jews died in the Lódź ghetto.43
Alexander Palfinger, a German ghetto administrator, seized upon this 
catastrophe as a partial solution to the escalating “Jewish problem.” As 
far as he was concerned, “A rapid dying out of the Jews is for us a mat-
ter of total indifference, if not to say desirable.” According to Palfinger’s 
interpretation of Nazi ideology, such an outcome was consistent with 
what he anticipated would become the regime’s “radical course,” because 
in relation to the “Jewish question the National Socialist idea…permits 
no compromise…”44 Palfinger thus provides another example of Carl 
Friedrich’s rule of anticipated reactions (i.e., guessing what one’s superior 
probably desires) or Browning’s “seizing the initiative from below…”
Browning calls German ghetto administrators like Palfinger, who 
believed the Jews should be starved, “attritionists.”45 Opposed to attri-
tionists were another group of administrators termed “productionists,” 
who believed that sources of labor should not be wasted, and that mak-
ing the Jews work would not only financially benefit Germany, but also 
enable Jews to obtain food at no cost to the Reich, thus averting any risk 
of starvation. This self-sustaining policy could be maintained until Berlin 
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decided where to send these Jews. As Palfinger’s immediate superior, 
Hans Biebow (Lódź’s chief ghetto administrator), argued on 18 October 
1940, “everything must be done to make the ghetto self-sustaining.”46 
Biebow and his superior, Dr. Karl Marder (the deputy mayor of Lódź), 
set up a ghetto economy, indicating that in Lódź the “productionists” 
were in control and Palfinger was ignored.47
The discontented Palfinger soon transferred to the Warsaw ghetto, 
where by March 1941 nearly half a million Jews had been squeezed into 
just over three square kilometers of space.48 There he met like-minded 
“attritionists” Waldemar Schön and Karl Naumann, and together they 
generated conditions that promoted what Schön euphemistically termed 
“premature impoverishment…”49 But again Palfinger’s intentions were 
subordinated to those of Warsaw’s own “productionists” who dom-
inated among the local German authorities. At a meeting on 3 April 
1941, Walter Emmerich argued, “The starting point for all economic 
measures had to be the idea of maintaining the capacity of the Jews to live” 
[italics original].50 Thus, on 19 April 1941 a new “productionist” pol-
icy was introduced in Warsaw. Schön was replaced by Max Bischof who 
was told that if Palfinger caused any further problems he could have him 
removed. Palfinger stopped trying to anticipate Hitler’s desires and, hav-
ing narrowly avoided dismissal, by early May 1941 informed a surprised 
Adam Czerniaków (the Jewish council chairman that helped manage the 
ghetto), “that he will do everything to improve the food supply.”51
Despite all this, because the Nazi regime struggled to meet the gener-
ous basic food requirements of its civilian population,52 being unable to 
always accommodate the needs of those at the top of their racial hierar-
chy meant that grueling times indeed lay ahead for the Jews at the bot-
tom, irrespective of how hard they were willing to work. As Göring said, 
“If someone has to go hungry, it won’t be the Germans…”53 In the end, 
promises of more food were made to the Jews in the Polish ghettos, but, 
as Biebow pointed out in January 1941, little arrived because it was con-
tinually “withdrawn for allegedly more urgent needs.”54 People in the 
ghetto population received about 220 calories per day, which is about 
15% of normal dietary requirements.55
During April and May 1941, a famine of endemic proportions took 
hold of the Warsaw ghetto killing 6000 Jews.56 Nevertheless, German 
administrators (“productionists” and “attritionists” alike) followed direc-
tives from Berlin that the Jews were not to leave the ghetto in search 
of food.57 These administrators were able to tolerate the deaths that 
resulted with relative psychological ease because, for reasons discussed in 
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Volume 1, starvation as a method of killing causes little affective stimula-
tion. None of the Germans involved—from those who rounded up and 
delivered victims to the ghettos, to the administrators, and the guards 
who prevented their escape—had to touch, see, or hear victims in their 
death throes. Excluding guards who frequently shot escapees, none of 
the perpetrators had to actually kill Jews. Instead, the German authorities 
were able to pass responsibility to a reified “Berlin” for imposing such 
deadly conditions. They did not perceive themselves as the most respon-
sible for the deaths. This strain resolving displacement of responsibility 
was made possible by the division of labor inherent within the ghetto 
administration’s bureaucracy, which helped ease the perpetrators’ psy-
chological burden of death.
Being in positions of power, most Germans involved could, if they so 
chose, deploy Obedience study-like avoidance techniques to circumvent 
the perceptual reality of those slowly dying in the ghettos. Consider, for 
example, Claude Lanzmann’s conversation with Deputy Commissioner of 
the Warsaw ghetto, Franz Grassler: “Did you go into the ghetto? Seldom. 
When I had to visit Czerniaków. What were the conditions like? Awful. Yes, 
appalling. I never went back when I saw what it was like. Unless I had 
to. In the whole period I think I only went once or twice.”58 The rea-
son Grassler rarely had to enter the ghetto was because the Nazis formed 
Jewish councils—the so-called Judenrat—and tasked them with organiz-
ing the day-to-day management and policing of the ghettos. Here, the 
Nazis deployed “the tried-and-tested colonial” technique “of indirect 
rule through favored natives who got privileges…in exchange for help-
ing control everyone else.”59 As we shall see, throughout World War Two 
the Nazis repeatedly relied on this divide and rule management tech-
nique. The Nazis did so because not only it more efficiently minimized 
German labor, but also it spread complicity for any harmful outcomes 
onto the Jewish leadership. As one German official in Warsaw noted, 
during periods of extreme hardship the ghetto inhabitants would rather 
conveniently “direct their resentment against the Jewish administrations 
and not against the German supervisors.”60 And when the Nazi overlords 
did have to enter the ghettos, the desperate and corrupting conditions 
endured by the starving population only served to reinforce the former’s 
prejudicial stereotypes of the Ostjuden (Eastern Jew). These distraught 
and starved people often looked and sometimes even behaved just like the 
parasitic and threatening criminals the Nazis assumed them to be.61
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Gassing
As early as July 1933, the Nazi regime passed the Weimar Republic’s 
Law for the Prevention of Genetically Damaged Offspring, after which 
somewhere between 200,000 and 350,000 Germans were sterilized.62 
However, several years later in October 1939, congruent with Nazi 
 ideology, Hitler produced the following secret document,
Berlin, 1 Sept. 1939
Reich Leader Bouhler and Dr. med. Brandt are charged with the 
responsibility of enlarging the competence of certain physicians, designated 
by name, so that patients who, on the basis of human judgment, are con-
sidered incurable, can be granted mercy death after a discerning diagnosis.
(signed) A. Hitler63
This document, which Hitler backdated to the start of the war, author-
ized what the Nazi’s euphemistically termed the euthanasia program: 
the extermination of people with physical and mental disabilities. Hitler 
signed the document because chancellery officials informed him that the 
physicians approached to implement this policy would likely require an 
assurance from the state that they would not be held criminally liable for 
their harmful actions.64 That is, Hitler’s advisors anticipated that those 
most directly involved would need to know that they could kill with 
impunity. Much like Milgram’s decision to insert the strain resolving 
“Waver [sic] of responsibility” into his emerging procedure (see Volume 
1),65 the chancellery officials also anticipated that their subordinate harm 
inflictors, fearing someone might later question them about their deci-
sion to hurt others, needed to feel they were sufficiently covered.
For several reasons, this is an important document. First, it illustrates 
that when Hitler suspected a policy of exterminating “subhumans” 
had a realistic chance of successful implementation, the strong believer 
in him was willing to pursue it. Second, his backdating of this doc-
ument to the same date he instructed his Death’s Head Units to start 
killing “all” members of the “Polish race” and when he threatened to 
start annihilating “the Jewish race in Europe” triangulates when in ear-
nest Hitler intended to convert Nazi ideology into a reality. It was from 
1 September 1939 that he wanted to start killing all “subhumans.”66 
The problem for Hitler was that his subordinates were not yet willing 
or capable of converting his intentions into a reality. Nevertheless, this 
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document irrefutably connects Hitler to, and establishes him as, the lead-
ing instigator of Nazi genocidal ambitions, which (in conflict with his 
usual modus operandi) captures his direct top-down orders to kill.
Clearly, however, Hitler had confidence in the ability of Philipp 
Bouhler (from the private chancellery) and Karl Brandt (Hitler’s pri-
vate doctor) to set up an organization capable of converting his desire 
into a reality. In all likelihood, this confidence traces back to the fact that 
such killings would target a particularly powerless group segregated from 
wider society in secretive institutions. Furthermore, political resistance to 
this policy was unlikely because the wider German public would be dis-
tracted by the natural distress of a nation at war.
Bouhler and Brandt soon formed an organization called Tiergartenstraße 
4 (T4). The organization started experimenting with different killing 
techniques, including lethal injection, which Brandt suspected T4 staff 
might willingly use on patients. However, he later concluded that this 
method was insufficiently “humane.”67 Trial-and-error exploration 
confirmed that lethal injection was too slow and unreliable.68 It surely 
didn’t help that this method of killing necessitated a physical connec-
tion between the injector (cause) and injected (effect), especially when 
patients died slow and presumably painful deaths. Then, Viktor Brack 
from Hitler’s private chancellery, in conjunction with chemist Albert 
Widmann, suggested diverting pure bottled carbon monoxide gas into 
a hermetically sealed room,69 intuiting that this was a method the T4 
staff might use. Put differently, when compared to lethal injection, Brack 
and Widmann suspected the more “humane” method of gassing might 
better ensure the act of killing would remain within the T4 staff ’s Zone of 
Indifference—a task that, without reservation, they would willingly par-
take. This method of killing was trailed soon after the start of the war 
when the tentacles of the euthanasia program reached across Germany’s 
border and into the annexed Polish territories.70
More specifically, in Poland Brandt helped set up the Lange Commando, 
headed by Herbert Lange, a “no-nonsense” fanatical Nazi.71 The 
15-man strong commando was based in Fort VII, a recently estab-
lished Gestapo prison located in Poznań (in Greiser’s Wartheland prov-
ince in the former Poland).72 Around October or November 1939, the 
T4 chemist August Becker arrived at Fort VII armed with cylinders of 
carbon monoxide. Becker was there to provide Lange with “technical 
assistance” in pursuit of an experimental killing operation.73 The Lange 
Commando locked a group of psychiatric patients in a prison cell that 
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had rather hastily been hermetically sealed with clay.74 Carbon mon-
oxide was then pumped into the cell, killing the patients. Throughout 
December, Lange and his men used this killing technique to exterminate 
patients from the surrounding area. They also instructed prisoners from 
Fort VII—non-Jewish Poles accused of partisan activity—to empty the 
cell and, in a nearby forest, bury the victims’ bodies.75 After some reflec-
tion, Lange deemed collecting and then killing patients at Fort VII inef-
ficient and soon after instructed his Polish prisoner work detail to help 
convert a truck with a large cargo cabin into a mobile gas chamber.76 
Despite accounts that Lange had two or more of these early-model gas 
vans, Patrick Montague is confident that only one such truck existed.77 
Canisters of pure carbon monoxide were attached to the driver’s com-
partment. From January 1940, this truck was observed being driven 
to victims located at various institutions throughout the Wartheland.78 
Once patients were locked in the cargo cabin, gas was released by open-
ing valves located in the driver’s cabin. Again, Lange’s prison work detail 
was instructed to dispose of the victims’ bodies in a nearby forest. Using 
Polish workers for such tasks obviously enabled Lange’s men to avoid 
having to touch the recently killed victims.
Perhaps inspired by Lange’s efforts, back in Germany around January 
1940 a team of T4 officials were invited to Brandenburg-Havel prison to 
observe a demonstration. Twenty institutionalized men were locked in a 
cell79 and according to Becker, having recently returned from his trip to 
Fort VII, the cell was,
a tiled shower room, measuring about three meters by five, and three 
meters high. On the periphery were benches, and along the wall, at about 
ten centimeters from the ground, a gas main about an inch in diameter 
passed. This pipe was pierced with little holes out of which the carbon 
monoxide came.80
A physician controlled a lever on the gas canister. After about twenty 
minutes, asphyxia set in followed by death.81 At least seventeen T4 offi-
cials observed this demonstration—including Brandt, Brack, Widmann, 
Philipp Bouhler, Christian Wirth, Irmfried Ebel, and August Becker—all 
of whom went on to play central roles in the extermination of Jews.82 
They deemed the demonstration so “successful” that having discov-
ered what they suspected was the “one best way” to achieving Hitler’s 
goal of exterminating people with disabilities, the euthanasia gassing 
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program was initiated in Germany. Five permanent gas chambers were 
set up at various institutions throughout Germany, including Grafeneck, 
Bernburg, Hadamar, Hartheim, and Sonnenstein. These institutions 
tended to have benign, strain resolving names such as The Charitable 
Foundation for Institutional Care and The Reich Work Cooperative for 
Institutional Care.83
Throughout the Wartheland between January and April 1940, 
Lange’s roaming unit continued killing Poles with disabilities.84 The 
commando proved so effective that in May they were seconded to an 
East Prussian hospital (a few hundred kilometers north) where, across 
a mere two-week period, they gassed 1558 patients.85 Somewhat mys-
teriously, between 8 June 1940 and 3 June 1941 the Lange Commando 
ceased killing Poles with disabilities.86 Nonetheless, in terms of the 
broader picture, between the end of 1939 and the summer of 1941, T4 
gassed at least 80,000 Germans87 and thousands of Poles with disabili-
ties.88 This gassing technique generated little strain, trauma, or repug-
nance on the perpetrators who neither had to touch, see, nor hear their 
victims die. In fact, should they have desired it, gassing offered the killers 
the option of total perceptual avoidance.
the transformation of himmLer and heydriCh
Since early in 1939 when Heydrich had been charged with settling 
Germany’s “Jewish problem,” Himmler, his superior, fretted over the 
SS’s repeated failure to resolve this issue. This concern came to a head in 
January 1941, when Himmler appealed directly to Heydrich for a solu-
tion to the problem of population exchange in the East between Jews, 
Christian Poles, and ethnic Germans.89 There was no obvious place 
yet available to send the Poles. Around this point in time, however, I 
would argue that Himmler and Heydrich underwent a gradual transfor-
mation. That is, across the period that their own more “realistic” policy 
of emigration faltered, moderately antisemitic Germans demonstrated an 
uncanny ability to eliminate fairly large numbers of defenseless civilians. 
It did not take long for Himmler and Heydrich to sense potential in pre-
viously rejected ideas of the “strong believers.”
The emergence of this transformation perhaps traces back to the sum-
mer of 1940 when Himmler confirmed his “realist” status when he said, 
“‘out of inner conviction,’ he still rejected ‘the physical extermination of 
a race through Bolshevik methods…[because they were] un-Germanic 
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and impracticable.’”90 In other words, it was beneath the dignity of 
Germans to engage in acts of mass killing. Simultaneously, Heydrich par-
roted the same argument.91 And in any case, because such ideas were 
considered “impracticable,” they were ruled out from further discussion. 
However, as Himmler implied, if extermination suddenly became feasi-
ble, he might be willing to reconsider.
So, it is clear that much like their Führer, Himmler and Heydrich only 
favored emigration over more radical “strong believer” measures because 
the former seemed more “realistic.” Thus, for “realists” like Hitler, 
Himmler, and Heydrich, the desire to exterminate “inferiors” had always 
been present92—keeping in mind that their preference to cram Jews into 
cargo ships and deport them to Madagascar’s harsh tropical environment 
(perhaps governed by T4’s Philipp Bouhler)93 was, in itself, inherently 
genocidal.94 However, before 1941 a realistic means of achieving large-
scale extermination did not exist. Hitler may have repeatedly hinted at 
his “wish” that the Jews be exterminated, but before 1941 all signals 
indicated that converting such a desire into reality was probably impos-
sible.95 The impracticality of a “Final Solution” before 1941 helps to 
explain why there was no planning for genocide before then.96
But as the previously unrealistic ideas of the “strong believers” began 
showing greater potential than their own stalled “realist” strategies, both 
Himmler and Heydrich started contemplating ways of applying “strong 
believer” solutions to local manifestations of the “Jewish problem.” For 
example, sometime after October or November of 1940, the Chief SS 
physician, Ernst Grawitz, claimed that Heydrich asked him to boost the 
death rate in the Warsaw ghetto by triggering an epidemic.97 More cer-
tainly, a few months later Himmler contemplated using the T4 eutha-
nasia gassing technique in his over-crowded concentration camps. In a 
discussion in early 1941 between Himmler and Bouhler about prisoners 
no longer capable of productive labor, the SS-Reichsführer wondered, 
“whether and how the personnel and the facilities of T4 can be utilized 
for the concentration camps.”98
Early in 1941, T4 leader Bouhler agreed to let Himmler use T4 personnel 
and facilities to rid the camps of ‘excess’ prisoners – notably those ‘most 
seriously ill,’ physically and mentally. Sometimes called ‘prisoner euthana-
sia’ or (by prisoners) ‘Operation Invalid,’ the resultant program was offi-
cially ‘Operation [or Special Treatment] 14f13.’99
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The 14f13 killing program started in April 1941100 and was soon after 
extended to the recently built concentration camps in the East. By the 
end of May101 or July102 of 1941, ex-T4 personnel working in Operation 
14f13 had arrived in the hinterlands of Poland, in places like Auschwitz 
I. In a related operation, 575 men from Auschwitz I who “were all 
worn out”103 were selected and transported by train to a T4 gas cham-
ber hundreds of miles away at Sonnenstein in Germany.104 German camp 
officials determined that these men could not be killed at Auschwitz I 
without causing a commotion.105 By the end of the war, Operation 
14f13 had killed nearly 20,000 people.106
Himmler and Heydrich, of course, were not the only ones to sense 
potential in the ideas of the strong believers. Consider, for example, 
Rudolf Gater, a rationalization expert, who independently saw merit in 
ghetto administrator Palfinger’s intuition when in March of 1941 he 
argued that, “conditions of undernourishment” in the Polish ghettos 
“could be allowed to develop without regard for the consequences.”107 
Also, on 16 July 1941 SS-Sturmbannführer Rolf-Heinz Höppner wrote 
in a letter to Eichmann,
This winter [in the Wartheland] there is a danger that it will not be pos-
sible to feed all the Jews. It should therefore seriously be considered 
whether the most humane solution would not be to eliminate those Jews 
unfit for work by some fast-working method. That would in any case be 
more agreeable than leaving them to die of starvation.108
He concluded, “These things sound somewhat fantastic but are in my 
opinion definitely feasible.”109 Curiously, during the four-week period 
before Höppner wrote this letter, the Lange Commando had resumed, 
after their 12-month hiatus, exterminating Wartheland Poles with dis-
abilities.110 Perhaps Höppner was cognizant of Lange’s activities (both 
were based in Poznań),111 and maybe this explains why, with respect to 
the Jews, he had euthanasia gassing technology in mind.112 However, 
Himmler, who two months earlier had sent hundreds of Auschwitz’s 
prisoners by train to be gassed in Germany, had already discovered that 
installing the T4 killing technology in the Eastern territories was actu-
ally impracticable. It was impracticable because gassing required cylin-
ders of pure carbon monoxide which were expensive to produce, difficult 
to transport out of Germany, and the quantities required to kill such 
large numbers of civilians simply did not exist.113 If gassing was ever to 
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be relied upon in the East, all of these obstacles would have to be over-
come. As Hilberg argued,
We are dealing not with a sudden decision but with the emergence of 
an idea. […] the idea of killing the Jews had now matured. As a plan for 
administrative action, the idea was not yet obvious or even feasible; but as 
a thought of something that could happen.114
But only those in direct control of the machinery of destruction—
Himmler, “a genius for organization”115 and the “Architect of 
Genocide,”116 and Heydrich, “the real engineer” (as Gerald Reitinger 
called him117)—were in sufficiently powerful positions to convert such 
ideas into reality.118 As both the “Realization of the Unthinkable”119 
simmered and Hitler started unveiling his intentions to invade the Soviet 
Union, “Murder” as Browning observes “was in the air…”120
hitLer and the invasion of the soviet union
With a handful of successful military campaigns and most of Western 
Europe under his belt in December 1940, a Hitler brimming with con-
fidence finalized his plans to attack the Soviet Union. Termed Operation 
Barbarossa, the campaign was to start the following summer.121 Like 
the invasion of Poland, Operation Barbarossa would be a two-pronged 
assault. The Wehrmacht would lead the way, deploying its trademark 
Blitzkrieg tactics. Himmler’s men would follow in the German mil-
itary’s wake and secure the captured territory. Again, the Nazi leader-
ship suspected that Russia’s so-called Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia 
would encourage common folk to resist German forces, and so on 13 
March 1941, Hitler tasked Himmler’s SS with the elimination of these 
leaders.122 On 26 March, Eduard Wagner (the Quartermaster General of 
the Wehrmacht High Command) and Himmler agreed with this general 
plan.123 A few days later on 30 March, Hitler informed a couple of hun-
dred commanding officers that during Operation Barbarossa they were 
not to rely on traditional military customs. Instead, this was a,
Clash between two ideologies… Bolshevism equals a social criminality. 
Communism [is a] tremendous danger for the future. We must get away 
from the standpoint of soldierly comradeship. The Communist is no com-
rade, either before or after. It is a war of extermination […] The troops 
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must defend themselves with the methods with which they are attacked. 
Commissars and secret service personnel are criminals and must be treated as 
such. [italics added]124
If one reads a little between the lines here, because the Nazis closely 
associated Jews with Bolshevism, here Hitler was socially constructing 
the Jews—or at least the (apparent) Jewish Soviet leadership—into a 
population of criminals. And because, according to the dictates of Nazi 
ideology, Jews are genetically immutable, the only infallible and perma-
nent means of eliminating this omnipotent crime problem was that it be 
exterminated. Hitler urging his commanders to exterminate Bolshevist 
Jews may sound like an extremely radical request, but it should be kept 
in mind that before unification, Germany’s many states had long histo-
ries of killing those deemed by rule-making legislators to be “dangerous 
criminals.” Interestingly, just over a year earlier in the November 1938 
edition of Das Schwarze Korps, Heydrich explicitly captured what I sus-
pect was the Führer’s attempt at framing all Jews as “criminals…” On 
top of this, the SS-Obergruppenführer also makes the normative connec-
tion to what Germans had historically done with such people.
The German people are not in the least inclined to tolerate in their coun-
try hundreds of thousands of criminals, who not only secure their exist-
ence through crime, but also want to exact revenge. […] These hundreds 
of thousands of impoverished Jews [would create] a breeding ground for 
Bolshevism and a collection of the politically criminal subhuman elements. 
[…] In such a situation we would be faced with the hard necessity of 
exterminating the Jewish underworld in the same way as, under our gov-
ernment of law and order, we are accustomed to exterminating any other 
criminals – that is, by fire and sword. The result would be the actual and 
final end of Jewry in Germany, its absolute annihilation.125
Again, Bolshevists were Jews, Jews were criminals, and, as long practiced 
throughout German history, it was quite normal for the government to 
execute those deemed by rule makers to be dangerous criminals. For 
many Germans in the armed forces, this was just the kind of reasoning 
that helped personally legitimize their killing of a large category of other 
human beings.
Putting aside the Nazi’s gradual social construction of Jews into “crim-
inals,” it was Hitler’s suspicion that a successful invasion of the Soviet 
Union would have many benefits for Germany. It would surely force 
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Britain to concede defeat. If not, however, the Nazis would gain access 
to the fertile Ukrainian breadbasket, thus circumventing the effectiveness 
of any Allied blockade of the German civilian population, such as had 
occurred during World War One.126 The Nazis might also gain access to 
the Caucasus oil fields, the largest in Europe.127 And finally, a Soviet defeat 
might discourage the Americans from entering the war. Tainting any such 
anticipated victory, however, were the four or perhaps five million Jews liv-
ing within the Soviet Union’s post-August 1939 borders.128 Himmler and 
Heydrich, charged with resolving the Jewish problem, would have been 
particularly sensitive to this drawback. Then again, a successful conquest 
of Russia might (with the British Navy presumably out of the way) revive 
the Madagascar Plan as a potential solution to the “Jewish Question,” and 
if not, the massive Soviet interior included several new possible expulsion 
sites (presumably viewed to be German colonial penal colonies), including 
the Ukrainian marshlands or even the Siberian wastelands.129
In preparation for eliminating the Soviet intelligentsia, about 3000 
rank and file men drawn from the SS, SD, the Gestapo, Sipo, Waffen 
SS forces, as well as the less politicized State Police, Reserve Police 
Battalions, and also some civilian draftees were recruited for spe-
cial training in May 1941.130 The men were divided into four groups: 
Einsatzgruppe A, B, C, and D. These four groups were further subdi-
vided into units called Einsatzkommandos (50–175 men each), and 
further again into Sonderkommandos.131 Also, a month earlier, around 
mid-April, Himmler instructed Police Battalion 322, and probably other 
police units, to prepare for operations outside of Germany.132
One interpretation of the Nazi regime’s attack on the Soviet Union 
is that just before the start of the campaign, Himmler and Heydrich 
were so concerned about their ever-expanding “Jewish problem” that 
they subtly conveyed their ultimate desire to the commanders tasked 
with executing the “Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia” that they wanted 
their execution squads to exterminate every Jewish man, woman, and 
child encountered. As Breitman notes: “One reading of the events is 
that the Einsatzgruppen commanders already knew the final goal of Nazi 
Jewish policy and were given some discretion to accomplish as much 
as they could with limited manpower.”133 This is not to suggest that 
before the start of the invasion execution squad commanders were given 
direct orders to exterminate Soviet Jewry (a controversial issue termed 
the Krausnick versus Streim debate),134 but rather that the commanders 
of the execution squads had a “vague notion”135 of what Himmler and 
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Heydrich desired of them: They were to exterminate as many Jews as 
they possibly could.
The main reason I suspect there were no direct orders instruct-
ing all Jews to be killed is that before the campaign both Himmler and 
Heydrich were not sure their men would be willing and/or capable of 
fulfilling such orders. As Jürgen Matthäus puts it, “Before the unleash-
ing of Operation Barbarossa, the German leadership could not be cer-
tain that its political will would be carried out in the field.”136 Much of 
the SS leadership’s skepticism came from the earlier Polish campaign 
during which German armed forces were ordered to shoot civilians. 
Although the Germans killed tens of thousands, they frequently expe-
rienced “vast agitation and powerful emotional stress” from doing so. 
Himmler’s awareness of these psychological problems was so acute that 
in June 1940 he employed and promoted the brutal World War One vet-
eran Oskar Dirlewanger (also a convicted pedophile) and supplied him 
with a battalion of ex-convict poachers—killing specialists—for the kinds 
of human shooting assignments that Himmler suspected most Germans 
would shy away from.137 But the task of eliminating just the Russian 
intelligentsia was so great that Himmler and Heydrich needed to rely on 
more numerous categories of Germans from the SS, Order Police, and 
Wehrmacht.
On the other hand, Himmler and Heydrich may have had reason to 
suspect that their ordinary men might be willing and capable of killing 
every Soviet Jew encountered given the right circumstances. During the 
Polish campaign, some members of the execution squads proved them-
selves entirely capable of regularly shooting defenseless men138—a dif-
ficult task some perceived as a measure of manliness.139 This time the 
victims would not be somewhat similar-looking Poles, but Soviet Jews, 
people who were ethnically, culturally, and economically significantly 
different from the Germans who filled Himmler’s ranks. Furthermore, 
Soviet Jews embodied the two main targets of nearly a decade of Nazi 
propaganda—the threat of “Jewish Bolshevism.” On top of this, with 
some of his men having willingly executed many Poles accused of par-
tisan resistance, it is perhaps of little surprise that with increasing inten-
sity after the Polish invasion, Himmler liked to remind his men that 
“Where there are partisans…there are Jews, and where there are Jews, 
there are partisans.”140 Because Himmler later came to believe that the 
word “partisan” tended to glamorize Bolshevism, in a special order he 
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then requested the application of this word be replaced with “bandits,” 
“franc-tireurs,” and—in line with Hitler’s own term—“criminals…”141
Importantly, because during the lead-up to the Soviet invasion the 
Nazi regime had socially constructed Jews to be both “partisans” and 
“criminals,” Himmler and Heydrich likely suspected that the killing of all 
Jews—unlike during the start of the Polish campaign—might have been 
within the German armed force’s Zone of Indifference. More specifically, 
because the role of soldiers and police officers occasionally involves kill-
ing “criminals” and “partisans” (respectively), the annihilation of all Jews 
was now a task that, with less reservation, they might—if psychologically 
capable—willingly partake. And even if armed Germans proved psycho-
logically incapable of killing all Jewish civilians in the East, perhaps more 
fiercely antisemitic Eastern European collaborators might do the job.
Whether German or Eastern European executioners succeeded or 
not in killing every Jewish person encountered, the end result would 
still be fewer Jews contributing to Himmler and Heydrich’s escalating 
“Jewish problem.”142 If their subtle plans resulted in a technically fea-
sible solution, they could then invest far more resources into it. And if 
the plan failed dismally, and all available forces flatly refused to partici-
pate in something as unethical and unlawful as genocide, the SS leader-
ship—including Hitler—could plausibly deny the existence of any such 
order (perhaps explaining why no direct orders to kill all Jews before 
the Soviet invasion have ever been found).143 It will be recalled that 
just before the Polish invasion Hitler had boasted to his commanders of 
sending “my ‘Death’s Head Units’ with the order to kill without pity 
or mercy all men, women, and children of Polish race or language.” He 
must have felt a little embarrassed when they did no such thing, with 
some soldiers even suffering breakdowns when they tried to kill Polish 
civilians en masse. And perhaps it was here that a red-faced Hitler learned 
from his presumptuousness. As Henry Friedlander observed,
although Hitler believed that the cover of war would make radical exclu-
sion through killing operations possible – which he emphasized by 
backdating his euthanasia authorization to the day the war began – he 
nevertheless did not issue a definite order [regarding the “Jewish prob-
lem”] until he was certain that such an ambitious killing enterprise was 
feasible.144
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Again, before Hitler would back a “strong believer” solution, such a 
solution had to be “realistic.”145 And even if Himmler and Heydrich 
failed, because they left the door of plausible deniability wide open, they 
could evade the embarrassment that usually, when among their Nazi 
peers, accompanies such failure and simply move on to test some other 
more “realistic” strategy. And the Nazi leadership did have a history of 
issuing vague orders necessitating subordinate initiative, especially when 
those leaders wanted to retain the option of later denying responsibil-
ity for delivering those orders.146 Because Himmler and Heydrich were 
confident that Germany would win the war and would soon be in total 
control of all of Europe, suspecting they could act with impunity, they 
likely believed themselves to have a free hand to dabble in genocide. 
Somewhat like Milgram, they suspected that from positions of power 
they could determine what was morally right and wrong. Quite sim-
ply, the SS leadership suspected they had an enormous amount to gain 
and little to lose in running their pilot study in genocide—what Konrad 
Kwiet terms a “testing ground for subsequent killings.”147
Although Himmler and Heydrich were unsure if their men would kill 
every Jewish person they encountered, one variable they did control was 
their own actions. Having learned from their past experiences during the 
Polish campaign, from the top-down, they would do all they could to 
encourage, persuade, or, if necessary, coerce their men into doing what 
they ultimately desired.148 For example, during training for their future 
tasks, members of the Einsatzgruppen and Order Police were exposed to 
a deluge of antisemitic propaganda.149 Perhaps if the men had a strong 
ideological rationale for harming others, they might come to see the 
“necessity” of killing all Jews and associate the second part of their train-
ing schedule—shooting practice—as the means of achieving that end.150
Even though the rank and file was not selected on an individual basis, 
the same could not be said of their field commanders. Around mid-April 
1941, Himmler started to personally select his Higher SS and Police 
leaders.151 And in terms of the Einsatzgruppen, not only were these 
commanders handpicked on the basis of initiative and independence152 
but also nearly all of them possessed characteristics that reinforced the 
perception that they were credible and intellectual elites. As Müller-Hill 
observes, of the fifteen commanders in the Soviet interior between 1941 
and 1943, six (40%) had doctoral degrees, and three others (20%) had 
studied law.153 Furthermore, 16 of 69 (23%) Einsatzkommando lead-
ers held doctoral degrees, with the remainder having at least studied 
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at university.154 Officers were likely to have been educated at prestig-
ious German or Austrian universities and often worked in the law pro-
fession.155 This was no coincidence: If there was a threat that the lower 
ranks might baulk at the legalities of exterminating certain categories of 
civilians, the binding force of uncompromising ideologues whose exper-
tize frequently lay in the law itself might mitigate this risk. If they were 
not lawyers, the field commanders typically came from other respected 
professions—the kind of high-status positions (like Dr. Milgram or 
Williams the Yale-based “scientist”) a reluctant subordinate could con-
veniently place their faith in. Drawing on Müller-Hill’s research, as 
Hilary Earl notes: “When a university professor, an economist, a priest, a 
doctor, or a lawyer order executions, ‘they cannot be wrong…’”156
Despite carefully selecting the leadership class and then barraging 
the rank and file with ideological propaganda and training with weap-
ons fairly low in perceptual stimulation, a few days before the launch of 
Operation Barbarossa, Heydrich expressed doubts about the willingness 
and/or capability of his men to shoot civilians. With the intention of 
passing off such dirty work to local populations, Browning argues that 
Heydrich stressed in a meeting with the Einsatzgruppen commanders 
in Berlin on 17 June that, “No obstacle was to be placed in the way of 
the ‘self-cleansing efforts’…of anticommunist and anti-Jewish circles.”157 
With respect to the German men’s capacity to exterminate civilians, 
Matthäus argues the SS leader had a “fear of going too far too quickly,” 
and (with a hint of the foot-in-the-door phenomenon) “instead of pro-
viding explicit orders for the rapid expansion of the killing process, the 
SS and police leadership in Berlin seems to have followed a course that 
can be described as controlled escalation.”158 According to Breitman, 
Himmler likewise believed “Once they [his men] had carried out mass 
murder in response to an alleged crime or provocation, it would be easier 
to get them to follow broader killing orders later.”159
On the eve of the attack, the German armed forces issued the rank 
and file with the (purposefully ambiguous?) Commissar Order. The 
order stated, “This struggle demands ruthless and energetic measures 
against bolshevist agitators, guerrillas, saboteurs, Jews, and complete 
elimination of any active or passive resistance.”160 For groups such as 
the Einsatzgruppen, the Commissar Order was congruent with their 
main task: Much like during the Polish invasion, they were to secure 
the captured territory and kill any signs of national leadership. Having 
said that, with the help of their field commanders, it was up to the men 
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to interpret what “ruthless and energetic measures” against “Jews” 
engaging in “active or passive resistance” meant. Some would guess 
correctly and be rewarded. Others would fail (perhaps purposefully) to 
implement the SS leadership’s desired course. For them, clearer hints—
secondhand or, if necessary, personally delivered oral orders—would be 
needed. True to Hitler’s usual management style, ambiguous orders left 
the door of “personal initiative” wide open.161 With increasing clarity, 
time, and experience, the men in the field would be shouldered with 
resolving what, for the more ambitious among them, would become an 
intense competition to find the “one best way” of shooting civilians en 
masse.162 With words somewhat reminiscent of Milgram’s pilot studies, 
as Browning put it: “What they were being asked to accomplish was at 
the time totally unprecedented. At this stage every step was uncharted, 
every policy an experiment, every action a trial run.”163
ConCLusion
Between the end of 1939 and halfway through 1941, realist Nazi 
bureaucrats spent much time and energy debating where they could 
resettle an ever-increasing number of Jews and other conquered peo-
ples. While at the same time, ordinary and arguably moderately antise-
mitic non-Jewish Germans164 began demonstrating their ability to kill 
fairly large numbers of defenseless civilians using what became by the 
war’s end the three common methods of shooting, starvation, and gas-
sing. With the repeated failure of the apparently more “realistic” policy 
of emigration, the most powerful “realist” bureaucrats started to sense 
potential in the previously rejected ideas of the “strong believers.” As 
the invasion of the Soviet Union approached, an excellent opportu-
nity appeared to at least test the feasibility of this radical solution. But 
would their men shoot all Soviet Jews? As Breitman argues, Himmler, 
Heydrich, and Kurt Daluege (of the Order Police) “did not yet know 
how smoothly the killing process would work, which leaders and units 
would prove effective, and whether there would be significant resistance, 
including resistance from the policemen themselves.”165 Browning adds, 
“they did not know – indeed could not have known – if the plans they 
had been formulating would even work.”166 Time would certainly tell.
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This chapter explores the top-down forces utilized by the SS leadership 
to encourage ordinary and moderately antisemitic Germans to participate 
in the genocide of Jewish men, then women, and finally all Jews, includ-
ing children and babies. It delineates the SS leadership’s central role in 
driving the extermination of Soviet Jewry. This chapter supports the 
previous argument that before the campaign, the SS leadership desired, 
but did not directly order, the extermination of Soviet Jewry. More spe-
cifically, because ordinary Germans had participated in the killings of 
fairly large numbers of “Untermenschen” over the previous few years, 
the SS leadership suspected before Operation Barbarossa that their men 
might willingly exterminate every Soviet Jew encountered. They could 
not, however, be certain, and consequently, they felt it unwise to set 
out by issuing direct orders. Instead, during the invasion Himmler and 
Heydrich planned to do all they could to socially engineer their desire—
the so-called Führer’s wish—into reality. I would argue that the SS lead-
ership’s rational intention to convert Hitler’s desires into reality shares 
some similarity with the initially uncertain Milgram where, while invent-
ing his baseline procedure, he did all he could to maximize his partici-
pants’ participation in harm doing.
But if, from the start of the Soviet campaign, there were no direct 
official orders to kill all Jews, then the “staggering…speed with which 
the wave of mass murder gathered pace” remains a mystery.1 The next 
two chapters aim to shed some new light on this mystery. This depress-
ing chapter in history begins with the so-called Holocaust by bullets.
CHAPTER 4
Operation Barbarossa and the Holocaust 
by Bullets—Top-Down Forces
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oPeration barbarossa
Operation Barbarossa began on 22 June 1941 when three million 
German troops entered Soviet territory. Following the Wehrmacht came 
the 3000 or so members of the four Einsatzgruppen units and at least 
nine thousand Order Police—about 18 battalions in all.2 As the Germans 
rapidly advanced into Soviet territory, large numbers of Red Army sol-
diers were, as Himmler had predicted, captured and sent to Nazi labor 
camps like Auschwitz I. Himmler had instructed Einsatzkommando Tilsit 
to carry out executions in response to sniper attacks against Germans. 
Between 24 and 27 June, Tilsit undertook three separate executions kill-
ing a total of 526 (mostly Jewish) Lithuanian men.3 These deaths sig-
naled the start of the Holocaust in the Soviet interior.4 Himmler and 
Heydrich were apparently delighted with this early first effort.5
On 25 June, the leader of Einsatzgruppe A, Franz Stahlecker, 
entered the Lithuanian city of Kaunas (or Kovno).6 In compliance with 
Heydrich’s orders, Stahlecker assessed the intensity of local antisemitic 
fervor and released convicts from a prison, thus instigating possibly the 
first pogrom of the campaign. On 27 June, a colonel in the Wehrmacht 
unwittingly stumbled on the pogrom. He saw a cheering crowd and, 
curious as to what was taking place, inquired further.
…I was told that the ‘Death-dealer of Kovno’ was at work and that this 
was where collaborators and traitors were finally meted out their rightful 
punishment! When I stepped closer, however, I became witness to proba-
bly the most frightful event that I had seen during the course of two world 
wars. […] a blond man of medium height, aged about twenty-five, stood 
leaning on a wooden club, resting. The club was as thick as his arm and 
came up to his chest. At his feet lay about fifteen to twenty dead or dying 
people. […] Just a few steps behind this man some twenty men, guarded 
by armed civilians, stood waiting for their cruel execution in silent submis-
sion. In response to a cursory wave the next man stepped forward silently 
and was then beaten to death with the wooden club in the most bestial 
manner, each blow accompanied by enthusiastic shouts from the audience. 
At the staff office I subsequently learned that other people already knew 
about these mass executions, and that they had naturally aroused in them 
the same feelings of horror and outrage as they had in me.7
As bizarre as it might sound, it was not unusual for members of the 
German armed forces to find this brutal hands-on brand of violence so 
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offensive that they would step in to save the Jewish victims, at least for 
the time being.8 During the above three-week-long pogrom, Lithuanians 
killed about 3500 Jews.9 Jewish women and children were not targeted. 
In other locations across the Eastern front, there was more,10 less, and 
no interest at all in killing Jews.11 Lithuanians may not have killed all or 
even most Jews, but fewer Jews still meant a smaller Soviet “Jewish prob-
lem” for the SS to later deal with. On 29 June, Heydrich issued a written 
order to “remind” the Einsatzgruppen commanders of his earlier verbal 
instruction to encourage “self-defense circles….”12
At this very early stage of the invasion, however, only a minor-
ity of German security forces set out to kill all Jews. One salient exam-
ple occurred as early as 27 June, thus in violation with the Commissar 
Order, which never demanded such wide-sweeping actions. In the city 
of Bialystok, Major Weiss encouraged Police Battalion 309 and the 
Wehrmacht’s 221st Security Division to kill over 2000 Jews—men, 
women, and children.13 At one point, at least 500 people were herded 
into a synagogue, which was dowsed in petrol and set alight with a stick 
of dynamite thrown through a window. When people desperately tried 
to escape the inferno through the building’s windows, Weiss’s men 
mowed them down with machine guns.14 One German police officer 
expressed his reservations over what was taking place and was informed, 
“You don’t seem to have received the right ideological training yet.”15 
Even though these Germans exceeded their official orders—how are 
children instigators of “active or passive resistance” and a threat to secu-
rity?—Matthäus suspects Himmler approved.16 Massacres early in the 
campaign where all Jews were killed were, however, exceptions to the 
rule. Typically, only Jewish men were targeted during these early execu-
tions.17 There were also examples of behavior at the very opposite end of 
this violence spectrum. For example, for almost a month following the 
Commissar Order (until mid-July 1941) the 10th Regiment of the 1st 
SS Brigade chose only to guard bridges.18 But it was not long before the 
demands of the SS leadership increased in both clarity and breadth. For 
example, on 2 July 1941 Heydrich instructed that, “all Jews in state and 
party positions” were to be executed.19
Then at a 16 July meeting that Browning regards as a “turning 
point” for the Holocaust,20 Hitler informed a variety of inner-cir-
cle Nazis that Soviet territory was to be transformed into a “Garden 
of Eden.”21 Browning adds that Hitler, per usual, did not give explicit 
orders, but the meaning behind his words was clear. “What role could 
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Jews have in a German Garden of Eden?”22 Congruent with Himmler 
and Heydrich’s strategy of controlled escalation, the next day the broad-
est killing orders yet were committed to writing for the first time: From 
17 July 1941, according to Heydrich, “all Jews” in the Soviet interior 
were to be shot.23
Einsatzgruppe B commander, Artur Nebe, suggested around mid-July 
1941 that with so few men, what was demanded was simply unachiev-
able.24 Nevertheless, some leaders in the field came up with their own 
solution to this problem. For example, in early July the German secu-
rity police in Kaunas formed a battalion consisting of Lithuanians, 
which came under the control of Karl Jäger’s Einsatzkommando 3 
(a sub-unit of Stahlecker’s Einsatzgruppe A).25 Also in early July, a 
fifth Einsatzgruppe was formed.26 As early as 27 June 1941, Himmler 
reacted to the emerging manpower issue when he commandeered his 
Kommandostab Reichsführer SS brigades from the army (a total of 
25,000 men), arguing, “I need these units for other tasks.”27 Out of 
the 25,000 men, Himmler only intended to use Higher SS and Police 
Leader Friedrich Jeckeln’s 7000-strong SS Brigade One and SS and 
Police Leader Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski’s 4000-strong SS Cavalry 
Brigade to kill civilians.28 There was also another SS Brigade headed 
by Higher SS and Police Leader Hans-Adolf Prützmann.29 These men 
under Himmler’s “personal command” mainly provided a second wave 
to the Einsatzgruppen’s first murderous sweep of the new territories.30 
According to Breitman, the men in these Brigades were, relatively speak-
ing, “a less politicized force than the Einsatzgruppen,” and “not part of 
a political-ideological elite.”31
In terms of their destructive tasks, how did these ideologically more 
moderate Germans fare? By 10 July, Himmler had decided to use Bach-
Zelewski’s men to search for Jews hiding in the Pinsk or Pripet marshes 
to the east of Lublin. About a week later, on 19 July, these men received 
orders to engage in the mass murder of all Jews.32 These orders—directly 
from Himmler—were repeated on 27 July.33 Although like many units 
elsewhere, Bach-Zelewski’s men found it fairly stressful to execute Jewish 
men, they found shooting women and children greatly exacerbated their 
stress.34 The existence of psychological difficulties among the execution 
forces is confirmed in the letters these men sent back to their families in 
Germany.35
Shooters were not the only ones to suffer from intense bouts of 
stress. Early in the Soviet campaign, SS-Obersturmführer August Häfner 
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described Sonderkommando 4a leader Paul Blobel’s mental breakdown 
in July 1941, and his desperate call for a less stressful and more efficient 
killing method.
I found my unit, they were all running around like lost sheep. I realized 
that something must have happened and asked what was wrong. Someone 
told me that [Standartenführer] Blobel had had a nervous breakdown and 
was in bed in his room. […] He was talking confusedly. He was saying 
that it was not possible to shoot so many Jews and that what was needed 
was a plough to plough them into the ground. He had completely lost his 
mind.36
Other squad commanders who did not have to directly kill anybody also 
proved susceptible to mental breakdowns, including Einsatzkommando 
3’s Karl Jäger,37 Higher SS/Police Leader Bach-Zelewski,38 and (twice) 
Einsatzgruppe B commander Nebe.39
As Himmler and Heydrich had suspected, the order to shoot defense-
less civilians en masse generated what the men in the field themselves 
termed Seelenbelastung or “burdening of the soul.”40 The SS Cavalry 
Brigade’s mass shootings of all Jews in the Pripet marshes started to 
flounder. Similarly, despite Einsatzkommando Tilsit’s promising early 
efforts, Kwiet notes that some of the shooters also started to struggle to 
implement their orders.
[T]he attrition rate from psychological problems connected to the killings 
was not insignificant. Some marksmen in EK Tilsit succumbed to feelings 
of nausea and nervous tension during the massacres. […] In many cases 
killers suffered vomiting attacks or developed severe eczema or other psy-
chosomatic disorders.41
In fact, when Einsatzkommando Tilsit was instructed to also shoot 
women and children, a small proportion of the men flatly refused to 
do so. These men were pulled out of the extermination campaign.42 
Such cases of insubordination between the end of July and mid-August 
of 1941 caused a patently frustrated Himmler to regularly criticize his 
Einsatzgruppen and police forces.43 To make matters even more stress-
ful for Himmler, the Einsatzgruppen commanders were instructed on 
1 August 1941 that, “the Führer [was] to be kept informed continu-
ally from here about the work of the Einsatzgruppen in the East….”44 
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With Hitler having implied only two weeks earlier that he desired that all 
Jews be shot, Himmler must have wondered if his men were up to the 
task. The SS leadership was equally interested in knowing how far their 
officers would go and, as a result, they developed “an almost obsessive 
interest in receiving information about events in the field.”45 The day 
after Hitler’s request, 2 August, Himmler criticized his SS Cavalry for 
their “soft behavior,” and again demanded they kill more Jews.46 Both 
Himmler and Heydrich became notorious for categorizing functionaries 
as either “soft” or “hard.”47 In response to Himmler, Bach-Zelewski’s SS 
Cavalry Brigade and some local militias continued to shoot at least 3000 
Jewish males over the age of five on a daily basis.48 However, despite 
Himmler’s direct order that the Pinsk action was to be completed, the 
men flatly refused—thus disobeying direct orders—to kill all Jews. This 
refusal was indicative that these men deemed Himmler’s orders unac-
ceptable—tasks they obviously placed outside the parameters of their 
Zone of Indifference. In fact, by the evening of 8 August the action was 
abandoned.49
To halt this kind of insubordination, Himmler and many other sen-
ior SS officers below him personally visited the troops in the field and 
directly instructed them to do as the SS-Reichsführer wanted and kill 
more Jews.50 Because the men were struggling, during these visits 
Himmler also attempted to personally reinforce, as dictated by Nazi ide-
ology, the great necessity of the men’s difficult duties.51 If this did not 
have the desired effect and the men still refused to kill all Jews, the SS 
leadership applied more coercive techniques to encourage them to do 
what they desired. For example, during field visits, Himmler and his most 
senior commanders told their men that having shot Jewish men they 
had to eliminate the risk of revenge attacks by also killing the women 
and children.52 Officers in the field soon started to rely on this justifi-
cation for their destructive actions. One, for example, wrote in a letter 
to his wife, “But we are fighting this war for the survival and non-sur-
vival of our people. […] My comrades are literally fighting for the exist-
ence of our people.”53 As in Milgram’s web of obligation, once one starts 
moving in such a radical direction, suddenly deciding to stop becomes 
increasingly difficult. Abruptly stopping, for example, would not erase the 
fact that, by any definition, these Germans had already become killers of 
civilians. Primo Levi more specifically terms this manipulative mafia-like 
technique the “bond of complicity”54—where, as Hannah Arendt notes, 
Germans in the East were encouraged to kill at least one person, and 
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on performing this “irreversible act” they then entered a “community 
of violence” that suddenly and forever cut them off from “respectable 
 society.”55 After this, there could be no going back.
If Himmler’s persuasions failed to work, one officer noted the 
SS leadership had other, perhaps even more “malicious,” strategies. 
“Himmler issued an order stating that any man who no longer felt able 
to take the psychological stresses should report to his superior officer. 
These men were to be released from their current duties and would 
be detailed for other work back home.”56 Himmler planned to replace 
any dropouts with new men. But, this seemingly attractive offer was 
an “evil trick” designed to highlight those who were “too weak” to be 
an officer.57 The officer also suspected (correctly as it turned out) that 
any declaration of softness would be detrimental to their career path. As 
Westermann states, “In cases where a final determination was made by 
the SS-Reichsführer against a policeman, the remark ‘unsuited for duties 
in the East’ was added to his personnel file, precluding the opportu-
nity for further promotion.”58 To accept the offer to be released from 
shooting duties, the men had to be willing to dent the quality of their 
organizational membership—along with all the fruits associated with 
it.59 As a last resort, Himmler could and did fall back on the “Führer 
Principle” that required “unquestioning obedience to a single leader.”60 
As Breitman observes, the SS leadership relied heavily on “the weight of 
authority to override qualms of conscience or simple distaste for unpleas-
ant tasks.”61
One limitation of these and other top-down initiatives designed to 
socially engineer what the SS leadership desired was that they did noth-
ing to physically shield the shooters from the cause of their stress. The 
closest Himmler came to suggesting such an initiative was when he 
told Bach-Zelewski’s cavalry that, “All [male] Jews must be shot. Drive 
Jewish females into the swamps.”62 Himmler, it seems, was trying to 
spare his men from the intense mental anguish associated with being 
directly responsible for murdering women. The quicksand, Himmler 
envisioned, would do the dirty work for them. However, the quality of 
his idea hints at the SS-Reichsführer’s desperate state. In early August, 
SS Sturmbannführer Franz Magill informed Himmler that his idea 
had failed. “The driving of women and children into the marshes did 
not have the expected success, because the marshes were not so deep 
that one could sink. After a depth of about a meter there was in most 
cases solid ground (probably sand) preventing complete sinking….”63  
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These women and children—about 20,000 people—lived for another 
year until they were killed during an independent sweep.64
Further north, Gustav Lombard, the commander of the Mounted 
Unit of the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment, continued to push his men hard: 
“Not one male Jew is to remain alive, not one remnant family in the vil-
lages.”65 Between 1 and 11 August, Lombard’s men killed about 1000 
Jewish men, women, and children per day.66 It is no coincidence that 
soon afterward Himmler promoted Lombard but demoted Magill.67 
Certainly, this was, as Matthäus notes, one effective way to ensure that 
the “…unit commanders of the Security and Order Police got the mes-
sage about the desired course of action and adapted in order to please 
their superiors. Clearly, these officers were talking to each other and 
observing what their colleagues elsewhere were doing.”68
finaLLy the ss-reiChsführer “understands”
Himmler, incensed by the refusal of some men to carry out his 
orders, and constantly reminded of their emotional difficulties, asked 
Einsatzgruppe B commander Nebe on 15 August 1941 to organize an 
execution while he (Himmler) was in Minsk.69 Having heard so much 
fuss, Himmler wanted to “see what one of these ‘liquidations’ really 
looked like.”70 The SS-Reichsführer’s Chief of Personal Staff, Karl Wolff, 
later stated that, “from his own mouth,” Himmler had never seen peo-
ple killed before.71 Nebe, in the presence of Bach-Zelewski, arranged for 
about 100 people to be executed—two of whom were women. Before 
the mass shooting, Himmler conveyed an air of casual indifference as he 
asked the Jews some questions. However, his blasé attitude disintegrated 
as the first volley of shots was fired. His lack of experience of killing was 
exposed to all present.
Both Wolff and Bach-Zelewski remembered that Himmler was shaken by 
the murders. “Himmler was extremely nervous,” Bach-Zelewski testified. 
‘He couldn’t stand still. His face was white as cheese, his eyes went wild 
and with each burst of gunfire he always looked at the ground.’72
Much as in the first Obedience pilot series where some participants 
engaged in avoidance-type behaviors, Himmler looked away from the 
disturbing things happening in front of him; unlike the executioners, 
who could not do so.73 Kwiet notes the inspection “caused Himmler 
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nausea (Unwohlsein) and symptoms of nervous collapse.”74 When 
the two women lay down to be shot members of the squad lost their 
nerve, and fired badly, injuring, rather than killing them. At that point, 
Himmler “panicked [and] […] jumped up and screamed at the squad 
commander: ‘Don’t torture these women! Fire! Hurry up and kill 
them!’”75 This event illustrates how Himmler’s idea of shooting did 
not equate with the task’s disturbing perceptual reality. “Almost faint-
ing, pale, limbs quivering” Himmler had come to understand personally 
the problem his men were facing.76 Bach-Zelewski must have felt vin-
dicated because he then told Himmler, “Reichsführer, those were only 
a hundred. […] Look at the eyes of the men in this Kommando, how 
deeply shaken they are! These men are finished [fertig] for the rest of 
their lives. What kind of followers are we training here? Either neurot-
ics or savages!”77 Adolf Eichmann felt similarly. “I said [to the local SS 
Commander in Lwów] young people are being made into sadists. How 
can one do that? Simply bang away at women and children? That is 
impossible. Our people will go mad or become insane….”78
As the leading figure present at the Minsk execution, Himmler felt 
compelled to try to reduce his men’s distress by providing them with 
a variety of strain resolving justifications. He reminded them that they 
need not feel guilty over what they did because—relying on the ability to 
displace individual responsibility elsewhere in the division of labor—they 
were only following his, and therefore Hitler’s, orders. Somewhat related 
to this, Himmler understood, as presumably they should, that these dif-
ficult and repulsive tasks were absolutely necessary. Finally, Himmler 
reminded the men that although vermin has a purpose in life, this did 
not mean that humankind could not defend itself.79 This kind of strain 
resolving speech was in line with Himmler’s preconceived strategy of 
providing the men with a reason to kill.80 On the eve of a Judenaktionen, 
execution squads were purposefully flooded with a deluge of antise-
mitic propaganda—speeches, literature, films, and documentaries.81 
Nonetheless, as this event—and the last month or so—had illustrated, a 
determined Himmler did everything he could think of to best ensure his 
men killed all Jews.82
After the mass shooting in Minsk, Himmler, Wolff, Bach-Zelewski, 
and Nebe visited a recently formed ghetto, which included a large insti-
tution housing the mentally ill. Himmler, who by this time had clearly 
calmed down, suggested in strain resolving, euphemistic terms that Nebe 
“release” (i.e., kill) the patients.83 But for reasons discussed below, the 
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shooters found killing such people nerve wracking. In fact, Nebe had 
already informed his deputy Paul Werner that he (Nebe) “could not ask 
his troops to shoot these incurably insane people.”84 Nebe therefore 
inquired how Himmler thought he might carry out the task. Himmler 
replied “that today’s event had brought him to the conclusion that death 
by shooting was certainly not the most humane”85 and asked Nebe “‘to 
turn over in his mind’ various other killing methods more humane than 
shooting.”86 This was not a throwaway request. Himmler knew that 
Nebe had overcome similar killing-related obstacles during his time 
working in the T4’s euthanasia program.87 This single conversation, as 
we shall see, powerfully influenced the fate of massive numbers of Jews 
and other groups such as the German Gypsies, who were also forced into 
the Polish ghettos.88
PiLot studies in kiLLing mid-to-Late 1941
Nebe went on to consult a former colleague from the euthanasia pro-
gram, chemist Albert Widmann, one of the inventors of the bottled 
(pure) carbon monoxide gassing technique. Widmann came from the 
Reich Security Main Office’s (RSHA) Criminal Technology Institute 
in Berlin. During the middle of September 1941, Nebe and Widmann 
engaged in their first ad hoc experiment. Just as Milgram had done by 
introducing a wall into his basic procedure, if Nebe and Widmann were 
to successfully diminish the “burdening of the soul,” they would need to 
reduce the perceptual intensity associated with the act of harming. The 
duo’s first experiment using explosives intuitively moved in this direc-
tion, but failed to achieve the goal. “Twenty-five mentally ill people were 
locked into two bunkers in a forest outside Minsk. The first explosion 
killed only some of them, and it took much time and trouble until the 
second explosion killed the rest. Explosives therefore were unsatisfac-
tory.”89 Wilhelm Jaschke, a captain in Einsatzkommando 8, provides a 
more detailed account of what happened.
The sight was atrocious. The explosion hadn’t been powerful enough. 
Some wounded came out of the dugout crawling and crying. […] The 
bunker had totally collapsed. […] Body parts were scattered on the 
ground and hanging in the trees. On the next day, we collected the body 
parts and threw them into the bunker. Those parts that were too high in 
the trees were left there.90
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Obviously, this pilot was a total failure.
A month later, in October 1941, a group of men under Odilo 
Globocnik (commander of Lublin’s SS and Police) independently devel-
oped a remarkably similar method of killing. Their technique required 
victims to lie in a ditch head-to-toe in batches of ten. Then, Globocnik’s 
men would seek cover and lob hand grenades on top of them. Again, 
body parts filled the air. Although this method enabled the perpetra-
tors to avoid the horrific visual spectacle when killing, occasionally some 
victims were not killed outright. The severely wounded required what 
the perpetrators, using strain resolving euphemistic language, called 
“mercy shots”—a visually disturbing task they did not enjoy. Though 
Globocnik’s men are believed to have killed about 75,000 civilians using 
this technique,91 it would seem that its distasteful side effects led to the 
grenade technique’s eventual abandonment.
Two months earlier in August 1941, hundreds of miles away in 
Austria’s Mauthausen concentration camp, Himmler had (as part of the 
14f13 program) begun organizing for those prisoners no longer capa-
ble of labor to be gassed at the T4 facility in Hartheim, located about 
30 kilometers to the west.92 This approach was costly and time-consum-
ing, and so in October—the same month Globocnik’s men were trialing 
their grenade killing technique—staff at Mauthausen started experiment-
ing with a new method of their own. Inmates sentenced to death were 
deceived into thinking they were to have their photograph taken. After 
being instructed to stand opposite a camera-like device and pressing their 
back up against a section of wall vertically lined with small holes, an SS 
man on the other side would then surreptitiously shoot the inmate in 
the back of the neck. After the execution, another inmate would quickly 
transfer the body to an adjoining mortuary and clean away all traces of 
what had just taken place, resetting the scene for the next victim. This 
shooting technique was capable of killing about 30 inmates per hour.93 
However, this killing method must have been abandoned because up 
until February 1942 Mauthausen continued shipping its unproductive 
prisoners to Hartheim.94 The prisoner manifest at Mauthausen contin-
ued to grow and so did the expense of getting rid of so-called useless 
mouths. Camp staff continued to search for a better—cheaper, effi-
cient yet, for the perpetrators, inoffensive—means of ending the lives of 
unproductive prisoners.
Back in the Soviet interior, the failure of Nebe and Widmann’s explo-
sives experiment did not dent their motivation to continue searching for 
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a more “humane” way of killing civilians. At an asylum in Mogilev, the 
duo embarked on a second experiment. Nebe, with Widmann’s help, 
drew on his own previous experience and intuition to develop a method 
of killing that he thought ordinary Germans might willingly use. Nebe 
recalled an experience many years earlier when, after having driven home 
drunk one evening, he nearly killed himself after failing to turn the vehi-
cle’s engine off inside a garage.95 Drawing on this near-death experience, 
Nebe connected one end of a hose to the exhaust pipe of a running 
motor vehicle and the other end to a hermetically sealed room contain-
ing 20–30 mentally ill patients. The people inside the room soon died. 
A cheap, abundant, and mobile alternative gas to that used in the T4 
euthanasia program had been found.
Widmann’s trial after the war revealed that, “Nebe discussed the tech-
nical aspects of the idea with Dr. Heess and together they brought the 
proposal before Heydrich who adopted it.”96 When Heydrich caught 
wind of this experiment, he contacted some subordinates in the RSHA, 
and they asked Friedrich Pradel and his chief mechanic Harry Wentritt97 
if exhaust gas could be directed into a truck’s sealed cargo cabin. The 
reasoning behind this idea was because “the firing squads in Russia suf-
fered frequent nervous breakdowns and needed [what Pradel termed] a 
“more humane” method of killing.”98 Based on Nebe’s idea, Wentritt 
constructed the first exhaust gas van prototype and in early November 
a killing pilot test was conducted on a group of Soviet POWs in the 
Sachsenhausen concentration camp.99 The results were so satisfactory 
that from November 1941 the van prototype was put into produc-
tion.100 The first vans constructed in Wentritt’s garage were sent to the 
East.
As Nebe and Widmann conducted their trial-and-error experi-
ments in the East, in Auschwitz I a similar yet completely independent 
set of experiments was taking place. Soon after the start of Operation 
Barbarossa, Soviet POWs began arriving at Auschwitz I. The camp’s 
Commandant, Rudolf Höss, had been ordered to immediately execute 
the officer ranks.101 The Soviet officers were shot in small groups at the 
infamous Black Wall.102 Despite initial enthusiasm, the German guards 
soon tired of the bloody task. As elsewhere, Höss and his men “had had 
enough of…the mass killings by firing squad ordered by Himmler and 
Heydrich.”103 The shootings were moved to a more secluded location, 
and it was not long before the task started to fall on the shoulders of a 
select few who decided,
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it would be more efficient to bring the condemned to the crematorium 
and kill them in the mortuary. “The walls were stained with blood, and in 
the background there lay the corpses of those already shot,” [Pery] Broad 
[who worked in Auschwitz’s Political Department] wrote after the war. 
“A wide stream of blood was flowing towards the drain in the middle of 
the hall. The victims were obliged to step quite close to the corpses and 
formed a line. Their feet were stained with blood; they stood in puddles 
of it. […] The right-hand man of the camp leader, SS-Hauptscharführer 
Palitzsch, did the shooting. He killed one person after another with a prac-
ticed shot in the back of the neck.” The stench was so foul that in the 
summer of 1941 the chief of the political department, Grabner, prevailed 
on Schlachter to install a more sophisticated ventilation system that not 
only extracted the air he found sickening but also brought in a fresh supply 
from outside.104
Höss’ deputy, Karl Fritzsch, also soon tired of these mass shootings. One 
day when Höss was away, Fritzsch decided to pursue an experiment. The 
idea for his experiment was stimulated by the camp’s omnipresent ver-
min problem: Some of Fritzsch’s men had been sent back to Germany to 
receive training in the use of Zyklon-B, an effective and deadly pesticide. 
Zyklon-B consisted of small pellets that turned into gas when exposed 
to oxygen at a temperature of (or above) 25.7 degrees Celsius.105 If 
Zyklon-B could easily kill vermin, it probably could kill humans as well.
On 3 September 1941 (less than two weeks before Nebe’s experi-
ments), a large group of Soviet and Polish prisoners were placed in a 
sealed detention cell known as Block 11. Pellets of the pesticide were 
then dropped into a small number of re-sealable vents in the roof. The 
victims died soon afterward.106 Upon Höss’s return, Fritzsch replicated 
his experiment. Höss later admitted being surprised that Zyklon-B killed 
the victims so quickly. “A short, almost smothered cry, and it was all 
over.”107 And it was cheap—it was established that around this point in 
time, it costs less than one US cent per victim killed.108 But most pleasing 
for Höss was that he was “relieved to think that we were to be spared all 
those blood-baths….”109 Unlike stressful shootings, for Höss “the gas-
sings had a calming effect on me….”110 By instituting what Höss and his 
men found to be a less stressful method of killing, Fritzsch had secured 
for his German executioners a feeling of sufficient indifference needed 
to ensure they remained within their Zone of Indifference. Consequently, 
Himmler’s higher “orders for actions” had, thanks to Fritzsch, become 
sufficiently inoffensive and thereafter “unquestionably acceptable.”111
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After Fritzsch’s experiments, Block 11 was abandoned and the 
morgue where Gerhard Palitzsch had been undertaking his shootings 
was converted into a gassing facility. The morgue had an attached cre-
matorium so the victims’ bodies would not have to be carted through 
the camp streets for disposal. Conversion of the mortuary into a gas 
chamber both reduced prisoner awareness of gassings112 and made the 
killings more efficient.113 The morgue’s new ventilation system, initially 
installed to remove the nauseating smells generated by the mass shoot-
ings, serendipitously contributed to the viability of the gassing process 
by rapidly expelling the poisonous gas.114 With little delay between gas-
sings, bodies could be transferred to the incinerator located close by in 
the crematorium.115 Thus was invented the gas chamber/body disposal 
unit called Crematorium I, which stimulated a major shift in Nazi kill-
ing techniques. Crematorium I’s 77.28 square meter gas chamber116 was 
capable of killing up to 900 prisoners per gassing117 several times per day. 
The only limiting factor was the crematorium’s 70-body per day disposal 
capacity.118
As the end of 1941 approached, increasing numbers of prisoners—
Soviet officers and non-workers targeted by Operation 14f13—were 
cheaply gassed and disposed of on-site, thus eliminating the need to 
shoot the former and, somewhat expensively, ship the latter by train 
to a T4 gas chamber hundreds of miles away in Germany.119 Word 
about Fritzsch’s discovery must have spread quickly because soon after 
the fall of 1941 Mauthausen in Austria started constructing a perma-
nent Zyklon-B gas chamber.120 Upon the gas chamber’s completion 
in March 1942, transports of prisoners to the T4 facility at Hartheim  
ceased. On-site gassings with Zyklon-B at Mauthausen continued to 
28 April 1945.121
Back at Auschwitz I, on 1 October 1941 Karl Bischoff was hired 
to manage the construction of the massive 100,000-person satellite 
camp that Himmler had promised to IG Farben officials back in March 
1941.122 This new camp, located about 1.5 kilometers from the main 
camp, was called Auschwitz II, but is now more infamously known as 
Auschwitz-Birkenau. Soon after hiring Bischoff, the late fall weather 
caused an increase in the Soviet POW death rate.123 The advancing 
cold and damp conditions, in conjunction with Auschwitz I’s new effi-
cient gassing method, caused an accumulation of bodies requiring cre-
mation. Furthermore, Bischoff anticipated on the horizon a second 
and much greater body disposal problem: Himmler’s 100,000-person 
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satellite camp would, through the attrition associated with a camp with 
little food or heating, likely generate an even greater number of bodies 
in need of disposal. On 11 November, Bischoff addressed the first rela-
tively minor problem with a plan to increase Crematorium I’s 70-body 
per day incineration capacity. He did so by requesting that engineer 
Kurt Prüfer from the firm Topf & Sons (designers and builders of 
Crematorium I) install a third incinerator.124 The potentially greater 
second problem was addressed during a meeting on 21 and 22 October 
1941 when Prüfer convinced Bischoff to commission his company to 
build an industrial-sized crematorium. The new structure was to be built 
behind Crematorium I in Auschwitz I.125 Prüfer estimated that this mas-
sive crematorium would be capable of incinerating about 1440 bodies 
every 24 hours.126 This industrial crematorium even came with an eleva-
tor, making it easier to transport any bodies in excess of this number to 
what Bischoff and Prüfer anticipated would be two large basement-level 
morgues.127
By mid-1941 to late 1941, then, as a result of experiments conducted 
by a variety of Nazi officials in places as far apart as Minsk, Mogilev, 
Lublin, Auschwitz I, and Mauthausen, new killing techniques had been 
discovered in an effort to find less stressful methods of disposing of large 
numbers of civilians than those offered by military-style mass shooting. 
Most of these experiments failed, or for some reason or another proved 
unviable, but as will be shown, further refinements—ironing out the 
kinks—ensured that Nebe and Fritzsch’s discoveries would gain prom-
inence. With exhaust fumes (carbon monoxide) and Zyklon-B, from 
September 1941 the Nazis had two cheap, plentiful, and mobile gases. 
They were the final remaining ingredient Himmler and Heydrich needed 
to convert the “Führer’s wish” into a reality. The gaps in the theoretical 
formula that made total extermination possible were closing and a fea-
sible “rough outline” was emerging.128 The gassing option was now a 
topic that any ambitious, goal-orientated, problem-solving Nazi bureau-
crat could raise in discussions of how to rationally and permanently 
resolve the “Jewish question.” September 1941 is therefore another 
important date in the history of the Holocaust. With Germany on the 
verge of gaining total hegemony over continental Europe, exterminating 
all of European Jewry was becoming increasingly possible. These discov-
eries therefore injected enormous power into any decision to exterminate 
European Jewry.129 However, the careful design, construction, and test-
ing of a large-scale gassing enterprise would take some time. So in the 
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succeeding months after Himmler observed the mid-August mass execu-
tion in Minsk, the shootings had to continue.
the hoLoCaust by buLLets Continues
Himmler’s insistence that shootings continue saw more squad leaders 
directly confront the SS-Reichsführer over the effect that the “bur-
dening of the soul” was having on their men.130 By 1942, Heinz Jost, 
the new commander of Einsatzgruppe A, had become so concerned 
about the mental state of some of his men that he felt it necessary to 
directly challenge Himmler. Jost, however, got no further than oth-
ers before him. Himmler snapped back, “Are you a philosopher? 
What is the meaning of this? What do you mean, problems? All that 
is concerned are our orders.”131 Himmler’s response may have been 
strategic. By refusing to sympathize with his squad leaders’ concerns, 
he ensured that most returned to their troops with nothing but bad 
news: They had to follow the SS-Reichsführer’s original command. 
The leaders in the field would keep pushing their men until they grew 
accustomed to their grisly tasks, or else broke down. When some did 
break down, Himmler simply advised that these men be sent home and 
replaced with new shooters. As Gustave Fix of Sonderkommando 6 
said, “I would also like to mention that as a result of the considerable 
psychological pressures, there were numerous men who were no longer 
capable of conducting executions and who thus had to be replaced by 
other men.”132 Without access to new killing methods, Himmler must 
have felt this was the only way to deal with the ongoing problem with 
shooter stress.
Himmler’s attrition and replacement policy were likely to have had 
another, albeit unanticipated, effect on the rates of killing. As Arendt 
insightfully noted, time saw the attrition and replacement policy even-
tually produce a concentration of ordinary men who differed from the 
ordinary men who dropped out—they could more regularly handle 
the intense strain associated with their bloody tasks.133 Therefore, the 
Germans who remained differed significantly from those who dropped 
out in that the former were not just willing, they were also able. 
Consider, for example, Einsatzkommando 3’s leader Karl Jäger who 
submitted a ledger-style progress report to Berlin that denoted over 
130,000 victims killed between 7 July and 25 November 1941. Before 
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presenting this astounding statistic, Jäger wrote, “Following the for-
mation of a raiding squad under the command of SS-Obersturmführer 
Hamann and 8-10 reliable men from the Einsatzkommando the follow-
ing actions were conducted in cooperation with Lithuanian partisans” 
[italics added].134 Such “reliable men”—selected by superiors because of 
their “strong nerves”135—earned the term “Dauer-Schützen” (perma-
nent shooters).136
It would seem, therefore, that the SS leadership’s gradually escalating 
orders and exertion of unrelenting top-down pressure started to have 
its desired effect. In June 1941, only men were targeted; however, by 
July women were regularly being killed. And by mid-August children 
were targeted.137 This general pattern—initial apprehension through 
to embracing the shooting of all Jews—is reflected in the body counts. 
Consider the Einsatzgruppen, for example. From 22 June to mid-Au-
gust 1941—that is seven weeks into Operation Barbarossa and over a 
month after the first direct orders were issued that all Jews be killed—
the numbers of Jews shot varied from squad to squad, and region to 
region. Karl Jäger’s Einsatzkommando 3 achieved unusually high num-
bers; 9188 civilians shot (10% of whom were women, with children 
spared).138 Conversely, the entire Einsatzgruppe D commanded by Otto 
Ohlendorf only shot 4425 Jews during the same period.139 By the end 
of July, the sum total of victims killed by all Einsatzgruppen units came 
to 62,805 civilians,140 most of whom (about 90%) were Jews.141 The 
victims were again almost exclusively males.142 However, after mid-Au-
gust the death toll rapidly escalated. In the two weeks ending the month, 
Jäger’s Einsatzkommando 3 killed 33,000 civilians (including an increas-
ing proportion of females and now also children). The same pattern 
applied to the previously sluggish Einsatzgruppe D whose death toll 
before the end of September rose to 36,000.143 From August onward, 
entire Jewish communities started disappearing. Perhaps even to the sur-
prise of Himmler and Heydrich, the German security forces and their 
Eastern European collaborators ended up exterminating about 1.4 mil-
lion Jews.144 In his summary of these events, Friedländer captures this 
almost exponential escalation in death rates and the ongoing mystery 
surrounding them:
There is something at once profoundly disturbing yet rapidly numbing in 
the narration of the anti-Jewish campaign that developed in the territories 
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newly occupied by the Germans or their allies. History seems to turn into 
a succession of mass killing operations and, on the face of it, little else. […] 
All there is to report, it seems, is a rising curve of murder statistics, in the 
North, the Center, the South, and the Extreme South.145
ConCLusion
What factors explain this rapid change from small- to large-scale slaugh-
ter? It would seem the SS leadership’s persuasive, forceful, and some-
times coercive orders exerted a key top-down pressure. As Bloxham and 
Kushner argue, Himmler, often after meetings with Hitler, was instru-
mentally involved in “driving the murder process” forward.146 And 
once it was clear that all Jews were to be killed, shooters either pulled 
out or continued to participate. Those that remained were the men capa-
ble of fulfilling their superior officers’ seemingly incontestable orders. 
As Matthäus argues, “Undoubtedly, encouragement from above had 
the effect of speeding things up.”147 Thus, it is tempting to argue that 
obedience to authority played the key role in these destructive actions. 
When, however, a so-called tendency to obey is used to explain obedi-
ence, the logic is tautological, as was the case with Milgram’s theoretical 
assertions (see Volume 1). Nevertheless, the perpetrators later inter-
preted their own actions in this way: They just followed orders from 
above. And the shooters frequently looked lost for words to find a better 
explanation. But, despite a common reliance on this defense, the subse-
quent war crimes trails highlight a glaring weakness. Take, for example, 
a question by one judge directed at Ohlendorf’s assistant, SS Lieutenant 
Colonel Willy Seibert, who adamantly claimed that he was only following 
orders.
“Now…after receiving an order…from a superior officer, to shoot your 
own parents, would you do so?” He blinked his puffy eyes as if to prolong 
his deliberations and then scanned the courtroom. […] Then, taking a 
deep breath, he expelled the words like one who had been hit in the chest: 
‘Mr President, I would not do so.’148
And as shown, some Germans refused to participate in the shootings. 
The shooters, therefore, did not have to follow their orders. Instead, 
they chose to do so.
When, however, one considers the interactive effect of the SS lead-
ership’s unrelenting top-down pressure in conjunction with bottom-up 
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forces generated by those in the killing field (men who happened to 
be armed with a means of inflicting harm that, in terms of perceptual 
stimulation, could potentially be lowered to the point that killing other 
humans became psychologically less burdensome), the mystery behind 
Friedländer’s so-called rising curve of murder statistics becomes much 
more comprehensible.
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before Bischoff arrived at Auschwitz), a second incinerator had been 
ordered because of concerns over Auschwitz I’s rising death rate (van 
Pelt and Dwork 1996, p. 177).
 125.  Pressac and van Pelt (1998, p. 199) and van Pelt and Dwork (1996, p. 269).
 126.  Pressac and van Pelt (1998, p. 199).
 127.  Pressac and van Pelt (1998, p. 200).
 128.  Browning (1985, p. 37).
 129.  A premature decision (or even “Führer wish”) to exterminate European 
Jewry could (and probably did) stimulate the search for a means that 
made such a goal possible. But until that means was found—and it may 
never have been—that decision or wish was and would remain impotent.
 130.  Breitman (2000, p. 75). See also Kwiet (1993, p. 88). It is important to 
note that some shooting squad leaders expressed an interest in saving 
the Jews, not because of the psychological difficulty associated with the 
killings, but because (much like the Nazi “productionists” in the ghet-
tos) they believed that killing the Jews wasted a valuable source of slave 
labor (Longerich 2005, p. 211). Certain influential members of the 
Wehrmacht, and later the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 
expressed similar concerns (Breitman 1991, pp. 216–217; Breitman 
2000, pp. 81, 85; Lower 2002, pp. 8–9). Of course, this reasoning may 
have been relied on because it also offered an excuse to not undertake 
the mass shootings.
 131.  Quoted in Rhodes (2002, p. 227). See also Höss (2001, p. 208).
 132.  Quoted in Klee et al. (1988, p. 60).
 133.  Naumann (1966, p. xxvii).
 134.  Quoted in Klee et al. (1988, p. 46).
 135.  This is according to the diary of Wehrmacht soldier Richard 
Heidenreich, dated 5 October 1941 (quoted in Heer 1997, p. 84). See 
also Longerich (2010, p. 225).
 136.  Kwiet (1998, p. 18).
 137.  Kwiet (1998, p. 17).
 138.  Streit (1994, p. 108).
 139.  Streit (1994, p. 108).
 140.  Headland (1989, pp. 401–412, as cited in Browning 1995, p. 100).
 141.  Gerlach (1998, p. 58, as cited in Matthäus 2004, p. 260).
 142.  As Alfred Filbert of Einsatzkommando 9 said, “in the first instance, with-
out a doubt, the executions were limited generally to Jewish males” 
(quoted in Goldhagen 1996, pp. 149–150).
 143.  Streit (1994, p. 108).
 144.  Hilberg (1980, p. 93).
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 145.  Friedländer (2007, p. 240).
 146.  Bloxham and Kushner (2005, p. 136).
 147.  Matthäus (2007, p. 224).
 148.  Musmanno (1961, p. 133). Then again, some Nazis like Eckmann and 
Ohlendorf said that they would have shot their parents if given a Führer 
order (Arendt 1984, p. 42; Musmanno 1961, p. 120). Interestingly, 
when Seibert answered the judge’s question, Ohlendorf and the other 
defendants were furious with him: Even though he was being honest, he 
(presumably as they had) should have lied because his truthfulness had 
just undermined their only defense.
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Having examined the top-down forces the SS leadership exerted on the 
extermination campaign, this chapter explores the bottom-up forces 
generated by those in the killing field. What becomes apparent is when 
managers and their functionaries work within an organizational process, 
they typically move toward “improving” an initially rudimentary system, 
much like Milgram and Williams did during the Obedience studies. With 
increasing experience over time—past history—some innovators add effi-
ciencies and eliminate inefficiencies, which helps advance the organiza-
tional system in the desired direction. As we shall see, during the Nazi 
regime’s pursuit of the Holocaust by bullets, many of these kinds of 
innovations focused on making the act of killing with guns both more 
efficient and sufficiently palatable for the German executioners. In this, 
I would argue, the Holocaust by bullets resembles Milgram’s pilot stud-
ies where participants invented their own strain resolving coping mech-
anisms from the bottom-up, for example, avoidance behaviors where 
they purposefully looked away from the learner. These kinds of bot-
tom-up innovations made what Milgram wanted psychologically easier 
(less stressful) for the participants to engage in. Likewise, on the Eastern 
front the easier the participation in harm doing became psychologically, 
the greater the proportion of ordinary Germans willing to partake in the 
infliction of harm. And the longer these Germans continued to partic-
ipate, the greater the devastation. As this and the remaining chapters 
demonstrate, the more attention one pays to the strain resolving power 
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of the means of inflicting harm, the clearer the internal logic behind the 
Nazis’ machinery of destruction becomes.
As I showed in the previous chapter, although Himmler and his com-
manders did all they could to ensure their men did what they wanted, 
mere words and orders could not eliminate the intense perceptual expe-
rience of shooting unarmed civilians at close range. As this chapter will 
show, squad commanders and executioners alike soon realized that if 
they wanted to avoid mental breakdowns, they would have to find their 
own more effective ways of relieving themselves of the “burdening of the 
soul.” This is the kind of situation where, as Bauman argues, from the 
bottom-up, “bureaucracy picks up where visionaries stop.”1
Although “Every…squad had its preferred methods,”2 after “lessons 
learned,”3 certain innovators in the field discovered a series of less stress-
ful and more efficient ways to shoot civilians. And after regular meet-
ings “to debate the most efficient methods”4 and “frequent information 
exchanges,”5 the most effective of these ideas spread to other squads. What 
follows is a very general big-picture overview of the transition from the 
earliest (rudimentary) inefficient and strain inducing shooting techniques 
to the emergence of the most efficient and popular strain resolving “one 
best way” of shooting civilians en masse. To gain a basic overview of what 
took place, we must briefly return to the start of Operation Barbarossa and 
the first mass shooting undertaken by Einsatzkommando Tilsit.
the first exeCutions
Einsatzkommando Tilsit’s first execution in Gargždai on 24 June dif-
fered from the early Polish executions in important ways. First, before 
the mass shooting, Tilsit’s men searched for an existing burial site— 
perhaps a hill-shaped land formation, ravine, or in their case, a tank trap. 
Second, victims were instructed to stand on the grave’s edge and were 
then shot, so that most would fall into the pit. As a result, their bodies 
quickly and conveniently disappeared from the shooters’ sight.6 Because 
the shooters did not have to dig the grave and then drag all the bod-
ies into it, they avoided significant physical labor (efficiency) and did 
not have to touch the bodies or see the unsettling wounds they had just 
inflicted on defenseless civilians.7 Finally, this more efficient technique 
allowed the men to more effectively separate cause (pulling the trigger) 
from effect (killing). After the shootings, the executioners quickly filled 
in the graves and moved on. To save themselves the effort of having to 
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search for a burial site, an even more efficient approach was to force the 
victims or locals requisitioned from the community to dig graves.8 For a 
photograph showing Lithuanian Jews forced by Germans to dig a grave 
pit in 1941, see https://dachaujacket.omeka.net/exhibits/show/pho-
tos/item/4602. Clearly, these new innovations first emerged at some 
point between the first executions of civilians during the Polish invasion 
and the start of Operation Barbarossa.9
After the men from Einsatzkommando Tilsit had secured a burial site, 
the condemned were instructed to walk toward the tank trap. On arrival.
A group of ten men was forced to take up position at the edge of the pit 
with their faces turned toward the execution commando. The twenty-man 
strong firing party stood at a distance of twenty meters from the pit’s edge. 
Two marksmen aimed their rifles at one victim, an SS officer gave the 
order to shoot. After each round a new group was driven to the edge of 
the pit and forced to push into it any corpses that had not fallen in on their 
own. [italics added]10
Despite all these innovations, perhaps having to look at the facial expres-
sions of people in their last moments resulted in some executioners 
showing signs of “burdening of the soul” and succumbing “to feelings of 
nausea and nervous tension….”11
One of the earliest and more popular strain resolving techniques for 
dealing with this stress was to consume alcohol.
In Gargždai, Kretinga and Palanga, coveted schnapps rations were distrib-
uted [to the Tilsit executioners] following each Judenaktion, […] Killing 
orders issued in July 1941 instructed the SS and Police commanders to 
ensure that members of the execution commandos came to no harm. 
Within the framework of seelische Betreuung (pastoral care), social get-to-
gethers in the evenings as well as excursions…took place in order to wipe 
out the impressions of the day.12
As Hilberg observes, most of the shooting squad members “were 
drunk most of the time—only the ‘idealists’ refrained from the use of 
alcohol.”13 Alcohol was rationed by commanding officers and became 
a central part of the extermination process for some squads. For exam-
ple, because the mass shootings were associated with a decline in squad 
morale, Alfred Filbert of Einsatzkommando 9 thought it wise to issue his 
men with increasing rations of vodka.14
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Elsewhere, Einsatzgruppe C relied on a similar yet more proximate 
shooting technique to Tilsit during its first executions. As one shooter 
noted, “In Rovno I had to participate in the first shooting… Each mem-
ber of the firing-squad had to shoot one person. We were instructed 
to aim at the head from a distance of about ten metres.”15 After fir-
ing at about five people, this squad member stopped due to “nervous 
strain….”16 To alleviate this strain, the method of shooting was changed: 
Several shooters were tasked with firing at each victim. On 12 July 1941, 
Einsatzkommando member Felix Landau noted in his diary a problem 
with the multiple-shooter-per-victim technique. “Six of us had to shoot 
them. The job was assigned thus: three at the heart, three at the head. I 
took the heart. The shots were fired and the brains whizzed through the 
air. Two in the head is too much. They almost tear it off.”17 Although 
this shooting technique produced a disturbing visual spectacle, many 
commanders, like Ohlendorf from Einsatzgruppe D, initially preferred it 
because it helped to “avoid any individual having to take direct, personal 
responsibility.”18
The general passivity with which many, though certainly not all, 
Jews went to their deaths may also have aided in reducing the percep-
tual intensity of what would otherwise have been for their executioners 
a much more emotionally disturbing task. A Wehrmacht cadet officer 
based in Ukraine wrote in August 1941.
What struck me particularly was the calmness and discipline of these 
[Jewish] people. […] The marksmen were members of the SS. On the 
orders of a superior they fired shots at the heads of these people with their 
carbines. […] Sometimes the tops of their skulls flew up into the air. […] 
The people who were to be shot walked towards this grave as though they 
were taking part in a procession. […] They went composed and quietly to 
their deaths. I saw only two women weep the whole time I observed such 
executions. I found it simply inexplicable.19
Was this cadet trying to “blame the victims” for not resisting?20 Other 
witnesses, like Alfred Metzner, suggested that some Jews even went to 
the trouble of reducing the stressful nature of the executioners’ task by 
going to their deaths in an orderly—some might say considerate—man-
ner. “It was amazing…how the Jews stepped into the graves, with only 
mutual condolences in order to strengthen their spirits and in order to 
ease the work of the execution commandos.”21 Why did the victims 
5 OPERATION BARBAROSSA AND THE HOLOCAUST BY BULLETS …  133
behave this way? Perhaps on realizing that escape was near impossible, 
facilitating a carefully aimed and immediately lethal (painless?) shot was 
surely preferable to a slower death associated with resisting.22 Complying 
with, and thereby accommodating, an irrational goal like mass extermi-
nation made some rational sense.
“Gypsies” (Roma), however, who as Untermenschen were also tar-
geted during the Soviet campaign, frequently caused greater difficulties 
for German shooting squads. As Lieutenant Colonel Walther stated,
Shooting the Jews is easier than shooting the gypsies [sic]. I have to admit 
that the Jews are very composed as they go to their death—they stand very 
calmly—while the gypsies [sic] wail and scream and move about constantly 
when they are already standing at the execution site.23
But it was the mentally ill who put up the greatest resistance. After 
Stahlecker’s destructive Einsatzgruppe A shot 748 mentally ill 
Lithuanians in October 1941 because they were apparently a “danger” 
to security, the Wehrmacht asked them to repeat the exercise at a similar 
institution. Stahlecker refused to repeat the exercise, arguing to Himmler 
that if the Wehrmacht deemed such dirty work so necessary then they 
should do it themselves.24 What Stahlecker and his men had discovered 
was that mentally institutionalized people typically refused to follow the 
instructions of those who intended to kill them and, as a result, they 
frequently became hysterical. The ensuing panic made the targets diffi-
cult to kill with one shot (thus greatly heightening and prolonging the 
perpetrators’ stress). Even Jäger’s prolific Einsatzkommando 3 had, by 
1 February 1942, only managed to shoot 653 mentally ill patients out 
of a total of 138,272 victims (100,000 of whom were women and chil-
dren).25 Other commanders, including Nebe, encountered similar diffi-
culties.26 After Germans encountered such experiences, the mentally ill 
were no longer categorized as a “danger” to security, and their execution 
by firing squad was no longer deemed a priority. The prospective victim 
pool contracted, and attention shifted to target categories such as Jews, 
who generated less “burdening of the soul.” The irony of the resist-
ance of the mentally ill and the passivity of the “normal” Jews are high-
lighted in the existing literature. For example, after Einsatzkommando 
5 had shot a group of mentally ill patients in Kiev, the men experienced 
what they termed an accompanying “heavy mental burden.”27 Headland 
has drawn attention to the apparently “twisted thinking of these men.” 
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It was “much easier to kill people who were sane.”28 Only the inherently 
irrational, it seems, were equipped with an effective strategy capable of 
subverting the increasingly rationalized goal of mass extermination. But 
it would not last. Despite Einsatzgruppe A’s unwillingness to kill the 
mentally ill, Himmler knew of some specialists who would.
At the request of the Wehrmacht, Himmler decided on 4 October…that 
Sonderkommando Lange [and his]…gassing vehicles, should be brought 
by plane to Novgorod in order to kill patients in three psychiatric hospitals 
there, because the accommodation was urgently needed for troops.29
Despite the strain resolving mechanisms they had developed, the exe-
cutioners and their squad leaders could still not avoid seeing their victims 
close-up just before and during the shootings. Bauman suggests that the 
shooters tried to distance themselves as far as possible from their civil-
ian targets.30 This strategy, however, created a problem of its own: Less 
accurate shooting resulted in wounded or in some cases, unwounded 
civilians falling into the graves with the dead. After the shootings, these 
victims were buried alive. Some would then try to claw their way out 
of the graves. But Nazi commanders soon demanded changes. One 
SS-Commissioner-General complained in a letter to the Reich Minister,
Peace and order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of 
that sort. To bury seriously wounded people alive who worked their way 
out of their graves again, is such a base and filthy act that this incident as 
such should be reported to the Führer and Reichsmarschall.31
The firing squads’ accuracy had to be improved. But to do so the shoot-
ers had to move closer to the civilians, but the closer they got, the more 
they could see and hear them thus intensifying the psychological bur-
den. It was a dilemma. Many years later, a Vietnam Special Forces vet-
eran related his own similar experiences to Grossman. “‘When you get 
up close and personal,’ he drawled with a cud of chewing tobacco in his 
cheek, ‘where you can hear ’em scream and see ’em die,’ and here he 
spit[s] tobacco for emphasis, ‘it’s a bitch.’”32 Because Jews were defense-
less and often acquiescent civilians, the Germans had opportunities to 
manipulate their victims in ways that the Vietnam veteran could not. To 
maximize accuracy, the executioners had to see exactly where they were 
shooting. One new technique used to alleviate the psychological strain 
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associated with the shootings was to have victims turn their backs to the 
shooters, thus enabling the shooters to avoid any eye contact or see the 
fearful expressions on their faces. One photo illustrating the German’s 
reliance on this shooting technique taken sometime during the first three 
months of the Soviet invasion shows at least four men kneeling over the 
edge of a ditch with a larger number of executioners shooting at the back 
of their heads from a distance of less than five meters: See https://col-
lections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa19151. In Grossman’s words,
The eyes are the window of the soul, and if one does not have to look into 
the eyes when killing, it is much easier to deny the humanity of the victim. 
The eyes bulging out ‘like prawns’ and blood shooting out of the mouth 
are not seen. The victim remains faceless, and one never needs to know 
one’s victim as a person. And the price most killers have to pay for a close-
range kill—the memory of the ‘face terrible, twisted in pain and hate, yes 
such hate’—this price need never be paid if we can simply avoid looking at 
our victim’s face.33
Also, because with this shooting technique the victims faced away from 
their executioners, they were less directly forced to hear any crying or 
screaming. Having the victims kneel instead of stand lowered their center 
of gravity over the precipice. Thus, upon being shot, they were more 
likely to fall forward into the grave below. The risk of Germans later hav-
ing to push (and thus touch) any victims who failed to fall into the grave 
was reduced.34 A final slight strain resolving innovation was the intro-
duction of “rotating firing squads,” which dispersed the distasteful task 
across an entire squad.35 As Browning argues, this generated enormous 
pressure on all rank and file members to do their fair share of the dirty 
work.36 It should also be kept in mind that because these Germans stood 
in potentially hostile enemy territory where all Germans depended on 
one another for their safety, failing to shoot one’s fair share of the vic-
tims risked losing their comrade’s goodwill.37 When contemplating the 
potential consequences of losing this goodwill, many Germans perceived 
their decision to shoot over refusing to do so as the lesser of two evils.38 
Even if a shooter simply proved psychologically incapable of continuing 
to undertake the executions—thus failing to do their fair share—most 
important of all was that they demonstrated to their fellow comrades 
that they at least tried to help out. This intense pressure to participate in 
the executions, however, only ended up implicating the vast majority 
of Germans. With nearly all guilty of having killed at least some civilians, 
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none of course would ever be in a position to critique the massacres or 
their fellows’ decision to take part in them.39
The shooting method of having the victims kneel and turn away, how-
ever, was also not without its problems. For example, sometimes victims’ 
skulls would shatter when struck by bullets from close range—a sight the 
shooters were unable to avoid.40 To eliminate problems like this, the neck 
shot emerged as the “recommended shooting technique….”41 The neck 
shot required that the victim turn away from the executioner or lie facedown 
on the ground. Then, from point-blank range, the shooter fired a single shot 
into the nape of the neck (just above the shoulders). The bullet would enter 
the back of the neck, producing a small entrance wound and, on severing 
the victim’s spinal cord, kill instantly. With the neck shot, executioners could 
avoid seeing the larger exit wound. Compared to earlier shooting tech-
niques, the neck shot was un-survivable and clean, and because it resulted in 
instant death, many Germans perceived it as a more humane way of killing.42 
For a photo showing a member of Ohlendorf’s Einsatzgruppe D relying 
on this shooting technique, see https://collections.ushmm.org/search/ 
catalog/pa5355. This photo also suggests that Ohlendorf’s early prefer-
ence for the multiple-shooter-per-victim technique was eventually eclipsed 
by the more popular neck shot. For another  photograph, see https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Einsatzkommando#/media/File:Einsatzgruppen_
or_their_auxiliaries_-_Kovno_1942.jpg. The neck shot shooting technique 
likely made it easier for a larger proportion of ordinary Germans to do their 
fair share of the dirty work.
With fewer psychologically fragile perpetrators and, thus, a larger 
number of capable ordinary Germans involved in the killings, ambitious 
leaders in the field continued to seek out more efficient innovations. 
Probably the most significant development in this direction was Higher 
SS/Police Leader Friedrich Jeckeln’s “Sardinenpackung” method, which 
developed fairly early in the Soviet campaign near the end of July 1941. 
August Meier, a “minor bureaucrat,” describes the technique.
I still particularly recall an Aktion in Schepetovka which stands out in my 
mind as extraordinarily gruesome. It involved about a hundred people. 
Women and children were among those shot. Jeckeln said: ‘Today we’ll stack 
them like sardines.’ The Jews had to lie layer upon layer in an open grave and 
were then killed with neck shots from machine pistols, pistols and rifles. That 
meant they had to lie face down on those previously shot [whereas] in other 
executions they were shot standing up and fell into the grave or were dragged 
in. […] I don’t know if Jeckeln did any shooting, but I don’t believe so.43
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As Helmut Langerbein observes, Jeckeln’s rationale behind this technique 
was, because the victims stacked themselves, the perpetrators not only max-
imized usage of the typically limited grave space, they also avoided “the 
added post-execution work of layering bodies….”44 As we shall see, with 
more time and greater experience, this stacking technique inadvertently 
generated other advantages that enormously increased killing efficiency.
About a month into the Soviet campaign, the Wehrmacht expressed 
concerns about a sudden influx of Jewish refugees from Hungary into 
the Ukrainian city of Kamianets-Podilskyi. A Wehrmacht official believed 
the refugees were too difficult to feed and also posed a “danger of 
[spreading an] epidemic….”45 In late August, Jeckeln announced his 
solution to this problem: By 1 September 1941 he would liquidate them. 
Jeckeln knew he could not undertake such a massive operation with just 
his own men, so he organized for other units to converge on the small 
township. He flew in especially to lead the action, and on the first day, 
he observed from a nearby hill the mass shooting of 4200 men, women, 
and children. On the second day, over 11,000 civilians were killed. A 
total of 23,600 victims had been shot by the massacre’s end.46 Jeckeln, 
who on 12 August had been ordered to report to Himmler about his 
brigade’s “lack of ‘activity’,”47 radioed Berlin with his body count statis-
tics. According to Dieter Pohl, this late August massacre was “the larg-
est of its kind and signaled a turning point in the Holocaust—a break 
from killing targeted groups of mostly Jewish males to the indiscrimi-
nate murder of entire Jewish communities.”48 Indeed, the massacre 
brought “Jeckeln the accolades that he had hoped for from his supe-
rior.”49 During the month of August 1941, Jeckeln’s Kommandostab SS 
Brigade One, which Breitman notes was not “part of a political-ideolog-
ical elite”50 (more moderately antisemitic?), had shot 44,125 civilians in 
Western Ukraine.51 This figure exceeded that of all other police units.52 
It was from this point on that the “curve of murder statistics” soared.
In terms of the broader military campaign in the East, September 
1941 was a particularly good month for the Wehrmacht.
…Leningrad was successfully cut off in early September. The Ukrainian 
campaign that Hitler imposed on his reluctant generals quickly followed. 
On September 12 Ewald von Kleist’s tanks broke through the Soviet 
lines behind Kiev. On the same day German forces cracked the defensive 
perimeter around Leningrad. In the words of Alan Clark, this day could 
be “reckoned the low point in the fortunes of the Red Army for the whole 
war.” By September 16 Kleist had joined up with Heinz Guderian at 
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Lokhvista to complete the vast Kiev encirclement. By September 26 Kiev 
had fallen and 665,000 Soviet prisoners had been taken.53
With the Soviet Union at such a low point, Hitler sensed that total 
control of Europe would soon be his. In the “euphoria of victory,”54 
Hitler, brimming with confidence, suddenly reversed his earlier decision 
not to expel the German Jews unable or unwilling to leave the Reich.55 
Hitler’s decision may also have been influenced by Karl Kaufmann, the 
Gauleiter of Hamburg, who in September apparently asked the Führer 
if he would deport Germany’s Jews so that their apartments could be 
used to house Germans whose homes had been destroyed by British 
bombing raids56—bombings Nazi propaganda blamed the Jews for.57 
Whatever the reason behind this change, Hitler’s decision (as we shall 
soon see) sparked Eichmann, the so-called Nazi’s people mover, into 
sudden activity. Because, as shown, most Germans benefited finan-
cially and materially from the Nazi military victories, perhaps the Nazi 
labor minister’s demand around September 1941 that the pension gap 
between white- and blue-collar (Aryan) Germans be narrowed is unsur-
prising.58 A month later and with more military successes, on 4 October 
1942 Göring was the bearer of more good news for Germany: “From 
this day on things will continue to get better since we now possess huge 
stretches of fertile land. There are stocks of eggs, butter, and flour there 
that you cannot even imagine.”59 Not publicly discussed, of course, 
was what diverting this food bonanza to Germany and its armed forces 
meant for those living in and around these fertile lands. A month before 
Göring’s good news, in August 1942 Erich Koch (Reich Commissioner 
for Ukraine) had already cemented his food policy guidelines, stating:
Ukraine is required to provide everything Germany lacks. This require-
ment is to be fulfilled without regard to casualties …. The increase in 
bread rations is a political necessity crucial to our ability to pursue the war 
to its victorious conclusion. The grain we lack must be extracted from 
Ukraine. In light of this task, feeding the civilian population there is utterly 
insignificant.60
As the Wehrmacht continued to push further into the Soviet interior, 
not far behind came Jeckeln efficiently executing unusually large num-
bers of Jews. In early September, Jeckeln’s HSSPF Russia South shot 
4144 Jews in the Ukrainian township of Berdychiv.61 A week or so later, 
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his men, accompanied by Police Battalion 45, killed another 12,000 
Jews. Most of the victims were women, children, and the elderly.62 
Wherever body counts were unusually high, Jeckeln could be found. 
The secret behind Jeckeln’s ability to rapidly wipe out entire com-
munities was the advancing organizational process he attached to his 
“Sardinenpackung” shooting technique.
the bureauCratized mass shooting ProCess: babi yar
On 19 September 1941, an advanced party from Paul Blobel’s 
Sonderkommando 4a (Einsatzgruppe C) arrived in Kiev.63 The city was 
home to Ukraine’s largest Jewish population. At a meeting between 
Jeckeln, Blobel, and Kurt Eberhard, Jeckeln set his sights on eliminating 
Kiev’s entire Jewish population and arranged for other units, including 
some Ukrainian auxiliaries, to help with the task.64 Soon after, announce-
ments on the streets of Kiev instructed all members of the Jewish com-
munity to meet at 8 a.m. on 29 September at a particular downtown 
location. All Jews were to bring official documents, warm clothing, linen, 
and any valuables. Those who failed to show up would be hunted down 
and shot. On the appointed day, a large crowd gathered. German and 
Ukrainian forces arranged them into a purposefully staggered line. Then, 
according to eyewitness Sergei Ivanovich Lutzenko, “in tight columns 
of one hundred each” the Jews “were marched to the adjoining Babi 
Yar” ravine.65 Another account by Lev Ozerov notes that at Babi Yar “an 
entire office operation with desks had been set up….”66 A truck driver 
named Höfer describes what he saw:
The Ukrainians led them past a number of different places where one after 
the other they had to remove their luggage, then their coats, shoes and 
overgarments and also underwear. They also had to leave their valuables in 
a designated place. There was a special pile for each article of clothing. It 
all happened very quickly and anyone who hesitated was kicked or pushed 
by the Ukrainians to keep them moving.67
Removing the victims’ clothing before shooting them generated two 
main advantages: the clothes could later be sold on for profit and, in 
terms of control, earlier executions confirmed that naked victims were 
less likely to make a run for it.68 The Babi Yar ravine,
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was about 150 metres long, 30 metres wide and a good 15 metres deep. 
Two or three narrow entrances led to this ravine through which the Jews 
were channeled. When they reached the bottom of the ravine they were 
seized by members of the Schutzpolizei and made to lie down on top of 
the Jews who had already been shot. This all happened very quickly. The 
corpses were literally in layers. […] When the Jews reached the ravine they 
were so shocked by the horrifying scene that they completely lost their 
will. It may even have been that the Jews themselves lay down in rows to 
wait to be shot. […] there was a ‘packer’ at either entrance to the ravine. 
These ‘packers’ were Schutzpolizisten, whose job it was to lay the vic-
tim on top of the other corpses so that all the marksman had to do as he 
passed was fire a shot.69
The packers helped to ease the psychological burden on the shooters by 
ensuring victims were facedown and thus faceless, robbing them of their 
individuality.70 There were so many people to kill that the shootings con-
tinued until darkness, with the action resuming at first light the follow-
ing morning.71 Paul Blobel divided his men into groups of 30, with each 
group spending an hour each on shooting duties.72 With specialist con-
tributors who collected clothing and valuables, channeled victims into 
the ravine, and “packed” the victims to await the arrival of the marks-
men who shot them, Jeckeln had developed a bureaucratized, assem-
bly-line process of mass murder. With more civilians killed in less time, 
this massacre overshadows that in Kamianets-Podilskyi. Despite Jeckeln’s 
record-breaking feat, his report to Berlin tersely noted, “Special com-
mando 4a, together with Einsatzgruppe C Headquarters and two com-
mando groups of the South Police Regiments, executed 33,771 Jews in 
Kiev on 29 and 30 September 1941.”73
At the same time that Nebe and Fritzsch were undertaking their gas-
sing experiments, Jeckeln’s application of means-to-end formal rationality 
enabled him to destroy a greater number of civilians than any other unit 
yet. A secret official report noted at the time that the key to this stagger-
ing result was Jeckeln’s application of some “extremely clever organiza-
tion” to overcome the usual “difficulties resulting from such a large-scale 
action.”74 As Yaacov Lozowick observes, “It seems no accident that the 
orderly, well-planned murder of 33,000 Jews took place at Kiev at the 
end of this period, rather than at Lvov near the beginning.”75 Much like 
Milgram would later do at Yale during his pilot studies, project manager 
Jeckeln also gradually and systematically refined his procedure of harm 
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infliction. And with more time, Jeckeln’s “factory-orientated approach”76 
underwent further refinements; the division of labor increased with 
ever more specialist functionaries performing ever more refined special-
ist tasks, including a reliance on specialist shooters who were willing and 
capable of doing more than their fair share of the dirty work.77 At a mass 
shooting eight weeks after the Babi Yar massacre,
In the pits…there were to be only a few active marksmen, each of whom 
used a machine pistol set on single shot. Walking over his victims, a 
“shooter” could fire fifty shots and then receive a new magazine from a 
comrade whose sole responsibility was refilling cartridges […] After a 
number of magazines, the marksmen would take a break. Row after row, 
marching block after marching block was to be killed in this manner, in 
accordance with Jeckeln’s minutely worked out method….78
Thus, as Angrick and Klein put it, with time and increasing experience 
Jeckeln came to prefer deploying in the pits “a small circle of truly emo-
tionless SS men,” “primarily his ‘old’ men…who had ‘already done’ 
something like this” at earlier executions.79 Still, due to the highly 
stressful nature of such work, Jeckeln felt it was necessary to rotate with 
“additional men for the relief….”80
Because, during the campaign, Jeckeln received the aid of various mil-
itary units—Wehrmacht regiments, Einsatzkommando units, Police bat-
talions, and Ukrainian auxiliary forces—his “one best way” of massacring 
civilians soon spread elsewhere. If Germans in the armed forces decided 
in the future to deploy Jeckeln’s “controlled” shooting process—and 
as we shall see, they did—“calculable” and highly “efficient” results of 
around 15,000 people killed per day became “predictable.” Jeckeln’s 
inherently bureaucratic mass shooting process advanced all four compo-
nents of a formally rational system.81 It is Jeckeln’s process (along with 
the innovations by other contributors, like Einsatzkommando 3’s Karl 
Jäger) that best explains the rising curve of murder statistics in the Soviet 
interior after mid-August 1941. And Jeckeln’s increasingly bureaucra-
tized shooting process—with its division of labor, specialization of labor, 
clear responsibilities, written records, rules and procedures, impersonality 
of relations—could do so because as Weber argues,
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always 
been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. 
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The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organ-
izations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of 
production.82
I therefore challenge the so-called de-bureaucratization argument during 
the Holocaust by bullets.83 In fact, the rational evolution of the execu-
tion process and the record-breaking Babi Yar massacre in particular can, 
I believe, be described more precisely as a modern bureaucratic process.
Despite the increased bureaucratization, an earlier problem persisted. 
Even some of the “ordinary” executioners, who after several months of 
killing had risen to the top of Himmler’s shooter attrition process, were 
still in need of, as Jeckeln put it, “relief….” For example, Kurt Werner, 
a marksman at the Babi Yar massacre, admitted after that, “It’s almost 
impossible to imagine what nerves of steel it took to carry out that dirty 
work down there. It was horrible….”84 Like the Obedience study’s Mrs. 
Rosenblum, Werner only seems concerned about his pain. With a seem-
ingly endless supply of Soviet Jews to kill, the question was how much 
longer could the most calloused of German killers like Werner keep it 
up? Shooting squad reports such as the one Jeckeln submitted to Berlin 
after Babi Yar rarely mention any psychological problems among the per-
petrators. However, as Headland noted earlier, officials were constantly 
aware of the issue and gave it a great deal of attention.85 As Rudolf Höss 
said after the war,
Many gruesome scenes are said to have taken place, people running away 
after being shot, the finishing off of the wounded and particularly of the 
women and children. Many members of the Einsatzkommando [Nazi 
shooting squads], unable to endure wading through blood any longer, had 
committed suicide. Some had even gone mad.86
In confirmation of much of this, in November 1941, lawyer Helmuth 
von Moltke wrote in a letter to his wife that at least one hospital existed 
“where SS men are cared for who have broken down while executing 
women and children.”87 A Wehrmacht neuropsychiatrist who treated 
many of those affected believed that about 20% of men suffered from 
psychological disorders associated with the shootings.88 Even those 
German executioners who did not break down, as Annette Schücking, 
a female aid based in the East, reported, “all had an intense need to 
talk.”89
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Despite the ongoing psychological problems, Jeckeln still proved 
capable of obtaining high body counts. Perhaps this is why on 10 
October 1941, Heydrich mused about deporting Germany’s Jews to 
new camps in Einsatzgruppe C’s area of operations in Ukraine.90 It is 
no coincidence that Einsatzgruppe C happened to fall under Jeckeln’s 
umbrella of control.91 Indeed, a week later, on 18 October, after meet-
ing with the General Government’s SS and Police Leader Friedrich-
Wilhelm Krüger and the previously mentioned Odilo Globocnik, 
Himmler ordered the cessation of Jewish emigration.92 Himmler would 
now be in charge of when the Reich Jews would leave Germany and 
where they would be sent. In reaction to Hitler’s earlier decision dur-
ing the September “euphoria of victory,” around mid-October the 
RSHA (Eichmann) started organizing trains packed with German and 
Austrian Jews (from cities including Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Vienna, 
and Breslau) to start rolling east. However, somewhat mysteriously, the 
plan to send German Jews to Ukraine was soon dropped. Instead, these 
trains were redirected to Minsk (Belarus), Kaunas/Kovno (Lithuania), 
Riga (Latvia), and, most proximately, Lódź (Poland). In the German 
university town of Göttingen, locals—presumably victims of British air 
raids—reacted to this news by “flooding” the NSDAP district office with 
applications for the soon-to-be-vacated Jewish apartments.93 Because 
these German Jews were limited to leaving with no more than 50 kilo-
grams of luggage,94 the household effects they had to leave behind—fur-
nishings, appliances, textiles, and such—were passed on to “deserving” 
Germans.95
The deportation of trainloads of these Western Jews to various east-
ern cities signaled significant movement in the Nazi regime’s solution 
to the “Jewish question.” Eichmann, the SS’s people-moving expert, 
knew that if the SS was to succeed, it would need to draw on the exper-
tise, resources, and support of other German governmental agencies. 
But doing so would require that the usually secretive SS discloses its 
intentions to others. With such cooperation in mind, on 29 November 
Eichmann sent invitations on Heydrich’s behalf to almost a score of 
mostly high-ranking civil servants from certain government agencies, 
for example, the Transportation Ministry. The meeting, scheduled for 9 
December, has become known as the Wannsee Conference.96 Heydrich 
attached to the invitations a 31 July 1941 mandate from Göring97 that 
reinforced that he (Heydrich) had total control over resolving the Jewish 
question,98 and therefore, all invitees were to cede to his needs. Those 
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invited were the people whose acquiescence Heydrich would demand, 
and whose help and resources Eichmann would need, to resolve once 
and for all the persistent and expanding “Jewish question.” And it was at 
this meeting that a new plan would be revealed.
But soon after the invitations were sent out, Germany was struck by 
several significant blows on the military front lines. First, in the Soviet 
interior, the onset of winter from about November 1941 saw the Nazi 
war machine grind (freeze?) to a halt. Then, beginning on 5 December 
the Soviets managed to muster a forceful counteroffensive. Germany’s 
lightening victory over the Soviets would not come as easily as Hitler 
had so confidently anticipated. The resumption of the successful march 
to victory would have to await the spring thaw. The second and imme-
diately more disconcerting blow to the German military came just a 
few days later on 7 December 1941 when the Japanese attacked Pearl 
Harbor—an act which caused the USA to declare war on Japan. Due to 
the Axis Pact between Italy, Japan, and Germany, the USA’s declaration 
of war against Japan required Germany to declare war against the USA. 
If the USA could free itself from a predictably difficult campaign against 
the Japanese in the Pacific, the already stretched Nazi war machine 
would face, on multiple front lines, a new, highly industrialized, and no 
doubt awesome foe.
In response to these military setbacks, on 12 December 1941, Hitler, 
according to Goebbels’ diary, “decided to make a clean sweep [of the 
Jews].”99 An entry in Himmler’s diary, dated 18 December, confirms 
that around this point in time the policy toward all Jews changed. 
“Jewish question | exterminate as partisans.”100 For the previous six 
months, Soviet Jews had been the targets of genocidal actions, so this 
statement was obviously not specifically directed at them. Powerful Jews 
in the Reich, Europe, and America were, as far as Hitler was concerned, 
behind Germany’s recent military setbacks.101 All such groups, at least 
those within reach, would now pay the price.
But how exactly were all the Western Jews transported to the East 
to be killed? As shown, over the previous few months, a variety of 
 trial-and-error experiments had taken place—some of which indicated 
strong signs of probable success. Still, as Hilberg argues,
As of November 1941, there was some thinking about deporting Jews to 
the Einsatzgruppen so they could be killed by these experienced shooters. 
That is why German Jews were transported to Minsk, Riga, and Kovno.102
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If so, why were most of these cities located in Einsatzgruppe A’s north-
western sphere and none in Jeckeln’s southwestern territories? Put dif-
ferently, why was the Nazi’s most effective executioner being excluded 
from this tentative plan? The answer to this question is that he was not 
excluded—in mid-October 1941 Himmler decided to replace Hans-
Adolf Prützmann (Higher SS and Police Leader of Northern Russia) 
with the far more “efficient” Jeckeln.103 By November, Jeckeln, with 
his team intact, had relocated to the north (based in the Latvian capi-
tal of Riga).104 According to his own testimony after the war, nearing 
 mid-November Jeckeln received orders from Himmler for his first assign-
ment: liquidate the 25,000–28,000 Latvian Jews in the Riga ghetto inca-
pable of productive labor.105 For this assignment, Jeckeln intended to 
apply his trusted “Kiev model….”106 He settled on a site in a clearing in 
the Rumbuli forest about 10 kilometers south of Riga.107
On 25 November 1941, about 250 kilometers south of Riga, the first 
of the Reich Jews arrived on Eichmann’s trains at the Lithuanian city of 
Kaunas. The nearly 3000 German Jews on board—mainly women and 
men and a small number of children—were met by Karl Jäger’s efficient 
Einsatzkommando 3 and were soon after shot.108 Back in Riga, on 30 
November Jeckeln implemented his plan to liquidate the Latvian Jews 
in the Rumbuli forest. But the previous evening a train with 1000 Jews 
from Berlin arrived.109 On his own initiative, Jeckeln decided to also 
kill the new arrivals first thing in the morning, instead of housing them 
in the recently vacated Riga ghetto as planned.110 Einsatzgruppe A’s 
Dr. Rudolf R. Lange (not to be confused with T4’s Herbert Lange) tried 
to defy Jeckeln’s decision. Lange not only stood up to Jeckeln but also 
informed both Heydrich and an immediately furious Himmler what was 
taking place. Himmler’s order to Jeckeln that this particular trainload of 
Jews was not to be shot arrived too late—all were killed earlier in the day. 
It is not clear why Himmler wanted to save, for the meantime, this par-
ticular transport.111 What is clear is that although many more trainloads 
of Western Jews soon followed, most were not shot. Instead, these Reich 
Jews were housed in the Lódź, Minsk, and Riga ghettos.112 Indecision in 
the Eastern territories seems to have set in. As Browning notes, “In the 
last months of 1941, the total mass murder of the deported Reich Jews 
was clearly not yet being implemented.”113
One explanation for the hesitancy is that the onset of winter made 
grave digging in the permafrost impossible.114 This may be part of 
the answer, although such conditions did not seem to stop Jäger and 
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Jeckeln’s winter massacres.115 Much of this mystery must then be 
explained by the fact that the shooting squads were struggling with the 
increased psychological burden associated with having to shoot Western 
Jews. Wilhelm Kube, the Generalkommissar for White Ruthenia based in 
Minsk, highlighted the problem when he noticed that two young Jewish 
women from Germany appeared to have fully Aryan features. Although 
in the 1930s, he was rightfully described by one scholar as “an invet-
erate antisemite”116—and described Minsk Jews as “indigenous, ani-
malistic hordes”117—it appears Kube developed strong second thoughts 
about the “Final Solution” when it came to shooting Jews from “our 
cultural milieu.”118 And until “a more discrete and ‘humane’ way” could 
be found, Kube refused to shoot Reich Jews.119 Soon after, however, 
Heydrich overruled Kube’s reluctance and these Western Jews were 
eventually shot. But of course, for those implementing these orders, 
if the most seasoned of German executioners struggled to kill every 
Eastern Jew placed before them, it is not difficult to imagine they faced 
heightened psychological difficulties when ordered to shoot civilians 
from the west who dressed, sounded, and sometimes looked much like 
themselves. Most of these Jews did not resemble the images promoted 
in Nazi propaganda: poor Eastern Jews whose impoverished appearances 
were a side effect of the wartime condition imposed on the ghettos by 
the Nazis themselves. Perhaps Jeckeln could find a solution. However, 
it appears the SS-Reichsführer was quickly losing faith in his chief execu-
tioner. At a meeting on 4 December, Himmler told Jeckeln:
shooting is too complicated an operation…For shooting, he [Himmler] 
said, one needs people who can shoot, and…this affects people poorly, 
therefore Himmler said further, it would be best to liquidate the people by 
using gassing vehicles, which had been prepared in Germany according to 
his instructions, and that by using these gassing vehicles the troubles con-
nected with shooting would fall to the wayside.120
For Jeckeln, more bad news followed. The day before this meeting 
Rudolf Lange was promoted to Chief of the KdS Latvia.121
Of course, it was from September 1941 Höss’s Zyklon-B gassing 
technique and Nebe’s gas van innovations held the potential to pro-
vide an apparently more “humane” means of killing civilians. By the 
time of the above meeting between Himmler and Jeckeln, the SS in 
Berlin had already placed an order with Prüfer from Topf & Sons for a 
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crematorium to be built in Mogilev (near Minsk),122 which, according 
to Gerlach, they intended to combine with a gas chamber “not to kill 
the remaining local Jews but those of Western and Central Europe.”123 
An extermination camp for Jews was being planned for Mogilev,124 and 
since the German military had priority use over the Soviet railway, the 
emerging plan was to transport the Jews to the camp by boat along the 
Bug, Pripet, and Dnieper rivers.125 In fact, in Mogilev, “Not only was 
a large crematorium ordered, but HSSPF Hamburg Rudolf Querner 
apparently also ordered large quantities of Zyklon-B gas from Tesch & 
Stabenow, and HSSPF Ostland in Riga [Jeckeln] expected this gas to be 
delivered.”126 If, indeed, Jeckeln supported this delivery of Zyklon-B to 
Mogilev, it would suggest that even he conceded that gassing was prob-
ably the more preferable means of killing Western Jews. The decision 
to use gassing technology in Minsk (stationary chamber) and gas vans 
in Riga on “Old Reich” Jews “not fit for work” can be traced to a let-
ter written by Erhard Wetzel (racial advisor in the Eastern Ministry) to 
Hinrich Lohse (Reichskommissar for the Ostland) on 25 October 1941:
…[T4’s Victor] Brack of the Führer’s Chancellery has already declared 
himself willing to work on the production of the required accommodation 
as well as the gassing apparatus.127
Gas vans were indeed sent to Riga and parts for Prüfer’s cremato-
rium were delivered to Mogilev where they sat awaiting construction. 
Infrastructure along the waterways had been too badly damaged for boat 
transport, and as a result, in 1942 the plan was abandoned.128
Also important, by early December 1941, as Himmler spoke to 
Jeckeln, Nebe’s gas vans had already started rolling off the production 
line and were being sent to the East. Therefore, as Himmler implied at 
this meeting, he no longer needed Jeckeln’s specialist skill-set at the last 
link in the machinery of destruction. With other options on the hori-
zon, the problematic shootings were no longer needed and Jeckeln’s star 
role in Nazi Jewish policy was over. Pending the arrival of the vans, lead-
ers like Kube passed on the usual shooting duties to their Latvian and 
Lithuanian collaborators.129 Kube’s solution actually highlights what, in 
the absence of the new killing technology, became the German execu-
tioners’ most popular self-invented strain resolving coping mechanisms 
that reduced (eliminated?) their “burdening of the soul.”
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the insertion of “[e]nd [s]PeCiaL [u]nits”
From the start of the Soviet campaign, Himmler noticed that even with-
out guns antisemitic Eastern Europeans still seemed far more eager than 
his own men to attack Jews. What more could he gain from arming 
them? It seems Himmler raised this possibility in Berlin during Hitler’s 
16 July 1941 “Garden of Eden” meeting; however, the Führer was ada-
mant that Eastern Europeans should never be armed.130 But, toward 
the end of that month, as his Kommandostab SS Cavalry Brigade des-
perately herded Jewish women and children into the shallow Pripet 
quicksands, Himmler disobeyed Hitler’s order by copying the German 
security police’s early July initiative to set up a battalion of Lithuanians 
and placing them under the control of Jäger’s Einsatzkommando 3. On 
July 25, Himmler officially “authorized the creation of auxiliary police 
forces from the reliable non-Communist elements among Ukrainians, 
Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Byelorussians.”131 He did so 
because, in his words, “the task of the police in the occupied eastern 
territories cannot be accomplished with the manpower of the police 
and SS now deployed or yet to be deployed.”132 However, as Breitman 
observes, the Eastern collaborators,
and their future use as executioners reflected more than just a shortage of 
German policemen. Whereas Himmler, Daluege, Bach-Zelewski, and some 
other high officials had some concerns for the morale of German police, 
they did not much care what happened psychologically to the non-Ger-
mans as long as there were enough of them to carry out their appointed 
tasks. [italics added]133
Simply increasing German manpower was unlikely to work, but Himmler 
suspected that augmenting Eastern European manpower might. 
Himmler’s disobedience may, therefore, be explained by his suspicion 
that Eastern Europeans might make better executioners than ordinary 
Germans. By the end of 1941, 33,000 Eastern European collabora-
tors had joined German extermination squads.134 Six months later, the 
number had risen to 165,000, and by January 1943, it had almost dou-
bled to 300,000.135 However, simply arming large numbers of Eastern 
Europeans was, by itself, inadequate. In the spirit of Weberian formal 
rationality and means-to-end logic, the task at hand demanded meticu-
lous organizational preparation.136 Under the careful management of 
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German authorities, Eastern European collaborators were slotted in as 
the last link in the Nazis’ shooting assembly line where they could effi-
ciently perform their specialist labor.
A mass shooting undertaken in August 1941 in the Ukrainian vil-
lage of Belaya Tserkov illustrates the kind of roles given to collabora-
tors. After German soldiers shot all the men and women, and two of the 
boys, the rest of the children were held in a house without food or water 
until Ukrainian auxiliaries were brought in to shoot them. However, the 
Ukrainians left behind the 90 or so children under the age of seven—
mainly toddlers and babies. According to Blobel’s subordinate, August 
Häfner,
…Blobel ordered me to have the children executed. I asked him, ‘By 
whom should the shooting be carried out?’ He answered, ‘By the Waffen–
SS.’ I raised an objection and said, ‘They are all young men. How are 
we going to answer to them if we make them shoot small children?’ To 
this he said, ‘Then use your men.’ I then said, ‘How can they do that? 
They have small children as well.’ This tug-of-war lasted about ten min-
utes. […] I suggested that the Ukrainian militia of the Feldkommandant 
should shoot the children. There were no objections from either side to 
this suggestion….137
Regarding the proposed execution site, Häfner continued,
The Wehrmacht had already dug a grave. The children were brought along 
in a tractor. […] The Ukrainians were standing round trembling. The chil-
dren were taken down from the tractor. They were lined up along the top 
of the grave and shot so that they fell into it. The Ukrainians did not aim 
at any particular part of the body. They fell into the grave. The wailing 
was indescribable. I shall never forget the scene throughout my life. I find 
it very hard to bear. […] Many children were hit four or five times before 
they died.138
Blobel, presumably having recovered from his mental breakdown a 
month earlier, clearly had no qualms about ordering the Ukrainians to 
undertake this mass execution. Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, he chose 
not to attend.
Eastern Europeans were increasingly given the tasks of shooting 
women and children, which Germans often shied away from.139 As one 
member of Einsatzgruppe A stated,
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The orders for the third or fourth Einsatz were particularly important 
because they gave instructions for members of the local population to be 
used to carry out the actual dirty work, to which end special units should 
be set up. The purpose of this measure was to preserve the psychological 
equilibrium of our own people…. [italics added]140
Although German supervisors and executioners may not have liked to 
admit it, the locals in these “end special units” (i.e., the last and most 
stressful link in the Nazi’s destructive bureaucratic chain) were responsi-
ble for producing some of the bleakest statistics. For example, the Jäger 
report (which lists the deaths of over 130,000 civilians killed in under 
five months) states the massacres were undertaken by only eight to ten 
“reliable” Germans in “cooperation with Lithuanian partisans….”141 As 
Matthäus said of the Lithuanians under Jäger’s control, “these men con-
tributed massively towards the staggering figure….”142 MacQueen con-
cludes that,
Jager’s “achievement” has to be considered largely as a triumph of man-
aging the Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft forces (some 8000 men by the 
end of 1941) and the Lithuanian Police, without whom this deadly work 
would not have been remotely possible.143
In fact, during the liquidation of the Riga ghetto even Jeckeln tri-
aled Jäger’s most prized innovation when he supplemented his special-
ist German marksmen with a rapid rotation of Latvians. The rotation, 
however, did not last very long because most of the Latvians became too 
drunk to adequately perform their specialist role.144
It seems, then, that the most common strategy German authorities 
adopted to prevent members of their execution squads from becoming, 
in Bach-Zelewski words, “neurotics or savages,” was one that shielded 
German perpetrators from all perceptual engagement. As a security 
police interpreter in Liepaja stated, “It was only in the early days that 
members of our section had to man the firing-squad. Later we had a 
Kommando of Latvians who made up the firing-squad.”145 The reason 
this strategy proved so popular among German troops is not hard to 
guess. Just as in Milgram’s Peer Administers Shock condition, where an 
actor fulfilled the role of shock-inflictor, it enabled all Germans across 
the division of labor to make essential contributions to the overall pro-
cess (victim capture, roundup, cordon duty, and so on) without feeling 
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(or appearing) personally responsible for the deadly outcome. This strat-
egy powerfully promoted responsibility ambiguity among all Germans 
involved. As Wendy Lower put it, with the help of non-German shoot-
ers, “Even at the lowest level of the Nazi hierarchy, one could play one’s 
part in the ‘final solution’ without dirtying one’s hands….”146
The use of Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and other collaborators 
at the killing-end of the assembly line (the most destructive of whom 
were, for obvious reasons, eagerly sought by the Germans outside their 
homelands as “end special units”147) raises another question. If the psy-
chological strain generated by shooting civilians was as debilitating as 
many Germans attested after the war, why did these collaborators not 
experience comparable levels of strain and trauma? One possible reason 
may be, as Bauer noted earlier, that German perpetrators came from a 
mildly antisemitic society, while these collaborators were much more vio-
lently antisemitic. To ensure that the orders of those in Berlin were met, 
the Germans frequently required the help of those from certain Eastern 
European nations who had indisputable reputations for hating Jews and 
may have been more willing to act on such feelings. Another possible 
reason might be, as Jeckeln noted during his trial after the war, “Latvians 
were excellent for the job of murdering Jews, since they had strong 
nerves for executions of that sort.”148
However, there is evidence that Eastern European collaborators strug-
gled with the psychological burden of killing as much as anyone else, as 
their proclivity for drunkenness during executions suggests. But perhaps 
the strongest explanation is that in the wake of Operation Barbarossa, 
many Eastern European soldiers became prisoners of war and could only 
win release if they agreed to do the Germans’ dirty work. And release 
meant they were less likely to die from starvation.149 Again relying on 
the colonial management technique of favored natives obtaining priv-
ileges in exchange for controlling the others, as Göring himself said, 
the only non-Germans to be fed during the Soviet invasion were those 
“performing important tasks for Germany.”150 Many Eastern European 
“end special units,” therefore, likely also struggled psychologically with 
the shootings, but continued to participate in a desperate effort to secure 
their own survival.
Whatever the numerous and no doubt overlapping reason(s) the 
Eastern collaborators had for participating, this kind of analysis only 
serves to draw attention away from the key instigators—the Germans. 
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Here Breitman draws attention back to the Nazi regime and its rational 
and creative bureaucrats,
After the war Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski explained that the extermina-
tion camps arose because Germans and Central Europeans were not suited 
to be mass executioners. Stalin, he said, always had people to employ for 
this purpose—for example, the Latvians. Although the Nazis found some 
individuals to serve as killers, there was no collective eagerness to do so. 
The extermination camp…was something that the Russians could not 
accomplish: it reflected the German gift for organization. Bureaucrats cre-
ated it, he concluded.151
ConCLusion
In an attempt to ease the psychological burden of shooting civilians, 
the field leadership and their men introduced a variety of strain resolv-
ing coping mechanisms aimed at reducing the perceptual intensity of the 
mass shootings. These bottom-up techniques, including the consump-
tion of alcohol, a focus on shooting the most compliant victims, evolv-
ing shooting techniques, and, after the bureaucratization of the shooting 
process, a dependence on Eastern European “end special units,” pow-
erfully aided the advance toward what Milgram would later term (per-
ceptual) avoidance. This, in a nutshell, is how the German perpetrators 
coped with what Hilberg described as “weighty psychological obstacles 
and impediments,” and over time helped them avoid becoming “neurot-
ics” or “savages….”152
As the shooting squads’ most effective strain resolving mechanisms 
spread, the body count grew, and the closer these men came to achiev-
ing the desires of their leaders far away in Berlin. As Lower points out, 
from the top-down Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich defined and pushed 
in favor of the “final solution.” Implementation, however, came through 
the bottom-up initiatives of those in the field in the lower and middling 
ranks.153
This process reminds us of Milgram’s pilot studies where he decided 
to replace the translucent screen with a solid wall and, as a consequence, 
enhanced the psychological ability of a greater proportion of his par-
ticipants to implement his top-down desires. Indeed, as mentioned, 
Milgram’s idea to introduce a wall in the official experiments was insti-
gated by his participants (thus from the bottom-up), who looked away 
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from the learner in order to make it psychologically easier for them to 
inflict more shocks.
“The primary question concerning the Holocaust as a crime based on 
the division of labor is…” according to Michael Allen, “[w]hat interrela-
tionship existed between centralized authority and spontaneous initiative 
at the local level?”154 A convincing answer to this question would seem 
to go a little further than the “rule of anticipated reactions,” or what 
regional functionaries in the East themselves referred to as “anticipa-
tory obedience.”155 The leadership set policy goals and upper-level field 
management (Jeckeln, Jäger, Ohlendorf, and their problem-solving ilk) 
discovered strain resolving and efficient techniques, the introduction of 
which was probably motivated by a mix of coercive pressure from the 
SS leadership, their own personal ambitions, and a desire to ensure their 
subordinates did not become “neurotics or savages.”156 Also, motivated 
by a desire to ease their own stress, sometimes the executioners contrib-
uted to the banalization of the shooting techniques. As the most directly 
involved perpetrators found their tasks psychologically more bearable, 
they were able to perform them longer and, as a result, came ever closer 
to achieving the desires of the leadership in Berlin.
Using the terminology of organizational theorists, the emergence 
of the sufficiently banal shooting techniques was of crucial importance 
because the less stressful the executions became, the more likely the 
German shooters could remain within their Zone of Indifference. And 
once able to remain within the Zone of Indifference and thereby having 
accepted their new destructive roles, then their creative internal rational-
ization machine—much as outlined by Albert Bandura’s theory of moral 
disengagement—was able to exert “self-influence.” The shooters would, 
for example, tell themselves and other Germans that they were, for 
example, fighting for the Reich’s survival, and because Jews kept break-
ing the rules of occupation, all were—as Hitler and Himmler said from 
the start—“partisans” and “criminals” worthy only of death. The logi-
cal conclusion of all such rationales was the same: “what we are doing is 
necessary.”157 Of course, the German shooters had so much power over 
life and death decisions that nobody in the occupied territories could 
or would dare inform them that following the rules of occupation (like 
never leaving a barren ghetto) was in itself a death sentence that forced 
Jews to become “partisans” and “criminals.”158
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Crucial in making all this possible was the process of rationalization 
that saw the mass shootings become an increasingly bureaucratic process. 
As Bauman states,
Once the objective had been set, everything went on exactly as Weber, 
with his usual clarity, spelled out: ‘The “political master” finds himself in 
the position of the “dilettante” who stands opposite the “expert”, facing 
the trained official who stands within the management of administration.’ 
The objective had to be implemented; how this was to be done depended 
on the circumstances, always judged by the ‘experts’ from the point of 
view of feasibility and the cost of alternative opportunities of action.159
As subsequent chapters will show, advancing formal rationality where 
certain experts made the killing of civilians both more efficient and less 
offensive only continued, thus enabling the Holocaust to reach ever 
greater and more devastating heights.
Although the use of guns was labor intensive, involved complex logis-
tics, and was hard to keep hidden from public view, with time and expe-
rience, it nonetheless proved capable of killing civilians on a horrendous 
scale. Despite an initially slow start to the shooting campaign, by the end 
of the war this method of extermination had killed about 25% of all Jewish 
Holocaust victims. The number of Roma (Gypsies) shot is not clear but 
likely numbered in the tens of thousands.160 But as far as the leading Nazis 
were concerned, the major limitation of firearms was that their men were 
forced to witness an undeniable connection between their contributions 
and their lethal effects. The main shortcoming of guns was that they made 
many of the German executioners feel and appear too responsible for their 
actions—there was insufficient responsibility ambiguity at the last link in 
the organizational chain. The resulting responsibility clarity stimulated 
among some executioners intense feelings of guilt and, most commonly, 
repugnance (feelings that varied in intensity, depending on the type of vic-
tim). While throughout the war the Nazi regime never completely aban-
doned this highly mobile method of killing, as 1941 came to an end it 
was clear that firearms alone could not provide any long-term “solution” 
to the Nazi’s now European-wide “Jewish problem,”161 especially when 
many of the victims dressed, sounded, and often looked like the perpetra-
tors. What was needed instead was a more impersonal, less public, less labor 
intensive, and even more industrial and organized method of mass exter-
mination. When Himmler dumped Jeckeln in early December 1941, the 
SS-Reichsführer clearly sensed that a new method was on the horizon.
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Soon after the start of the Nazi regime’s furtive T4 euthanasia project in 
1939, rumors spread that the Nazi regime was killing Germans with dis-
abilities. On 8 July 1940, for example, a provincial probate judge wrote 
in a letter to the minister of justice, “‘Everyone knows as well as I do’ 
that ‘the murder of the mentally ill is as well known a daily reality as, 
say, the concentration camps.’”1 These suspicions were confirmed when 
some of the victims’ families received death certificates claiming clearly 
spurious causes of death. Some said that victims who had long ago had 
their appendixes removed died of appendicitis.2 Heated and public pro-
tests ensued—most notably led by Count Clemens August von Galen, 
the Archbishop of Münster.3 The Nazis may have been a dictatorship but 
they knew, as all long-lasting autocracies do, broad public dissent does 
not bode well for political longevity. For this reason, Hitler had always 
been sensitive to the emotional vagaries of public opinion.4 After placing 
the popular and potentially influential von Galen under house arrest, on 
24 August 1941, the Führer ended, at least officially, the euthanasia pro-
gram.5 At just the same time, however, the Eastern shooting campaign 
was expanding and, because these massacres were causing psychological 
problems for many shooters, Nebe and Fritzsch were about to embark 
on their search for a more “humane” way of killing civilians (ending in 
their discoveries of two cheap and mobile gassing techniques).
This chapter details what evolved into the large-scale gassing programs 
in the East, with a particular emphasis on Operation Reinhard—the 
extermination of Jews in the city ghettos of the General Government. 
CHAPTER 6
The Rise of Operation Reinhard
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What follows shares much in common with the pattern of escalation 
depicted in the previous chapters: initially low rates of killing, top-down 
pressure to increase those rates, the application of formal rationality from 
the bottom-up (increased experimentation, bureaucratization, and the 
honing of a less stressful killing process), resulting in increased kill rates 
that only served to stimulate new top-down pressures to meet new and 
even more ambitious goals, thus occasioning an ever-expanding cycle of 
destruction. Much like with the shootings, top-down and bottom-up 
forces “radicalized each other.”6 Much like Milgram’s pilot studies where 
all the kinks in his increasingly powerful procedure were ironed out, with 
time and experience the key innovators during this gassing program also 
ironed out every kink that threatened their goal—kill every person sent 
their way. As we shall see, the result was Operation Reinhard, an increas-
ingly efficient program that killed between 1.5 and 1.7 million people in 
just 20 months.
new oPPortunities
With the suspension of T4’s euthanasia program, individuals who had 
developed an expertise in gassing civilians suddenly found themselves 
out of work. One such person, the previously mentioned chemist August 
Becker, later explained what the SS-Reichsführer had planned for them: 
“Himmler wanted to deploy people who had become available as a result 
of the suspension of the euthanasia program, and who, like me, were spe-
cialists in extermination by gassing, for the large-scale gassing operations 
in the East which were just beginning.”7 Becker notes in more detail,
When in December 1941 I was transferred to Rauff’s department he 
explained the situation to me, saying that the psychological and moral 
stress on the firing squads was no longer bearable and that therefore the 
gassing programme had been started. He said that gas-vans with driv-
ers were already on their way to or had indeed reached the individual 
Einsatzgruppen. My professional brief was to inspect the work of the indi-
vidual Einsatzgruppen in the East in connection with the gas-vans. This 
meant that I had to ensure that the mass killings carried out in the lorries 
proceeded properly.8
From November onward,9 the Einsatzgruppen received at least 15 
gas vans fitted out with Nebe’s exhaust innovation: Einsatzgruppe 
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A two; Einsatzgruppe B four; Einsatzgruppe C five; and Einsatzgruppe 
D four.10 The inventive chemist, Albert Widmann (from the RSHA’s 
Criminal Technology Institute), was on hand to provide the execu-
tion squads with assistance and advice on using the vans—a role Becker 
would soon fill. A member of Blobel’s squad by the name of Lauer 
described what Spektor believes was the earliest documented gas van 
operation on Soviet territory. In November 1941:
Two gas vans were in service. I saw them myself. They drove into the 
prison yard, and the Jews—men, women, and children—had to get 
straight into the vans from their cells. I also know what the interior of the 
vans looked like. It was covered with sheet metal and fitted with a wooden 
grid. The exhaust fumes were piped into the interior of the vans. I can still 
hear the hammering and the screaming of the Jews—‘Dear Germans, let us 
out!’11
The gas vans enabled the executioners to avoid the stressful visual spec-
tacle associated with guns, but clearly they failed to shield them from 
the noise generated by those dying inside. A witness, Eugenia Ostrovec, 
described tactics reminiscent of Milgram’s participants talking over the 
learner’s screams in an attempt to neutralize this remaining source of 
perceptual information. “When it was quite full, the doors were firmly 
locked. The driver started the engine and left it running at full revs, but 
he couldn’t drown the cries of the prisoners and the trampling of feet 
inside the van.”12 Although some gas van operators certainly used the 
truck’s motor to help neutralize the victims’ screams, Becker’s report 
to Berlin of 16 May 1942 reveals that this was unlikely the only reason 
for pressing on the accelerator: “In order to get the Aktion finished as 
quickly as possible the driver presses down on the accelerator as far as it 
will go.”13
Because the original euthanasia program had used canisters of pure 
carbon monoxide, which is both odorless and colorless,14 gassing techni-
cians were more likely to have been spared the cries of panicking victims. 
In those cases, by the time the condemned realized what was happen-
ing to them, it was generally too late to react. On the other hand, the 
malodorous and visible diesel fumes used in the vans left victims alert 
to the presence of great danger and they reacted with desperation. They 
produced frightful sounds that proximate perpetrators found difficult to 
avoid.
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But for the perpetrators, the sounds of dying people were not the 
only disturbing source of perceptual stimulation they encountered. 
Blobel’s chauffeur described the visual spectacle that greeted perpe-
trators once the victims were killed. “The back doors of the van were 
opened, and the bodies that had not fallen out when the doors were 
opened were unloaded by Jews who were still alive. The bodies were 
covered with vomit and excrement. It was a terrible sight.”15 Faced with 
such a sight, the mentally fragile Blobel “looked, then looked away, and 
we drove off. On such occasions Blobel always drank schnapps, some-
times even in the car.”16 Perhaps fearing Heydrich’s accusations that 
he was “soft,”17 the attentive and pandering Blobel was determined 
to complete his distasteful assignment. Blobel’s avoidance behavior is 
reflected in a report sent from RSHA chief mechanic Pradel to Rauff 
on 5 June 1942 on ways to improve the vans. “The observation win-
dows that have been installed,” which helped the perpetrators determine 
if the victims had died, “…could be eliminated, as they are hardly ever 
used.”18
While Einsatzgruppe C came to depend on their gas vans, other 
squads made little or no use of them, preferring instead to continue 
shooting their victims. Becker implied a reason for this in a report he 
sent to Berlin on 16 May 1942:
I would like to take this opportunity to draw your attention to the fol-
lowing: some of the Kommandos are using their own men to unload the 
vans after the gassing. I have made commanders of the Sonderkommandos 
in question aware of the enormous psychological and physical damage this 
work can do to the men, if not immediately then at a later stage.19
Where Blobel’s men had Jews unload the vans, other Einsatzgruppen 
units decided, for security reasons, to deploy their own men to perform 
this harrowing task.20
For many perpetrators, it was important to kill victims as quickly 
as possible. In this respect, the gas vans were clearly inferior to a bul-
let in the back of the neck. Although the gas vans enabled the Germans 
to avoid having to see their victims die, the prolonged screaming and 
the visual spectacle after the back doors of the van were opened made 
it difficult to deny the reality that their victims had died slow and ago-
nizing deaths. Consequently, some of the Einsatzgruppen commanders 
and their men formed the opinion that compared with the neck shot, the 
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vans actually caused greater emotional stress for perpetrators. The verdict 
of a 1972 court case in Munich stated,
The defendant Schuchart declared to a member of the commando that 
personally he would have preferred to be shot rather than gone into the 
truck. When the doors were opened the bodies were all entangled and cov-
ered with excrement. As a result of complaints from members of the com-
mando, the defendant Schuchart later refused to use the gas vans again, on 
the grounds that it was impossible to persuade his men to carry out such a 
task.21
Of course, forcing Jews to remove their own people from the vans meant 
the executioners could, if they so desired, avoid the perceptual realities of 
their genocidal contributions.22
Indeed, the inventors of the gas van paid little attention to the slow 
and painful manner of their victims’ deaths because their search for a 
more “humane” method centered, first and foremost, on alleviating the 
executioners’—not the victims’—psychological stress. The members of 
the Einsatzgruppen tasked with using these vans then faced what they 
would have interpreted as a moral dilemma: to use firearms that killed 
instantly and were arguably less painful for the victims, but generated an 
unavoidable visual spectacle that inflicted an immediate and lasting psy-
chological burden on the shooter, or to use gas vans that could eliminate 
any disturbing visual spectacles for themselves, but inflicted a cruel and 
prolonged death on the victims. Many German executioners believed the 
gas van to be an inhumane and “cowardly” means of inflicting death. As 
Hans Stark said of the gas vans during his trial after the war:
“It was a terrible sight.” Judge Hofmeyer: “Did the people appear to have 
gone through an agonizing death struggle?” “I didn’t look closely; one 
glimpse was enough for me.” “How did you feel?” “Never again.” “Why? 
Did you think it was wrong?” “No, certainly not.” “Well, then, why ‘never 
again’ if it was right and necessary?” “When someone was shot it was 
entirely different, but the use of gas was not manly, it was cowardly.”23
There were other problems too. It did not help matters that the vans 
struggled to master the frequently muddy Soviet late-fall terrain. Also, 
the Einsatzgruppen’s 15 or so vans could not match the killing effi-
ciency of a mass shooting like Babi Yar.24 Hilberg is correct: In the end, 
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Nebe’s gassing innovation was not the killing “panacea” that Himmler 
and many shooting squad members were hoping for.25 Many of the 
men returned to shooting or simply passed this dirty work on to their 
Eastern European collaborators. It transpires, however, that another 
group outside the Einsatzgruppen—the euthanasia program’s Lange 
Commando—also received several exhaust fume gas vans. And in the 
hands of T4 gassing professionals like Lange, Nebe’s innovation went 
on to have, as we shall see, devastating consequences for those Jews and 
Gypsies still alive in the Wartheland.
the origins of the first extermination CamP: Chełmno
It will be recalled that based on Himmler’s mid-October 1941 instruc-
tions to Eichmann, Lódź was to be one of the four cities to receive 
trainloads of Western Jews. More precisely, on 18 September, Himmler 
wrote to Wartheland Governor Arthur Greiser and told him to expect 
the arrival of 60,000 Western Jews, all of whom were apparently to be 
moved further east the following spring.26 Greiser negotiated this num-
ber down, and across October and November, 20,000 Western Jews 
and 5000 Austrian Roma Gypsies were sent to the already over-crowded 
Lódź ghetto.27 How the Lódź ghetto was supposed to accommo-
date this large influx of people—where that winter officials like Rolf-
Heinz Höppner expected many Jews would starve—was now Greiser’s 
problem. Lódź’s Jewish council would not have welcomed Himmler’s 
news: The resettlement of so many relatively rich Western Jews into 
the ghetto would likely accentuate starvation among the poorest Polish 
Jews because the former’s greater wealth would cause the general cost 
of food to rise.28 In a panic, Greiser instructed Wilhelm Koppe, Lange’s 
superior officer, to somehow find a way of ensuring the ghetto could 
accommodate this large influx of newcomers.29 It is no coincidence that 
around this point in time the Lange Commando went from gassing Poles 
with disabilities (T4) to exterminating the potentially far more numer-
ous Wartheland Jews (and others).30 Lange and his men were unlikely 
fazed by this sudden change to a more numerous victim category: A 
proportion of their usual victims had been Jewish and, anyway, others 
elsewhere over the last few months had been shooting Jews en masse. 
Because Greiser and those below him like Marder and Biebow were, as 
Browning argues, committed “productionists,” Lange was instructed to 
kill only non-working Jews.31 He could not, however, set out by killing 
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non-working Jews in the Lódź ghetto—word of his instructions might 
spread panic among his main target population. Lange needed to start 
somewhere else—a more isolated locale where he could hone an increas-
ingly refined large-scale killing operation.
The Lange Commando’s “opening salvo” on the Jews was aimed 
at those living in the Grodziec and Rzgów ghettos in Konin County, 
located about 100 kilometers northwest of Lódź.32 Although the details 
surrounding this massacre are hazy at best, evidence suggests that across 
several days in late September and early October 1941, the Lange 
Commando very likely gassed and probably shot about 1500 Jews.33 
Then, after gassing 290 elderly Jews in late October about 50 kilometers 
to the south of these ghettos,34 Lange’s men soon returned to Konin 
County. This time the Lange Commando had the much larger rural 
ghetto in Zagórów—about 3000 non-working Jews—in their sites.35 
Facing this larger victim pool, Lange must have wondered how, armed 
with one gas van dependent on limited supplies of gas canisters and 15 
or so armed men (with no Jeckeln-style mass shooting experience), his 
commando was supposed to quickly exterminate so many people. It 
appears Lange, facing this killing conundrum, did what other rational 
problem-solvers a month or two before him did in places like Minsk, 
Mogilev, Lublin, Auschwitz I, and Mauthausen. That is, from the bot-
tom-up, as best he could, Lange improvised and invented a potentially 
effective means of meeting his top-down superior’s demands to rapidly 
kill large numbers of civilians: He “experimented with a new form of 
killing.”36 In doing so, Lange obviously hoped that his newly devised 
method would provide sufficient room for the large influx of Western 
Jews that had arrived or were heading to the Lódź Ghetto. According 
to one non-Jewish Polish prison laborer Mieczysław Sękiewicz, around 
mid-November 1941, the Zagórów Jews were transported to a nearby 
forest. In the forest, two large pits had been dug, the larger of which had 
been layered with chunks of unslaked lime. Lange’s men then ordered 
the naked Jews to enter and stand in the larger pit. From “above the 
only thing visible was the heads of the people, tightly packed in the 
pit.”37 Then, according to Sękiewicz:
I noticed four vat-like things on the truck. Next, the Germans set up a 
small engine, which was probably a pump. Using a hose, they connected it 
to one of the vats. Two of the Gestapo officers then dragged the hose from 
the motor to the large pit. They started the motor and these two Gestapo 
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officers holding the hose began pouring something onto the Jews crowded 
in the pit. I think it was water, that’s what it looked like but I’m not sure 
[…] Apparently, as a result of the slaking of the lime, the people began to 
boil alive. The screaming was so horrible that those of us who were sitting 
near the clothing tore off pieces of material and put them in our ears. The 
horrible screams of those being boiled in the pit was joined by the scream-
ing and wailing of those still waiting to be executed. That lasted for about 
two hours, possibly longer.38
The next day Sękiewicz observed that “[t]he mass of people inside had 
collapsed and sunk towards the bottom of the pit. The bodies were 
packed so tightly together that they remained in the somewhat vertical 
position; only their heads were tilted in all different directions.”39 Lange 
must have assessed his experiment a failure because despite the slacked 
lime achieving his goal—in just a few hours a large number of Jews had 
been killed—the commando gassed the remaining victims.40 Presumably, 
the Germans, again with themselves in mind, found this new killing 
method too harrowing.
Around the time of this massacre, that is mid-November, commando 
member Walter Burmeister recalled driving Lange to Berlin.41 Around 
the period of Lange’s stay in Berlin, T4 leader Karl Brandt perhaps 
caught wind of Lange’s disturbing experience when trying to quickly 
exterminate large numbers of Polish Jews and aware that contempora-
neously the Einsatzgruppen were receiving the latest in gas van technol-
ogy, deemed it wise to direct a few of Nebe’s vehicles to the Wartheland. 
More certainly, Brandt informed Koppe (Lange’s superior) that “the 
‘testing of Brack’s [Nebe’s] gas’ was planned for the Warthegau 
[Wartheland].”42 Lange returned to his team in Poznań with instruc-
tions to set up a new permanent base close to the Lódź ghetto.43 With 
his preconceived goal to construct a permanent gassing facility, Lange 
in the role of the problem-solving project manager kicked into action. 
First up, he needed a location, more manpower, and, upon the arrival of 
his new fleet of gas vans, an efficient extermination process. Nearing the 
very end of 1941, Lange selected a castle with a large basement located 
in the small township of Chełmno.44 Lange found the castle attractive 
for several reasons: It was secluded in a quiet rural setting yet connected 
to road and rail networks. Also, Chełmno was centrally nestled among 
the largest Jewish populations living in the Wartheland,45 particularly 
the Lódź ghetto only 60 kilometers away.46 Seclusion was important 
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because, again, Lange’s deadly assignment had to remain a secret from 
his Jewish targets. But with several Jewish communities living within a 
five- to 15-kilometer radius of the castle, Chełmno’s prized central loca-
tion also threatened to reveal its dark secret. Once Lange had recruited 
more manpower, he would need to neutralize this threat to preconceived 
goal achievement.
After the Konin County massacre, Lange’s usual crew was sent to 
Chełmno. In need of more staff, Lange had increasing numbers of police 
officers based in Lódź transferred to his new camp. One of Lange’s 
recruitment and retention strategies was, much like Milgram, to antici-
pate his prospective helpers’ likely needs and desires. For example, one 
technique Lange relied on was the lure of pecuniary reward: On top 
of their usual salary, his German staff, much like those in the shooting 
squads,47 “received a daily bonus of 12 Reichsmarks that doubled their 
pay relative to the others….”48 On top of this, Lange gave his men spe-
cial allotments of liquor and cigarettes.49 One of the police transferees 
from Lódź was Alois Häfele, who arrived at Chełmno with some of his 
men around January 1942. On arrival, Lange told Häfele and his men 
that he (Lange) had been tasked with gassing local Jews, but in order 
to fulfill his orders he needed more manpower. According to Häfele, 
Lange added that to maintain secrecy about Chełmno’s purpose, he only 
needed the new recruits to perform guard duties and thus “We would 
have nothing to do with the extermination of the Jews themselves.”50 
Lange’s attempt to recruit these policemen by suggesting they only had 
to perform ancillary (yet necessary) tasks is, again, somewhat similar to 
Milgram’s Peer Administers Shock condition. Then again, Lange’s strain 
resolving inducement may actually have been more congruent with the 
foot-in-the-door technique. That is, soon after Häfele committed himself 
to performing mere guard duties, he became more intimately involved 
in the killing of Jews and eventually became a key figure in the camp’s 
extermination process.51 Because Lange’s orders had come from the very 
top of the Nazi hierarchy, he also alluded to the great national impor-
tance attached to them. As another camp guard Kurt Möbius said: 
“Hauptsturmführer Lange had told us that the orders concerning the 
annihilation of the Jews had been given by Hitler and Himmler.”52
But if Lange intended to increase the scale of killing, who would 
he burden with the more arduous and repulsive tasks that his German 
staff were likely to shy away from? During the period he was setting up 
Chełmno, Lange returned to the prison at Fort VII and paid his old 
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Polish work commando a visit. On meeting with his old body disposal 
unit, Lange commented on their poor and somewhat emaciated physi-
cal condition and then supplied them with a meal of bread and sausages. 
Lange then informed the Poles that, if they were interested, he could 
really use their help on a new operation.53
Like all good project managers, Lange knew just what to say and do 
to get every diverse link in his anticipated organizational chain interested 
in working toward goal achievement. Because Lange utilized some-
times different routes when attempting to anticipate and then appeal 
to his helper’s sometimes different motivational needs and desires, like 
Milgram, he was able to find a way of getting each of them on board 
with organizational goal achievement. Some signed on because they 
would make a rather generous living, there were promotional opportu-
nities, and perhaps they saw great merit in Nazi ideology. Others might 
well have felt indifferently toward or even disagreed with Nazism, but 
during hard and dangerous times, who is going to turn down a well-
paid and (relatively) safe job likely to come with lots of material perks? 
Some of Häfele’s men, for example, might have accepted Lange’s gen-
erous employment offer because of a preference to remain among an old 
and trusted group of comrades—people of great personal importance 
with whom they would do anything to remain on good terms with. 
And perhaps being involved in a top secret mission personally backed by 
Himmler and Hitler was enough to pique the interest of the more ambi-
tious among them. For the most desperate of those Lange approached, 
clearly all it took was the offer of a decent meal and the opportunity to 
see another day. This is how Lange enhanced what organizational theo-
rists term employee “performance motivation….”54
Interestingly—and in conflict with Goldhagen-like single moti-
vational explanations of the Holocaust—Lange’s reliance on various 
means of  incentivizing his workforce illustrates the insufficient singular 
force of Nazi ideology.55 On this note, although Lange was no doubt a 
strong-believing Nazi, it is unlikely he would have been concerned that 
some of his prospective helpers might have ardently disagreed with his 
politics or even Chełmno’s organizational goal—all he cared about was 
that they performed their specialist roles. And much like Himmler and 
Heydrich before him, Lange did everything he could to make sure all 
those below him did just that. On the frequently discussed issue of per-
petrator motivation during the Holocaust, as Kühl forcefully argues,
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the motives for an organization member’s actions play a subordinate role 
for the organization because organizations ultimately disregard the con-
crete motives of their members when they formulate behavioral expec-
tations. Whether members meet an organization’s formal expectations 
because of their identification with the goal, coercion, collegiality, money, 
or enjoyment of the activity is of secondary importance – just as long as 
they do it. The unsettling aspect from a sociological viewpoint is that, 
when it comes to organized violence, the motives driving people to par-
ticipate in torture, shootings, or gassings are incidental. In the end, all 
that matters to the organization is that its members do what is expected of 
them….56
Nearing the end of 1941, some Polish prisoners and locals from the 
surrounding area were tasked with renovating the Chełmno castle.57 It 
took them about a month to set the camp up,58 upon which Lange’s 
old guard addressed the previously mentioned threat to secrecy posed by 
those Jewish communities who lived near the castle. That is, between 8 
and 11 December, Koło’s Jewish community, just 14 kilometers away, 
were rounded up and killed in Lange’s old gas van (thus using canis-
ters of carbon monoxide), and then buried in a nearby forest.59 These 
local Jews became Chełmno’s first victims. As 1941 came to an end, 
Lange’s men proceeded to exterminate nearly every Jewish person living 
within a 20-kilometer radius of the camp.60 Consequently, secrecy about 
Chełmno was secured, at least among the remaining Wartheland Jews. 
Then, in early January 1942, Lange’s men received orders to kill another 
new category of victim: the previously mentioned 5000 Austrian Roma 
Gypsies, who only two months earlier had arrived in the Lódź ghetto. It 
transpires that these Gypsies were restricted to a small and isolated cor-
ner of the ghetto,61 and their living conditions were so atrocious that 
most of them contracted typhus.62 In a desperate rush to inhibit the 
infectious disease from spreading, fix-it-man Lange received a call from 
his superiors. It took the commando eight days to gas and shoot the 
Gypsies, a task for which a no doubt grateful Lódź ghetto administration 
paid Lange 20,000 Reichsmarks.63 But as far as Lange’s main goal was 
concerned, the most important event around this point in time was that 
in January 1942, three new vans fitted with Nebe’s innovation arrived at 
Chełmno.64 After the camp infrastructure had been constructed, these 
vans suddenly provided Lange with access to a much cheaper, more 
abundant, and accessible source of gas. It was from this point onward 
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that Lange’s men were able to start making major in-roads into their 
goal to eliminate non-working Jews in the Wartheland. However, just as 
the Lange Commando was about to convert their goal into reality, a few 
events that were to have a major bearing on the course of World War 
Two took place.
CentraLization of the extermination  
ProCess: the wannsee ConferenCe
In early to mid-December 1941 as Lange set up his camp, as mentioned, 
the German advance into the Soviet interior was repelled by a forceful 
Russian counteroffensive and the USA entered the war. At this time, 
Hitler informed his inner circle that all European Jews—Eastern and 
now also Western—were to experience a “clean sweep.” Hitler’s inten-
tions at the private 12 December meeting appear to closely mirror his 
public threat issued back on 30 January 1939 to annihilate “the Jewish 
race in Europe.” As the Training Journal of the Order Police dated 
December 1941 notes, the significant difference between early 1939 
and late 1941 was that advances in capability had made Hitler’s threat of 
extermination technically feasible.
The word of the Führer [in his speech of January 1939] that a new war, 
instigated by Jewry, will not bring about the destruction of anti-Semitic 
Germany but rather the end of Jewry, is now being carried out. […] What 
seemed impossible only two years ago, now step-by-step is becoming a 
reality: the end of the war will see a Europe free of Jews.65
Now, the challenge to Nazi plans came from another source, a more dif-
ficult war on the Eastern, Western, Italian, and African fronts and the 
consequent need to find all the help they could to win the war.66 The 
regime’s desperation for slave labor meant it could ill afford to extermi-
nate all Jews at that time. With respect to both the Jewish question and 
the threat of the Allied forces, the Nazi regime needed to seriously and 
quickly reassess their plans of attack.
The latest policy on the Jewish question was to be revealed at 
Heydrich’s Wannsee Conference on 9 December. However, because 
Hitler had recently declared war on the USA, emergency military prepa-
rations dictated that some of the invitees could not attend. Also, the new 
Chief of KdS Latvia, Rudolf Lange, who according to Angrick and Klein 
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“had without a doubt been accorded by Reinhard Heydrich a special role 
at this meeting,” was, for reasons that will become apparent, also unable 
to attend.67 The Wannsee Conference was, therefore, postponed until 20 
January 1942. In terms of the agenda, the only major difference between 
the proposed 9 December meeting and the 20 January postponement 
was, somewhat curiously, the addition to the original invitee list of two 
high-ranking officials from the General Government: Hans Frank and 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger (both of whom ended up sending their assis-
tants).68 David Cesarani argues that Heydrich’s addition of represent-
atives from the General Government to the invitee list suggests either 
an earlier oversight or, more intriguingly, that in light of Hitler’s 12 
December inner-circle meeting, the purpose of the Wannsee Conference 
had been broadened beyond the deportation of just Reich Jews to the 
Ostland.69
On 8 January, Göring issued a decree on labor policy. All Soviet 
POWs—the Nazis’ preferred, but now diminishing, source of slave 
labor—were henceforward to be assigned only to the all-important pro-
duction of armaments.70 These and other major policy changes indicated 
that the Nazi regime had plans in the spring to bounce back from its 
recent military setbacks.
When the Wannsee Conference finally went ahead, 14 mostly state 
secretaries and other high-ranking government officials were in attend-
ance. The relatively lowly ranked shooting squad leader Rudolf Lange 
and Eichmann were also there, with the latter (or his assistant) tasked 
with taking the minutes, which were not verbatim. These minutes, 
however, are the only record of what was said. To these men, Heydrich 
revealed the latest plan to resolve the Nazis’ “Jewish problem.” Heydrich 
started the meeting by repeating Göring’s 31 July mandate that dele-
gated to him [Heydrich] full authority for resolving the “Jewish ques-
tion.”71 As he asserted his authority, Heydrich made it clear that there 
were to be no other competitors secretly working toward the Führer’s 
wish, only collaborators. Previously failed attempts at resolving this ques-
tion were discussed, as was a new solution that the Führer had apparently 
authorized.72 More specifically, a country-by-country survey showed that 
about 11 million Jews lived in Europe.73 To deal with this population, 
the entire continent was to be “combed from West to East….”74 Hitler’s 
despised German Jews were to be a priority in this roundup, appar-
ently because of a “housing problem and other sociopolitical considera-
tions.”75 Those Jews caught in the Nazis’ nets were to be transported by 
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train, thus drawing on Eichmann’s strengths, and held in a small num-
ber of centralized concentration camps. Upon arrival at these camps, 
prisoners would undergo a selection process to identify those capable of 
productive labor. Those selected would go on to help strengthen Nazi 
Germany’s economy and military capability.
According to Friedländer, Heydrich noted, “The evacuated Jews 
would be assigned to heavy forced labor (like the building of roads), 
which naturally would greatly reduce their numbers. The remnants, ‘the 
strongest elements of the race and the nucleus of its revival,’ would have 
to be ‘treated accordingly.’”76 Presumably, the Jews assigned to hard 
labor would receive an insufficient quantity of food, which would ensure 
that a normally innocuous task like road-building would greatly weaken 
them and perhaps even prove lethal. Heydrich, who was alluding to 
Organization Schmelt’s earlier use and abuse of slave labor to construct 
the Autobahn in the East,77 euphemistically termed this process “nat-
ural diminution.”78 When no longer capable of productive labor, these 
Jews were to be killed. Those who were killed would be replaced with 
new arrivals. This plan—referred to by some historians as “extermination 
through work”79—would not only counter the criticisms of the “produc-
tionists” regarding the wasteful extermination of potentially useful and 
now sorely needed slave labor, but could also appease the “attritionists” 
by eventually bringing about the total extermination of the European 
Jews.
So how did the Nazis intend to kill those Jews no longer capable 
of labor? And what, at the start of this process, was to be done with 
those not selected for work—the old, young, and weak? According to 
Friedländer, Heydrich said,
decorated war veterans, invalids, and elderly Jews (from Germany and pos-
sibly some Western or Scandinavian counties) would be deported to the 
“old people’s ghetto” in Theresienstadt (where they would die off). But 
what of all the others, the unmentioned vast majority of European Jewry? 
Heydrich’s silence about their fate stated loudly that these nonworking 
Jews would be exterminated. The discussion that followed the RSHA 
chief’s address clearly showed that he was well understood.80
Some evidence, however, suggests that apparent attendee “silence” to 
and “understanding” of Heydrich’s speech might more accurately be 
described by words like “curiosity” and even “skepticism.” For example, 
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according to Cesarani, during Eichmann’s 1961 trial in Jerusalem, he 
confirmed that at Wannsee, “there had been blunt talk about killing 
methods in the second, informal half of the meeting.”81 If true (and 
Eichmann obviously stood to gain nothing by mentioning such things 
at his trial), perhaps this explains the presence of the relatively lowly and 
out-of-place Rudolf Lange. Most certainly, he was the only person pres-
ent at Wannsee with expertise in the resettlement (killing) of Reich Jews 
sent to the East.82 In fact, Lange had been unable to attend the cancelled 
9 December meeting because the previous day his services as a supervisor 
during the massacre of Jews in the Rumbuli and then Bikernieki Forests 
could not be spared.83 At the 20 January meeting, however, Lange 
could relay firsthand that mass shootings had, indeed, included Reich 
Jews (recall his run-in with Jeckeln)—mostly the elderly, women, and 
 children. Perhaps Lange had been carefully selected as an invitee among 
the Wannsee elite because, unlike the most proven practitioners of mass 
shootings, the callous-mouthed Jeckeln or the ex-tradesman Karl Jäger, 
Lange was a jurist with all the accouterments that accompanied a person 
with a Ph.D. in Law. That is, Lange was much more likely to possess an 
air of sophistication, which might aid in taking the sharp edge off the 
barbaric topic under consideration.
Either way, Lange could have at least explained to the others first 
hand that, although there had been problems, since June 1941 hun-
dreds of thousands of unwanted Jews had been shot.84 Furthermore, 
when this method faltered, as it had when the shooting squads were 
faced with orders to kill Western Jews, Lange could have mentioned 
the recent arrival of gas vans in Riga,85 or Heydrich could have chipped 
in by referring to the new gassing facilities at Auschwitz and Chełmno. 
Again, Heydrich knew about Organization Schmelt and it is interest-
ing to note that since mid-November 1941 Schmelt had been sending 
exhausted road workers to Auschwitz to be gassed in Crematorium I.86  
As Heydrich said at Wannsee, “even now practical experience is being 
gathered that is of major significance in view of the coming Final 
Solution of the Jewish Question.”87 Eichmann was involved in the deci-
sion to send gas vans to Riga88 and had visited Chełmno in January,89 
or perhaps earlier in December.90 He had been instructed by Gestapo 
chief Heinrich Müller to observe, as Eichmann put it, “what was going 
on there.”91 So it is possible Eichmann also weighed in on the conversa-
tion. What became clear at Wannsee, then, was that the Nazis were rap-
idly moving in the direction of a more perfect “one best way” formula 
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of extermination that made provisions for the most useful Jews to make 
a brief contribution to strengthening Nazi Germany on their way to the 
grave. Representing Hans Frank, Staatssekretär Josef Bühler requested,
that the General Government would welcome it if the final solution of this 
problem would begin in the General Government, as, on the one hand, 
the question of transport there played no major role and consideration 
of labor supply would not hinder the course of Aktionen. […] [This was 
because] of the approximately two and a half million Jews under considera-
tion, the majority were in any case unfit for work.92
Perhaps Heydrich expected a response like this from Bühler—Heydrich 
was basically offering to kill anybody’s unwanted Jews and, as all pres-
ent would have known, nobody had more unwanted Jews than Governor 
Frank.93 As mentioned, Frank had long held desires of one day making 
his fiefdom Judenfrei.
Putting this speculation aside, Bühler’s request that the Jews in the 
General Government should be targeted first was accepted and soon 
after given the code name Operation Reinhard (in fitting memory of 
Heydrich, who was assassinated a few months later). The Wannsee 
Conference eventually broke down into a debate over what to do with 
genetically mixed German-Aryan Jews (whom one Wannsee attendee 
interestingly noted would surely prefer sterilization over death, or 
as attendee Otto Hofmann more delicately put it “evacuation”).94 
Nonetheless, Heydrich had achieved his main goals: He presented a 
rough outline of the latest final solution to those leading bureaucrats in 
the civil service agencies whose help he needed to make it a reality and, 
relying on his somewhat coercive and manipulative style, he obtained 
their consent and future compliance.
Six days after the Wannsee Conference, on 26 January 1942, 
Himmler signaled the relinquishment of his preferred source of slave 
labor when—in line with Heydrich’s above plan—he informed the 
Inspector of Concentration Camps,
As no Russian prisoners of war can be expected in the near future, I am send-
ing to the camps a large number of Jews who have emigrated [sic!] from 
Germany. Will you therefore make preparations to receive within the next 
four weeks 100,000 Jews and up to 50,000 Jewesses in the concentration 
camps. The concentration camps will be faced with great economic tasks in 
the coming weeks. SS-Gruppenführer Pohl will inform you in detail.95
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In response to Himmler, Pohl stated in a report on 30 April 1942, 
“keeping prisoners on the grounds of security, re-education, or preven-
tion was no longer a priority”; instead, the “main emphasis” had “shifted 
towards economics….”96 On the same day, Pohl also informed the con-
centration camps that, “In order to achieve maximum performance this 
deployment must be exhausting in the truest sense of the word.”97
With Höss’s then five-month-old Zyklon-B gassing technique and 
Lange’s activities in Chełmno probably gaining steam, Himmler did 
not need to worry about the potential economic burden of housing 
and feeding the unproductive “useless mouths” of the young, old, and 
exhausted in his concentration camps. Now, he could cheaply and effi-
ciently have these Jews exterminated on arrival. Perhaps it was just a 
coincidence, but one month after the Wannsee Conference, the file on 
the Madagascar Plan was closed in favor of an alternative strategy.98 And 
as we shall now see, after the Lange Commando received their new gas 
vans in January 1942, their destructive activities indeed gained steam.
Chełmno’s extermination ProCess: a deadLy game 
of deCePtion
At Chełmno, as far as Koppe knew, the Lange Commando was,
employed only on an experimental basis to begin with. This idea was 
based on the fact that a certain Dr. Brack, of Hitler’s private chancel-
lery, had already done some preparatory work with poison gases, and 
that these were to be tried out by the Sonderkommando Lange. […] 
Sonderkommando Lange was the obvious choice for carrying out the 
 gassings…. [italics added]99
For several reasons, the Lange Commando was, as Koppe put it, the 
obvious choice in this new “trial and error”100 killing experiment. First, 
unlike some in the Einsatzgruppen units, Lange’s men had learned a 
few years earlier not to unload the vans themselves. Second, any “soft” 
members of the Lange Commando who found the vans to be disgust-
ing, stressful, dishonorable, or inhumane had, through attrition, long 
ago left the T4 ranks.101 All such people had been replaced by others 
until eventually every position was filled by men unencumbered by such 
concerns. Third, the men remaining in the Lange Commando had accu-
mulated extensive experience and had obviously become emotionally 
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inured (routinized) to killing increasing varieties of “useless mouths”—
those with disabilities, Polish Jews, and Gypsies. This is why the Lange 
Commando was, as Koppe said, the “obvious choice…” But considering 
that many of Lange’s victims would come from the Wartheland’s Lódź 
ghetto, which, at the time, was receiving trainloads of Western and par-
ticularly German Jews, the true test would come in whether the com-
mando could handle exterminating non-workers who dressed, sounded, 
and often looked much like themselves.
Across the winter months of 1941–1942, Lange’s men quickly refined 
and then settled on a standard operating procedure. As Montague 
points out, the initial extermination process at Chełmno was “not fixed; 
there was no outlined plan to follow…” But, as the following shows, 
“as a result of the experience gained from each new transport…” by 
the cold season’s end, an efficient technique of mass extermination had 
emerged.102 Because the victims came from all over the Wartheland, 
methods of transportation to Chełmno varied: trucks; trains followed by 
walking; trains then trucks; and eventually, trains followed by use of a 
narrow gauge rail line.103 Whatever the mode of transportation, Lange’s 
men preferred breaking up the last part of the journey by detaining the 
victims in some kind of holding pen: A nearby synagogue, church, and 
an old mill were all trialed for this purpose.104 In these holding pens, 
Lange’s men would restrict the victims’ access to food, water, and san-
itary facilities. This holding pen technique was purposefully designed to 
induce fatigue and render the victims docile to subsequent instructions. 
With time and increasing experience, the Lange Commando settled on a 
preferred holding pen: have the Jews wait under armed guard in freezing 
conditions in the courtyard outside the purposefully bright and inviting 
Chełmno castle.105 When the Jews were sufficiently desperate for shelter, 
camp guard Kurt Möbius describes what happened next:
[T]hey waited some time in the courtyard. Then Plate or I addressed 
them. We told them that they were to be sent to Austria to a large assem-
bly camp, where they would have to work. But, it was explained to them, 
they would first have to take a bath and have their clothes deloused. We 
told the Jews this so that they would not know what fate awaited them, 
and to encourage them to obey calmly the instructions that they were 
given. After this the Jews—men, women, and children—were taken to the 
ground floor of the castle.106
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This purposefully polite speech was actually delivered by a 
variety of Lange’s men, one of whom, the previously mentioned Walter 
Burmeister, occasionally wore a physician’s white coat to bolster the 
guise that Chełmno was indeed a medical-type delousing facility.107 
German-speaking members of Lange’s Polish work commando aided 
with translation.108 To draw the freezing victims a little further into the 
net, the castle’s ground floor was purposefully kept warm.109 According 
to Burmeister, during the next part of the process,
New arrivals undressed in the hall […] Their valuables and money were 
collected by Poles from the work detail. The Poles also wrote down 
the names, but that was only for form’s sake. […] When the Jews had 
undressed, they were ordered to go down the stairs and into the cellar. 
[…] signs hung bearing the words: ‘To the Baths.’ […] From the cellar, 
the naked people continued straight on, leaving the building by a rear 
door and going up onto a wooden ramp. One of the gas vans…was backed 
up to the end of the ramp with the doors open. […] The people who came 
out of the cellar by the rear door did not have any choice but to climb into 
the van. As soon as the interior was full…the door was closed.110
Again, according to Möbius,
Most of the Jews got into the gas van calmly and obediently, trusting in 
the promises made to them. The Polish workers accompanied them. They 
carried leather whips with which they struck obstinate Jews who had 
become mistrustful and who hesitated to go further.111
Another guard, Theodor Malzmüller, provides more detail about this 
part of the process:
The Jews were made to get inside the van. The job was done by three 
Poles, who I believe were sentenced to death.112 The Poles hit the Jews 
with whips if they did not get into the gas-van fast enough. When all the 
Jews were inside the door was bolted. The driver then switched on the 
engine, crawled under the van and connected a pipe from the exhaust to 
the inside of the van.113
According to commando member Wilhelm Heukelbach, “Soon screams 
and groans could be heard coming from the interior. Those inside were 
hammering on the sides of the van.”114 The initial protocol was to drive 
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the vans out of the castle grounds to the burial site in the Maiden for-
est several kilometers away, thus killing the victims on route. But vans 
loaded with screaming victims passing through Chełmno’s village streets 
detracted from Lange’s desire that the local (Gentile) community remain 
unaware of his tasks.115 Consequently, Lange’s men had to adopt a less 
time-efficient protocol: The vans remained within the castle compound 
in a stationary position—for about 10 minutes or so116—until all the vic-
tims were dead. From the time the victims arrived at Chełmno to the 
time they entered the gas vans, no more than one-and-a-half hours had 
elapsed.117 The vans loaded with dead bodies were then driven from the 
castle to the forest. Hauptscharführer Gustav Laabs describes what hap-
pened during his first driving mission:
After about three kilometers we arrived in a clearing in the wooded area 
that runs alongside the road to Warthbrücken. In the clearing the officer 
told me to stop in front of a mass grave, where a work detail of Jews was 
working under the supervision of a police officer. There were also several 
policemen spread out in a circle, who were obviously on sentry duty. The 
police officer supervising the work detail ordered me to back the van up to 
the mass grave.118
According to Jacob W., a non-commissioned police officer, the clearing 
in the forest contained several mass graves shaped like large swimming 
pools, each about three meters deep. Two particularly large graves meas-
ured about thirty meters long and ten meters wide.119 Across the win-
ter of 1941/1942, these graves were dug using pickaxes and shovels.120 
From the spring onward, however, more efficient digging machinery was 
introduced.121 One of the mechanically dug graves ended up being 254 
meters long(!)122 Laabs continues,
Then the policeman who had driven in the cab with me undid the padlock 
that fastened the doors. A few members of the work detail were ordered 
to open the double doors. Eight or ten corpses fell to the ground, and the 
rest were thrown out of the back by the members of the work detail.123
After all the victims’ gold teeth had been extracted,124 their bodies were 
dumped in the graves and left to rot. Because the graves in the wintery 
conditions took so long to excavate, maximized utilization of this limited 
space was achieved by having the victims’ bodies stacked facedown and 
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head-to-toe.125 Initially, the Polish collaborators performed all of these 
grisly and arduous tasks, but, perhaps as a reward for their loyalty, with 
time Jewish work commandos were set up and performed most of this 
labor. Thereafter, the Poles moved on to other (relatively) more attrac-
tive roles: van maintenance; collecting and sorting clothing, valuables, 
and luggage; and even occasionally driving the vans.126 In terms of role 
allocation, much like during the mass shootings, all the worst—arduous, 
stressful, and/or repulsive—jobs were assigned to some subordinate cat-
egory of non-German.
If members of the Jewish work detail were unwilling or unable to per-
form their frightful roles, they were shot. According to a non-commis-
sioned officer by the name of Josef I,
Almost every day members of the Jewish work detail were shot in the 
forest camp, in the evening before the commandos returned to Kulmhof 
[Chełmno]. They were always Jews who were unfit for work or who 
refused to work. Most of the time five or six were killed, but sometimes as 
many as ten people were shot. The executions were mostly carried out by 
Polizeimeister Lenz. He ordered the Jews to lie face down on the edge of 
the mass grave. Then he took his pistol and shot them in the back of the 
neck. The other Jews then had to throw the bodies into the mass grave.127
Working in the Jewish work commando was undoubtedly a nightmare 
beyond imagination, and it is not surprising that many chose death over 
the offer to work and live a little longer.
After establishing the above standard operating procedure across 
the winter of 1941–1942, in March 1942 the “ironfist[ed]” Lange was 
transferred to the RSHA head office in Berlin and was replaced by the 
more “easygoing” commandant Hans Bothmann.128 Easygoing or not, 
Lange’s set procedure under Bothmann’s supervision saw Chełmno con-
tinue to consume large numbers of Jewish lives. More specifically, it has 
been estimated that one cycle of the killing process at Chełmno could, 
depending on the size of the van used, kill between 35 and 170 civil-
ians.129 According to Möbius, one cycle could be performed “five to 
eight, sometimes even ten times a day” and, depending on the influx of 
Jews, do so potentially six days a week.130 Obviously, Chełmno was never 
intended to single-handedly offer a solution to the Nazi’s European-
wide “Jewish question.” Chełmno started out as an experiment to 
resolve a local problem—a pilot study that aimed to eliminate all the 
188  N. RUSSELL
“useless mouths” in the Lódź ghetto, thereby making room for influxes 
of Western Jews.131 And unlike Lange’s earlier experimental foray with 
slacked lime, the Chełmno pilot proved successful in achieving its goal. 
Between 16 January and 2 April 1942, 44,064 Jews from the Łódź 
ghetto were murdered in Chełmno.132
Two weeks later, on 16 April 1942, Himmler, after meeting with 
Hitler, flew into Poznań and met with Greiser and Koppe. What could 
they possibly have talked about? The following day Himmler, Koppe, 
and possibly Greiser met with some Baltic German settlers in the town-
ship of Koło (whose entire Jewish population, it will be recalled, had 
been exterminated in Chełmno several months earlier).133 It is not 
known if Himmler visited the nearby castle, but he did order that 10,000 
Western Jews in the Łódź ghetto (originally from Germany, Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, and Luxemburg) be killed next. Four weeks later, his 
orders had been converted into a reality.134 This was the first large-
scale mass gassing of Western Jews.135 As Montague notes, by “May 15, 
only 31 percent of these Western European Jews, who had arrived only 
some six months earlier, remained in the ghetto.”136 Killing the diffi-
cult-to-shoot Reich Jews—men, women, and children—who dressed, 
sounded, and often looked much like the Germans themselves obviously 
posed no problem for Lange’s men. In fact, no matter what category 
of victim—whether they be mentally ill, Eastern Jews, Gypsies, Western 
Jews—Lange’s gassing commando, eventually under Bothmann’s man-
agement, never seemed to complain about any “burdening of the soul.” 
A leader from Berlin just need to point his finger in a certain direction, 
and soon after all in that direction were dead.
The closest the Germans working at Chełmno came to encountering 
a major problem was when spring arrived. That is, the victims’ bodies 
started decomposing and bodily fluids started spilling out of the mass 
graves. The putrid stench that filled the air proved so powerful that on 
11 June 1942, Chełmno stopped accepting further transports.137 The 
remains in the graves needed to be cremated. Independent of this prob-
lem, in March 1942 Himmler had already tasked the mentally fragile but 
nonetheless determined Paul Blobel with discovering the most efficient 
and effective techniques of mass cremation.138 He did this because as the 
snow on the Eastern front started to thaw, it was feared that an advanc-
ing Red Army might discover mass graves filled with Soviet POWs and 
civilians. Even worse, what if the Wehrmacht’s up-and-coming coun-
teroffensive failed and Germany ended up losing the war? Facing such 
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possibilities, a less confident Himmler realized that his days of acting 
with impunity might be numbered.139 Consequently, Blobel’s goal was 
to erase all evidence of the Nazi’s genocidal past.140 His first assignment 
was the recently closed Chełmno camp where in the summer of 1942 he 
assembled a large group of Jewish workers known as Kommando 1005. 
Kommando 1005 set about exhuming, then cremating, the remains of 
the extermination camp victims in massive outdoor bonfires.141 During 
Blobel’s stay at Chełmno, he too used trial-and-error techniques of dis-
covery until his team settled on the most efficient and effective tech-
niques of mass cremation.142
Once Blobel’s men got on top of the body disposal problem, 
Bothmann’s commando was able to get back to what they did best. With 
several vans used across the score of months that Chełmno was open, 
the number of victims quickly added up. Information from a 1962 trial 
at Bonn has shown that between December 1941 and July 1944 at least 
153,000 people for whom documentation existed were killed in the gas 
vans at Chełmno.143 Having said this, because documentation did not 
always exist, according to Montague the actual victim count was “no 
doubt” higher.144 Despite this massive number and as a dark sign of 
things to come, Chełmno was just the first of what Hilberg terms the 
most “primitive” of the Nazi extermination centers.145 Despite its (rel-
atively) primitive nature, the camp at Chełmno was thorough—of all 
the civilians sent its way, only seven managed to escape.146 In the end, 
Chełmno saw the alignment of a number of factors that foreshadowed 
the success of mass killing on a much larger scale: a cheap/mobile gas, 
an industrialized assembly-line organizational process, centralization 
(where mobile victims were delivered to a stationary execution plant), 
and a hardened and professionally trained pool of specialist executioners. 
Therefore, on all fronts, Chełmno, as a small-scale experiment, glowed 
with immense killing potential. All that was needed were ideas likely to 
improve overall systemic efficiency, increase its scale, and finally replicate 
the number of such facilities. Elsewhere other more ambitious project 
managers were doing just this.
the emergenCe of oPeration reinhard
More than three months before the Wannsee Conference and just 
as Lange was receiving instructions to kill Jews in the Wartheland, on 
13 October 1941,147 Odilo Globocnik suggested to Himmler148 that 
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the General Government should be “Germanized” by killing the local 
Jews.149 More specifically, Globocnik envisioned that killing off some 
local Jews in the General Government would help relieve the food sup-
ply problem, stem black market activity, and free up accommodation for 
newcomers,150 particularly for inbound Slovakian and Reich Jews.151 
Himmler thus approved Globocnik’s construction of a death camp in 
the General Government.152 Perhaps the failure of Globocnik’s own 
men around this point in time to find a more “humane” method of kill-
ing local Jews (using grenades) explains why, as the following shows, 
he was eventually sent the civilian-killing specialists who, after being 
“employed only on an experimental basis,” might prove more capable of 
Germanizing the General Government.
Viktor Brack, a former member of the disbanded T4 team, stated in 
his postwar testimony,
In 1941, I received an order to discontinue the euthanasia program. In 
order to retain the personnel that had been relieved of these duties and in 
order to be able to start a new euthanasia program after the war, Bouhler 
[head of the Führer Chancellery] asked me—I think after a conference 
with Himmler—to send this personnel to Lublin and place it at the dis-
posal of SS Brigadeführer Globocnik.153
In fact, as 1941 came to an end, ninety-two ex-T4 personnel were 
sent east by the Führer Chancellery.154 One of them, Christian Wirth, 
became Globocnik’s top aide on 14 October 1941,155 just one day after 
Himmler’s meeting with Globocnik.156 Wirth had been present at the 
first-ever euthanasia gassing pilot two years earlier and then started kill-
ing people at the T4’s permanent gas chamber in the Brandenburg-Havel 
prison. Subsequently, Wirth was employed at Hartheim, the most “effi-
cient” of all the T4 facilities, where, according to Adam, “he distinguished 
himself…by his organizational abilities.”157 In December 1941, Wirth 
arrived in Lublin.158 Although Wirth was acquainted with the “advantages 
and disadvantages” of the gas vans used in the Soviet interior and at some 
point observed the killing process at Chełmno,159 he does not appear 
to have contemplated using such vehicles in the General Government. 
Wirth’s means-to-end logic more closely resembles an extension of the 
kind of system he had relied upon in Germany: a permanent gas chamber 
facility with the more efficient capacity to dispose of bodies on-site. Also 
gas vans had volume and weight limitations, but a permanent gas chamber 
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had no such restrictions and could—should it ever be required—poten-
tially handle much larger numbers of victims per cycle.
On 1 November 1941, construction on Wirth’s death camp—called 
Belzec—began.160 The center’s gassing apparatus was sourced from a 
recently abandoned T4 euthanasia facility in Germany.161 According to 
Stanislaw Kozak, a Polish construction worker,
we built a third barrack, which was 12 m. long and 8 m. wide. This bar-
rack was divided by wooden walls into three sections, so that each section 
was 4 m. wide and 8 m. long. These sections were 2 m. high. The interior 
walls of these barracks were built such that we nailed the boards to them, 
filling in the empty space with sand. Inside the barrack the walls were cov-
ered with cardboard; in addition, the floors and the walls were covered 
with sheet zinc to a height of 1.1m.162
The actual gassing apparatus must have taken a long time to stripe and 
then transport out of Germany because the construction of Belzec’s gas 
chambers was not completed until the end of February 1942. Then, 
Wirth, much as Lange had a few months earlier, pursued a number of 
pilot studies to test, refine, and iron out the kinks of his killing process. 
According to SS-Unterscharführer Franz Suchomel, “Belzec was the lab-
oratory. Wirth was camp commandant. He tried everything imaginable 
there.”163 Again like Lange, Wirth initially used pure bottled carbon 
monoxide.164 These pilots were undertaken over a period of several days 
and involved several convoys, each consisting of about four to six freight 
cars of Jewish victims.165 Soon afterward, the canisters were substituted 
by exhaust fumes generated by a stationary 250 horsepower engine.166 
After test-running the new system, the Belzec extermination center 
opened on 17 March 1942. Although at this point (mid-March 1942) 
75–80% of eventual Holocaust victims could be counted among the liv-
ing, 11 months later only 20–25% would remain alive.167
Importantly, back in the fall of 1941 when Globocnik first approached 
Himmler over his desire to kill local Jews by building what became the 
Belzec extermination center, there were no plans to build other similar 
and accompanying death camps in the General Government. But at some 
point in time after the end of 1941 (probably early 1942), Wirth became 
sufficiently confident in Belzec’s enormous killing potential. It was only 
on this realization that—with much larger numbers of victims in mind—
longer-term plans to build other potentially “improved” Belzec-like 
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extermination camps were devised. I say this because it is unlikely the 
Nazi regime would invest significant sums of money into constructing 
such a large-scale multi-site project that, in the absence of any testing, 
might actually prove to be a failure. As Dieter Pohl insightfully notes, 
at some level a “limited capacity” version of Belzec first had to prove its 
worth before any “upgrading” was possible.168 And obviously the best 
assessor of that worth was gassing expert Wirth. In support of this, as 
Wirth’s liaison officer, SS-Untersturmführer Josef Oberhauser said, after 
Belzec first opened “the gassings were not yet part of a systematic erad-
ication action but were carried out to test and study closely the camp’s 
capacity and the technical problems involved in carrying out a gas-
sing.”169 Upon Belzec, as it turned out, proving its destructive worth, 
as Oberhauser implies, it also made sense that the new death camp 
would serve as the experimental prototype from which all subsequent 
centers—Sobibor and Treblinka—would learn and advance.170 Having 
said all this, Wirth must have become confident in Belzec’s enormous 
killing potential just before or as the camp opened in, as just mentioned, 
mid-March 1942, because construction at Sobibor started sometime 
during the same month.171
Anyway, Wirth’s observations of Belzec in action led to his recom-
mendation that Sobibor be built on a larger section of land. More space 
at Sobibor meant, for example, that unlike at Belzec, more than a max-
imum of twenty train carriages at a time could enter the camp172 and 
that confiscated property could more efficiently be stored on-site. It also 
meant at Sobibor a potentially longer path separating the undressing area 
from the gas chambers could be built (presumably better ensuring those 
victims undressing were less likely to hear the screams of those ahead 
of them in the process being gassed).173 Wirth’s biggest concern, how-
ever, was that frequent usage of Belzec’s wooden gas chambers might 
fail to resist the internal pressures generated by the collective force 
of large groups of panicking victims.174 It was therefore decided that 
Sobibor’s gas chambers should be made from brick rather than wood. 
The newer and improved Sobibor extermination center, which opened in 
May 1942, was to be managed by ex-T4 employee Franz Stangl, whom 
Globocnik apparently believed to be “a good organizer….”175 The initial 
chambers at Belzec and Sobibor were capable of killing approximately 
150–200 and 140–160 people per gassing, respectively176—a task that 
could be performed several times a day.177
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In mid-June 1942, Wirth suspended operations at Belzec so the 
wooden chamber could be replaced with a structurally stronger facil-
ity.178 This suspension signaled the end of Belzec’s first stage. In its three 
months in operation, nearly 100,000 Jews were killed.179 Clearly, Belzec 
was a far superior killing facility to Chełmno (which at its peak efficiency 
took twice as long to kill the same number of people).180 A month later, 
Himmler visited Globocnik at Operation Reinhard’s headquarters in 
Lublin, presumably to receive a detailed progress report. By this time, 
Globocnik was armed with data about Belzec and Sobibor’s killing 
capacity, the latter of which Himmler apparently visited that day.181 Like 
Belzec, Sobibor had killed 90,000–100,000 Jews in its first three months 
of operation.182 A few days later on 19 July 1942, after some meetings 
with Hitler, Himmler issued the staff of Operation Reinhard an end-of-
year deadline.
I herewith order that the resettlement of the entire Jewish population of 
the General Government be carried out and completed by December 31, 
1942. From December 31, 1942, no persons of Jewish origin may remain 
within the General Government, unless they are in the collection camps 
in Warsaw, Cracow, Czestochowa, Radom, and Lublin. All other work on 
which Jewish labor is employed must be finished by that date, or, in the 
event that this is not possible, it must be transferred to one of the collec-
tion camps.183
It was during this month—July 1942—that Himmler apparently 
informed his personal masseuse, Felix Kersten, that his present work 
would end in “the greatest piece of colonization which the world will 
ever have seen.”184 Around this time, the prospective German beneficiar-
ies of Himmler’s colonial ambitions invested, as perhaps best captured 
by Götz Aly, great hope in his success: “By 1942 German children were 
staging imaginary gunfights on the ‘black soil’ of central Russia, while 
hundreds of thousands of soldiers’ wives dreamed of owning coun-
try estates in Ukraine.”185 German authors Thea Haupt and Ilse Mau 
soon contemplated the writing of a primer designed to “acquaint small 
children with the ideas behind the settlement plan and transfer the 
cowboys-and-Indians romanticisms [of the American West] to Eastern 
Europe.”186
A week or so after Himmler delivered his end-of-year deadline, 
Treblinka, the third and most “perfect” of Wirth’s three extermination 
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centers, was completed.187 This center was to be managed by another 
ex-T4 employee, Irmfried Eberl, a medical doctor who was also present 
at the euthanasia gassing pilot. According to Unterscharführer August 
Hingst, who worked at Treblinka, Eberl’s ambition, somewhat like that 
of the highly competitive Jeckeln, was to kill as many people as possi-
ble, and certainly more than the other two centers.188 Eberl’s strategy 
to achieve this goal seems to have been to solicit and accept more vic-
tims than both Wirth at Belzec and Stangl at Sobibor, to have the gas 
chambers running almost continuously, to dump the bodies in mass 
graves dug mechanically by an industrial scoop shovel, and, finally, to 
simply hope the center’s staff and facilities were able to sustain a fright-
fully high rate of killing. Eberl boldly accepted 312,500 potential victims 
in Treblinka’s first five weeks of operation.189 However, as Eberl discov-
ered, although Treblinka was the most “perfect” of the three Operation 
Reinhard facilities, it was not absolutely perfect. The commandant’s 
ambitions exceeded the extermination center’s ability to absorb such 
massive numbers of civilians, and a backlog of freight cars crammed with 
Jews started to accumulate outside the camp gates. With no access to 
water, many of the Jews simply perished in the intense summer heat.
Simultaneously, the high summer temperatures also started to cause 
problems at Sobibor and Belzec. Much like at Chełmno, the recently 
buried bodies started to bloat, causing the thin surfaces of the camps’ 
mass graves to burst open. Sobibor worker Leon Feldhendler described 
the scene. “After gassing, the people were laid into the graves. Then, 
out of the soil, blood and bad odor of gas began to surface; terrible 
smells spread over the whole camp, penetrating everything. The water in 
Sobibor became rancid.”190 Blobel’s recent discoveries of the most effec-
tive mass outdoor cremation techniques were passed on to Globocnik, 
who introduced them to all three of the Operation Reinhard camps.191 
For example, according to Feldhendler, at Sobibor a large pit was dug 
“with a roaster above it. The bodies were thrown on the roaster. The 
fire was ignited from beneath, and petrol was poured on the corpses. 
The bones were crushed into ashes with hammers….”192 Burning so 
many bodies, however, was a time-consuming task that generated a 
major bottleneck in the otherwise smooth-flowing system. The rate of 
killing declined. As all other camps would soon discover, maximum kill-
ing capacity greatly exceeded the on-site ability to both efficiently and 
hygienically dispose of victims’ bodies.
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Eberl at Treblinka, however, was unwilling to slow down, and chaos 
soon reined throughout the camp. Before long, the extermination 
center’s tight security measures deteriorated to the point where escapes 
became common.193 These security breaches quickly attracted the 
attention of Globocnik and Wirth who, upon seeing the camp in disar-
ray, dismissed the overly ambitious Eberl. Eberl was replaced with the 
more reliable Stangl (while Franz Reichleitner, another ex-T4 employee, 
took over at the smaller Sobibor center). Even so, the 210,000194 or 
280,000195 lives Treblinka extinguished in just its first five weeks of oper-
ation meant the latest Nazi extermination center had flexed its genocidal 
muscle.196 Eberl was not exaggerating when he earlier wrote in a letter 
to his wife, “The pace in Treblinka is truly breathtaking.”197 As survivor 
Abraham Krzepicki put it, the mass slaughter at Treblinka resembled “A 
factory of horror whose sole product was bodies.”198
Nevertheless, the problems at Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka put 
Himmler’s end-of-year deadline in jeopardy. Globocnik and Wirth were 
aware that, just like at Belzec, the killing capacity of the gas chambers 
at both Sobibor and Treblinka had to be increased. Consequently, they 
needed to build additional or completely new and much larger gas 
chambers. Plans to expand, however, generated new problems that also 
threatened the achievement of Himmler’s deadline. Larger chambers at 
Belzec and Sobibor had to be filled with sufficiently lethal quantities of 
exhaust fumes. This not only meant increased fuel costs but also that 
victims would take longer to die. The new and much larger gas cham-
bers could, therefore, generate financial and temporal inefficiencies. At 
Treblinka, however, the cumulative improvements that often come with 
the application of goal-directed means-to-end rationality saw the elim-
ination of these problems with a single innovation. There, simply low-
ering the ceiling height of the new set of gas chambers by 60 cm both 
increased killing efficiency and lowered fuel costs. With less space to fill 
with sufficiently lethal concentrations of exhaust fumes, this innovation 
reduced the asphyxiation time and thus decreased the amount of time 
before bodies could be removed.199 The three camps’ new and larger gas 
chambers all produced massive increases in killing efficiency. According 
to Yitzhak Arad, the number of victims per gassing in the new chambers 
at Belzec and Sobibor doubled. At Treblinka, it may have quadrupled 
(Table 6.1).200
At his trial following the war, Franz Stangl admitted, when asked 
about the second period of exterminations at Treblinka, that, “the 
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optimum amount of people gassed in one day, I can state: according to 
my estimation a transport of thirty freight cars with 3,000 people was 
liquidated in three hours. When the work lasted for about fourteen 
hours, 12,000 to 15,000 people were annihilated.”201
Operation Reinhard not only met Himmler’s end-of-year deadline by 
exterminating all the Jews in the General Government,202 but was also 
expanded to include the Jews of Bialystok and the Ostland.203 On 12 
February 1943, Himmler once again visited Sobibor.204 One month 
later, on 13 April 1943, Globocnik successfully pushed for Wirth to be 
promoted to SS-Sturmbannführer or Major.205 At the end of Operation 
Reinhard in late October 1943, 1,500,000–1,700,000 Jews had been 
murdered.206 Approximately 600,000 were killed at Belzec,207 250,000 
at Sobibor,208 and between 700,000 and 800,000 at Treblinka.209 
Operation Reinhard also proved highly profitable: After deportation 
and extermination costs, it has conservatively been estimated that almost 
179 million Reichsmarks were diverted into the Nazi coffers210—money 
then pumped into the Nazi war machine.211 And unlike the labor-inten-
sive mass shootings, “these three huge extermination factories in which 
approximately one-third of all Nazi genocide victims were murdered, 
were never operated by more than a little over 100 German camp offi-
cials.”212 Belzec, for example, required several hundred worker Jews, a 
hundred or so Ukrainians, and just 20 Germans (many in distant mana-
gerial roles).213 Such efficiency depended greatly on the total compliance 
of the victims themselves. A closer look at Belzec’s standard operating 
procedure reveals how the compliance of most victims was secured.
On 19 August 1942, hygienist professor Wilhelm Pfannenstiel of the 
SS, armed with a stopwatch, observed Belzec’s carefully organized killing 
process:
After they had undressed, the whole procedure went fairly quickly. They 
ran naked from the hut through a hedge into the actual extermination 
centre. The whole extermination centre looked just like a normal delous-
ing institution. In front of the building there were pots of geraniums and 
a sign saying ‘Hackenholt Foundation’, above which there was a Star of 
David. The building was brightly and pleasantly painted so as not to sug-
gest that people would be killed here. From what I saw, I do not believe 
that the people who had just arrived had any idea of what would happen 
to them. Inside the building, the Jews had to enter chambers into which 
was channeled the exhaust of a [100(?)]-HP engine, located in the same 
building.214
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According to survivor Rudolf Reder, two Russian staff members oper-
ated the engine.215 In Pfannenstiel’s view, once locked in, “it was only 
then that the people sensed something else was in store for them. It 
seemed to me that behind the thick walls and door they were praying 
and shouting for help. After about twelve minutes it became silent in the 
chambers.”216 In another account, Pfannenstiel stated it took eighteen 
minutes for the victims to die. Whether it was twelve or eighteen min-
utes, he still “found it especially cruel” that it took so long.217 Whether 
by accident or design, Pfannenstiel believed that the gas chambers’ new 
strain resolving “thick” concrete walls helped muffle (reduce) the inten-
sity of the victims’ screams. Before the victims were removed and cre-
mated, a Jewish work detail stripped the bodies of anything of potential 
value, particularly gold teeth and any hidden valuables.
To encourage the victims at Belzec to enter the gas chambers of their 
own accord, the perpetrators relied on certain tried-and-tested tricks of 
deception, including the installation of fake showerheads (as at the T4 
institutions) and promising the victims work on the condition that they 
undergo delousing (as at Chełmno). With its pleasantly painted buildings 
and strategically placed geranium pots designed to alleviate victims’ fears 
that they had arrived at a death camp, Belzec also developed some of its 
own techniques of deception. As survivor Ada Lichtman notes, similar 
tricks were used at both Sobibor and Treblinka:
We heard word for word how SS-Oberscharführer Michel, standing on a 
small table, convincingly calmed the people; he promised them that after 
the bath they would get back all their possessions, and he said that the 
time had come for Jews to become productive members of society. They 
would presently all be sent to the Ukraine, where they would be able to 
live and work. The speech inspired confidence and enthusiasm among the 
people. They applauded spontaneously, and occasionally they even danced 
and sang.218
One survivor observed that at Sobibor this speech was, much like at 
Chełmno, delivered by a German wearing the white coat of a medical 
doctor.219 Another technique of deception was that after arriving, some 
victims were coerced into writing postcards to their relatives, informing 
them of the apparently auspicious outcome of their journey to the East: 
They said the Germans treated them well and there was food, shelter, 
and employment.220 Obviously, all these tricks were designed to ensure 
an unencumbered flow of docile victims into the camps.
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Some of those Jews lucky enough to escape returned to the ghettos 
to warn others of the impending danger. Word soon spread, and for 
those Jews forcibly transferred by train to unknown destinations, words 
like “Belzec,” “Sobibor,” and especially “Treblinka” became signals of 
imminent death. Increasingly, Jews arriving at the extermination centers 
were no longer easily duped by the “showers” or the promises of work. 
Growing numbers of victims refused to comply with their executioners’ 
requests and some engaged in spontaneous acts of resistance. Probably, 
the earliest significant and verified act of resistance occurred at Treblinka. 
In the second week of December 1942, a group of youths from the 
Kelbasin camp refused to enter the gas chambers. With fists, knives, and 
even a grenade, they resisted. A riot ensued, but with superior firepower 
the guards rapidly quelled the resisters, resulting in massive carnage.221
Wirth and Stangl feared such resistance because it not only endan-
gered their own lives but also removed a key ingredient that enabled 
them to inflict death on such a massive scale—victim docility. Sharing 
much in common with Jeckeln’s shooting process, the gassing opera-
tions from start to finish required that victims remain totally compliant, 
because any resistance would create bottlenecks in the system,222 which 
would threaten the achievement of Himmler’s ambitious goals and tight 
deadlines. In Ritzer’s terminology, victim docility provided the Germans 
with greater “control” over the flow of the process, which enhanced 
“predictability,” whereby it became possible to anticipate the weekly out-
put of bodies. As the ability to predict increased, “calculability” became 
possible, allowing managers like Himmler to set ambitious, but not unre-
alistic, production targets by calculating the output of bodies expected 
over a certain number of weeks. And to achieve Himmler’s targets, every 
week a certain minimum number of people needed to be killed.223 Just 
two weeks after the revolt at Treblinka, Stangl introduced more sophisti-
cated techniques of deception in order to reinstate the essential ingredi-
ent of victim docility.
AT CHRISTMAS 1942 Stangl ordered the construction of the fake rail-
way station. A clock (with painted numerals and hands which never 
moved, but no one was thought likely to notice this), ticket-windows, 
various timetables and arrows indicating train connections ‘To Warsaw,’ 
‘To Wolwonoce,’ and ‘To Bialystock’ were painted on to the façade of the 
‘sorting barracks’; all for the purpose of lulling the arriving transports – an 
increasing number of whom were to be from the West – into a belief that 
they had arrived in a genuine transit camp.224
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Another technique of deception appeared just 40 meters from the gas 
chambers where,
a small musical ensemble stood under a tree. Three Jews with yellow 
patches, three musicians from Stock, stood and played there on their 
instruments. […] They played enthusiastically. It was difficult to make out 
their repertoire…these were apparently the latest hit songs favored by the 
Germans and Ukrainians.225
Much like the pleasant pots of geraniums, this cheerful ensemble sug-
gested anything but a death camp. However, it seems the main purpose 
of the music was to “drown out the victims’ screams on their way to 
the gas chambers…so that they would not be heard throughout the 
camp….”226 An orchestra was also present at Sobibor,227 where, accord-
ing to survivor Mirjam Penha-Blits, the latest musical hits could be heard 
“blasting out…” of loudspeakers.228
Just how successful these deceptions were is unclear. What is clear 
is that they served to intensify the concerns of members of the camps’ 
Jewish work details, who were ever mindful of their precarious exist-
ence. With more time than new arrivals to plot, plan, arm, and iden-
tify weaknesses within the system, it was working Jews who posed the 
greatest threat to Operation Reinhard. Two major revolts instigated by 
Jewish underground organizations ended in escapes. The first occurred 
on 2 August 1943 at Treblinka, which facilitated the escape of a small 
number of prisoners and the deaths of many. Half-a-month later, on 19 
August 1943, Treblinka was closed.229 The second major revolt occurred 
at Sobibor on 14 October 1943 and ended in significant staff casualties 
and many escapes.230 Along with meticulous planning and near-perfect 
execution, a major contributing factor to the success of this revolt was 
that German staff broke an all-important camp rule. As Richard Glazor, 
one of the escapees, explained,
The idea [to revolt] was almost ripe back in November 1942. Beginning 
in November ’42, we’d noticed…that we were being “spared,” in quotes. 
We noticed it and we also learned that Stangl [sic Franz Reichleitner], the 
commandant, wanted, for efficiency’s sake, to hang on to men who were 
already trained specialists in the various jobs: sorters, corpse haulers, bar-
bers who cut the women’s hair, and so on. This in fact is what later gave us 
the chance to prepare, to organize the uprising.231
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At other camps, Jewish workers were periodically executed and replaced 
with new workers as per instructions, thus reducing the risk of revolt. 
But at Sobibor this rule was ignored. Five days after this success-
ful revolt, on 19 October 1943, it was decided to close and dismantle 
Operation Reinhard, which had already achieved both its original and 
most of its new objectives.232
This somewhat premature shutdown, however, left a few tasks remain-
ing. How, for example, was Himmler to erase the last official trace of 
Jews in the General Government, who, due to their better physical con-
dition, had been selected to work in various commercial and military 
enterprises (the majority of whom were at the Majdanek, Poniatowa, 
and Trawniki labor camps)? Himmler moved quickly and with stealth 
because if these surviving Jews caught wind of the successful revolt at 
Sobibor, it was feared they might be inspired to act similarly.233 Without 
industrial-sized gas chambers to do his dirty work, the safest option 
was to have these workers shot. With the help of SS and Police Leader 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger, Himmler hatched Operation Harvest Festival 
(or Erntefest). The first stage of this operation involved instructing 
management at all three labor camps to have their prisoners dig zigzag 
trenches in fields close to the camp boundaries (ostensibly for defensive 
military purposes). Then, on 3 November 1943, several thousand police 
and SS men simultaneously surrounded the camps. Using Jeckeln’s Babi 
Yar model, over the next two days the Jews were stripped of their clothes 
and forced toward the trenches through heavily armed cordons of police 
and SS men. Then, they were systematically shot in the trenches. The 
victims who followed were to stack themselves like sardines on top of 
those shot before them. By the end of the second day, 43,000 Jews 
had been shot in the largest mass shooting of civilians undertaken by 
Germans during World War Two.234 Arad explains what happened next 
at Trawniki.
A group of 100-120 Jews from the Milejow camp (east of Lublin) were 
brought to cremate the corpses of the murdered. After two or three weeks, 
when they finished the cremating work, they were also shot. They were 
shot in small groups, and each group had to cremate the corpses of the 
previous group. The last group was cremated by the Ukrainian guards.235
The men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 participated in Operation 
Harvest Festival. However, these “ordinary” Germans only performed 
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cordon and transport duties.236 For a big job like “Majdanek and 
Poniatowa during Erntefest, the Security Police of Lublin furnished the 
shooters.” These ordinary yet no doubt capable Germans, having risen 
to the top of Himmler’s attrition process, were, according to Browning, 
killing “specialists.”237
ConCLusion
This chapter traces a “rational” journey in mass murder that started out 
as pilot studies and rapidly expanded into a carefully calculated, contin-
uously improving, and ultimately successful attempt to murder all the 
“useless mouths” in the General Government. Between late 1941 and 
mid-1942, a journey of discovery took place among a competitive group 
of specialists that generated rapid advances across all four components 
of a rationalized system: increased control, calculability, predictability, 
and efficiency (along with a movement from human to more non-hu-
man technology). That is, after gradually developing a standardized 
set of mostly non-human cordon/security measures—sealed, electri-
fied, and barb-wired perimeters, minefield buffer zones, 24 hour armed 
security towers, regular Jewish worker rotations—and relying on a vari-
ety of equally controlling techniques of deception, eventually one inno-
vator—Christian Wirth—managed to invent a virtually inescapable and 
highly efficient assembly-line process of mass murder. The key to the suc-
cess of Wirth’s veritable factory of death was the uncanny ability of his 
system to efficiently convert a constant, calculable, and therefore predict-
able flow of docile victims into dead bodies.
Wirth’s journey of discovery shares much in common with Jeckeln’s. 
Much like the shooting campaign, the “twisted road” from Lange’s gas 
vans through to the construction of the Treblinka extermination camp 
exhibited initially low rates of killing, top-down pressure to increase 
those rates, the application of formal rationality from the bottom-up 
(increased experimentation, bureaucratization, and the honing of a less 
stressful industrialized killing process), resulting in increased kill rates 
that only served to stimulate new top-down pressures to kill more Jews—
thus occasioning an ever-expanding cycle of destruction. A key com-
monality between both murder campaigns was an interactive relationship 
between top-down and bottom-up forces whereby, as Matthäus observes, 
“[n]ot only did those committing mass murder learn by doing, but their 
top commanders and those in planning positions learned as well.”238
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The key distinguishing feature separating the murder campaigns was 
that Wirth’s “one best way” of killing civilians was more successful than 
Jeckeln’s largely because Wirth developed a more impersonal, less pub-
lic, less labor intensive, and more industrial and organized means of mass 
extermination. Consequently, unlike the shooting squads who balked 
over killing certain types of victims, Wirth and his fellow ex-T4 gassing 
experts revealed an uncanny and unparalleled knack for killing without 
complaint any civilians sent their way: Gypsies, Reich Jews, the elderly, 
women, children, even babies. When Wirth scaled all the weighty psy-
chological obstacles associated with killing civilians and refined his 
frightfully efficient killing process, he toppled Jeckeln from his star inno-
vator role in Nazi Jewish policy. Wirth became the solution to the Nazi 
regime’s seemingly unresolvable and expanding “Jewish problem.”
But in the Nazis’ competitive bureaucracy where entrepreneurial 
functionaries constantly tried to outdo one another, Wirth’s elevated 
status did not last long. Operation Reinhard gassing factories were only 
designed to exterminate people unable to work. Few of these victims 
were lined up as working fodder for the German war effort or broader 
economy. However, as discussed at the Wannsee Conference, for all the 
other Jews in Western and Central Europe who had not experienced the 
starvation conditions endured by those entrapped in the Polish ghet-
tos, the Nazis’ flagging military fortunes meant that a camp of dual 
purpose—elimination through work and, for non-workers, immediate 
extermination—was now needed. This more productive, yet still highly 
destructive work and death camp would become the new most “perfect” 
solution. It was called Auschwitz-Birkenau. Destruction with far greater 
efficiency was about to be perfected.
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At face value, Operation Reinhard and the Auschwitz concentration 
camp system appear somewhat similar, the main common denomina-
tor being the goal of killing massive numbers of human beings. Having 
said that, a closer look reveals each was governed by different, discrete 
policy objectives: Operation Reinhard’s policy was to kill all the “useless 
mouths” in the Polish ghettos while Auschwitz focused on extermina-
tion through work. Even so, as this chapter will show, Auschwitz moved 
toward its objective using the same mechanism as Operation Reinhard 
and, later, Milgram did—the application of intuition, past experience, 
and close observation of the pilot-testing process (all of which advanced 
efficiency, predictability, calculability, and control, along with a greater 
dependence on non-human technologies). With a more pronounced 
emphasis on industrialization, Auschwitz achieved its most significant 
“advancement”—the one that distinguished it most from other solu-
tions to the “Jewish problem”—in the matter of the most powerful 
strain resolving mechanism of all—the means of inflicting harm.
Killing on an industrial scale distinguished Auschwitz in three main 
ways: efficiency, profitability, and (from the Nazi perspective) “humane-
ness.” The Nazis, it seems, regarded the Auschwitz process as the most 
humane solution to the “Jewish problem” in two main ways. First, for 
the most directly involved perpetrators, Auschwitz was a relatively stress-
free, and with the camp’s high standard of living, pleasant place to work. 
Second, Auschwitz developed a standard operating procedure that the 
Nazis in and beyond the camp—including the German public cognizant 
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of the extermination campaign1—perceived as a gentle, even kind, way of 
killing other human beings on an unprecedented scale. Although it was 
neither of these, the process’s designation as “most humane” seems to 
have eased many of the reservations that Nazi functionaries might have 
otherwise felt.
As this chapter will show, the general perception that Auschwitz 
offered the most humane solution to the Jewish problem was particularly 
dangerous, because in all likelihood it extended the life cycle of the effi-
cient and profitable policy of extermination by work. That is, the mutu-
ally inclusive combination of advanced formal rationality and what, for 
the most directly involved perpetrators, was a less stressful killing process 
translated into an efficient body-consuming machine that, if not for the 
Soviets, would have probably known no end. The easier and less the 
stressful killing became, the more victims the leadership in Berlin found 
in need of extermination. What follows explains how the most efficient 
and profitable killing process developed during the Holocaust, and why 
many Nazis perceived it as humane.
humbLe beginnings
As Soviet military strength grew after the winter of 1941, Himmler’s 
plans to fill Auschwitz with Russian POWs naturally faltered.2 Thus, 
he turned to a less desirable source of slave labor—Jews. But the first 
group to arrive at Auschwitz I around this time was incapable of pro-
ductive labor: 400 mainly elderly people sent from an Upper Silesian 
labor camp to be killed.3 In mid-February 1942, these Jews were gassed 
in Crematorium I.4 Their death screams could be heard throughout 
the main camp, and German staff raised concerns that—despite a few 
attempts to dampen these noises5—gassing victims here probably lacked 
necessary “privacy…”6 Therefore, as more Jews incapable of work 
arrived at Auschwitz I, more were transferred to the nearby Birkenau 
satellite camp. On 27 February 1942, Hans Kammler, the head of the 
construction division of the SS Main Economic and Administrative 
Department, decided that it made more sense for the industrial-style 
crematorium—Crematorium II—which, Bischoff and Prüfer originally 
planned for Auschwitz I, instead be built at the more secluded Birkenau 
site.7 Soon after this decision, on 20 March 1942 (just as Operation 
Reinhard started), a stone cottage on the new satellite camp was hast-
ily converted into a gas chamber to deal with the ongoing influx of 
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non-workers to Birkenau.8 The 60–80 square meter cottage called 
Bunker I proved capable of killing about 500 victims per gassing.9 As 
in the early stages of Operation Reinhard, Jewish work commandos 
dumped the victims’ bodies into large nearby pits. According to Camp 
Commandant Höss, “Whereas in the spring of 1942 only small opera-
tions were involved, the number of convoys increased during the sum-
mer…”10 To keep up with the bureaucratic momentum that supplied 
increasing numbers of victims and to avoid bottlenecks, Höss felt, “we 
had to create new extermination facilities” [italics added].11 Of course, 
he did not have to do this; as a problem-solving bureaucratic functionary, 
he chose to do it. In June 1942, Birkenau’s gassing capacity increased 
when Bunker II, another stone cottage, was converted into a gas cham-
ber. Measuring about 105 square meters, Bunker II was larger than 
Bunker I and capable of killing about 800 people per gassing.12 The vic-
tims’ bodies were also dumped in nearby pits.
On 17 and 18 July 1942, Himmler visited Auschwitz for the second 
time. During this visit, he personally observed Bunker II in action.13 
The gassing operation he saw included mostly young and old Jews. 
According to Höss, Himmler “made no remark regarding the process of 
extermination, but remained quite silent.”14 Himmler’s reaction in this 
case stands in stark contrast to his earlier response to the mass shooting 
of mostly men in Minsk, which had caused his face to turn “white as 
cheese…” With the removal of the distasteful visual spectacle, Himmler 
was no longer disturbed by the massacre of civilians.15
During this visit, Himmler informed Höss, who after the war acquired 
a reputation for being unusually frank,16 “Eichmann’s [train transport] 
program will continue…and will be accelerated every month from now 
on.”17 Himmler then instructed Höss to increase Birkenau’s population 
capacity from 100,000 to 200,000.18 Himmler’s intention was to bolster 
the Nazi war machine by building a regional armaments industry that 
would draw upon Birkenau’s slave labor force.19 But, because many of 
those bound for Auschwitz were incapable of productive labor, Himmler 
also apparently instructed Höss to exterminate those Jews incapable of 
work.20 Because Himmler had just seen Bunker II in action, he knew 
that killing large numbers of non-workers as they arrived in Auschwitz 
would pose no problem for Höss, who had, as Lasik put it, the requi-
site “organizational talents.”21 But the SS-Reichsführer did raise con-
cerns about the adjacent pits full of rotting bodies. Again, just in case 
Germany lost the war, Himmler deemed it wise to eliminate any evidence 
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of Nazi war crimes. Doing so would also address the local authority’s 
concerns that the 107,000 bodies buried in the pits were polluting the 
groundwater.22
Himmler’s solution to the body disposal problem was two-fold. First, 
as a shorter-term measure, in September 1942 Paul Blobel’s Kommando 
1005 was sent to Auschwitz to apply the best outdoor body-burning 
techniques they had discovered that summer.23 Second, and as a longer-
term solution, Höss would expedite Topf & Sons’ construction of 
Birkenau’s industrial crematorium (Crematorium II). Himmler’s concern 
re-emphasized the central problem also encountered in the Operation 
Reinhard camps: Killing was generally easier than body disposal.24 But 
he clearly sensed that Birkenau held the potential to overcome such 
problems, which perhaps explains why during his visit he requested 
that Birkenau be doubled in size and Höss promoted to Lieutenant 
Colonel.25
The SS-Reichsführer’s demand to expand Birkenau’s capacity to 
200,000 must have sent camp official Karl Bischoff into a spin. The 
increased death rate that would come with doubling the camp’s size 
would mean even more bodies in need of cremation. To eliminate any 
risk of bottlenecks, on 19 August Bischoff ordered another Topf & Sons’ 
industrial crematorium.26 This crematorium—Crematorium III—located 
opposite Crematorium II was to be a mirror image of its predeces-
sor. See, for example, the following Allied forces aerial photograph taken 
in 1944 of both crematoria: https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/
en/photo/aerial-photograph-showing-gas-chambers-and-crematoria-at-
the-auschwitz-birkenau.
Out of a fear that these new facilities might still fail to handle the 
anticipated number of bodies, plans were made to build several other 
smaller facilities: Crematoriums IV, V, and VI (never built). Although the 
plans for Crematoriums IV and V included their own gas chambers, they 
were to be constructed next to Bunkers II and I (respectively) so that, 
if needed, the newer facilities could be co-opted to cremate the victims 
from these older gassing facilities.27
With all this construction likely to take some time, the bodies of victims 
gassed in the meantime were burned using Blobel’s open-fire techniques 
in massive pits adjacent to Bunkers I and II. This short-term solution, 
however, generated a problem of its own, exposing the camp and local 
community to the pungent smell of burning flesh.28 The elevated smoke-
stacks of the industrial crematoria would somewhat eliminate this prob-
lem, which provided another incentive to expedite their construction.
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A few months later, in September 1942, Himmler’s order to dou-
ble the capacity of Birkenau to 200,000 prisoners was scaled back to 
140,000 when Armaments Minister Albert Speer convinced Hitler of 
Himmler’s probable incompetence in the area of arms production.29 
Despite this setback to Himmler’s ambitions, the construction plans for 
Crematoria II to V remained unchanged and preceded with haste.
With the onset of the 1942–1943 winter, the operators of Bunkers I 
and II encountered an unanticipated problem. The cold weather made 
it difficult to raise the room temperature in the gas chambers above the 
requisite 25.7 degrees Celsius that enabled the vaporization of Zyklon-B 
pellets. To avoid this problem in the future, the plans for Crematorium 
II were changed: Its more insulated basement-level morgues were con-
verted into massive underground gas chambers. Doing so simply required 
replacing the morgues’ body chutes with a staircase, which victims would 
descend. The final plan had the larger of Crematorium II’s two morgues 
serving as an undressing room and the smaller as a massive, partially 
underground gas chamber.30 This decision was made easier by the fact that 
the morgue (now gas chamber) already came with a powerful odor-ex-
pelling ventilation system. It will be recalled that the earlier conversion of 
Crematorium I’s morgue into a gas chamber (around late 1941) had high-
lighted this technology’s usefulness for expelling poisonous gas.31 A minor 
setback of the new plan was that architect Walter Dejaco’s blueprints, pro-
duced on 19 December, arrived too late and the concrete for the chutes 
had already been laid and therefore required demolition.32 By 29 January, 
Bischoff and his team stopped referring to the smaller of Crematorium 
II33 and started terming it a “gassing cellar [Vergaungskeller].”34 Because 
the gas chamber was so big and any gas within it could be extracted so 
quickly (and replaced with fresh air), the application of this ad hoc decision 
to both Crematoriums II and III increased Auschwitz-Birkenau’s killing/
body disposal capacity enormously.
In early March of 1943, Crematorium II was ready to undergo a 
series of tests, the biggest of which occurred around the middle of 
the month when 1492 women, children, and elderly Jews were gassed 
and then cremated. Incineration of these bodies took more than a day, 
thus highlighting the inaccuracy of Prüfer’s initial calculation: It had 
failed to incinerate 1440 bodies in 24 hours. After some minor adjust-
ments, the facility’s maximum incineration capacity reached 750 bod-
ies in 24 hours, and on 31 March, Crematorium II was ready for use. 
Death and incineration in Crematorium II basically involved a six-step 
process. Step One: Victims lined up outside the extermination center 
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then descended the stairs into the morgue converted into an undress-
ing chamber. Step Two: victims undressed. Step Three: The naked 
 victims entered another slightly smaller chamber—the second  partially 
underground morgue recently converted into a gas chamber—termed 
the “showers.” Step Four: German “disinfectors” would climb on top 
of the gas chamber and pour Zyklon-B crystals through sealable ceil-
ing vents35 with the victims then dying below. Step Five: When the 
victims had died, the gas fumes would be extracted and the Jewish 
work commando, on entering the chamber, would strip the bodies 
of all  valuables. Step Six: the Jewish work commando would transfer 
the  bodies to the adjacent crematoria (one level above) to be inciner-
ated. The following video clip provides a basic overview of this process: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q75pOXBr4e0. For a virtual reality 
walk-through of Crematorium II, see https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=x3EeTFtYr5E.
A week before Crematorium II’s test-run, on 22 March 1943, 
Crematorium IV was completed. However, by May this facility had been 
permanently decommissioned because of a major structural defect that 
only worsened with time.36 The completion of Crematorium II was fol-
lowed by Crematorium V and then III on 4 April and 24 June 1943, 
respectively.37 Thus, as Operation Reinhard wound down, Auschwitz-
Birkenau’s role in the Final Solution ramped up.
By the first half of 1943, however, as all this construction came 
to an end, the tide of the war turned rather decisively in the Soviet’s 
favor. In February 1943, the Wehrmacht was defeated in the Battle of 
Stalingrad. Then in August, it was defeated again in the Battle of Kursk, 
its final offensive attack on Soviet territory. The Nazi war machine 
never recovered from these blows, and thereafter, all Germans knew 
that the Russians were coming. However, earlier, during the “eupho-
ria of victory,” Germany had been persuaded into willingly or indiffer-
ently supporting their government’s pursuit of a variety of horrific war 
crimes. And many of these crimes involved Soviet victims, a nation 
that in light of its enormous loses could in victory hardly be expected 
to act with benevolence. Having allowed the undertaking of such dark 
deeds, Germany probably wouldn’t be able to act with impunity after 
all. Suddenly, the folly, selfishness, and greed of it all became apparent. 
Germany collectively started to contemplate its fate. Many Germans 
no doubt considered assassinating Hitler and then blaming it all on the 
machinations of a hypnotic madman. Indeed, during 1943, there was a 
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rapid increase in assassination attempts on Hitler. In desperation, per-
haps Germany could negotiate a permanent truce. But it was too late 
for all that. As Hitler reminded his inner circle: “Gentlemen, the bridges 
behind us are broken.”38 Germany as a nation had arguably long passed 
the Obedience study’s persuasion phase (the first part of the experiment 
where participants were convinced into inflicting the intensifying shocks) 
and, having supported wrongdoing, by 1943 was deep inside the exper-
iment’s after-capitulation phase (the point after participants commit 
themselves to completing).39 “[T]hat is good”, Goebbels noted in his 
diary on March of the same year, because “a Volk that have burned their 
bridges fight much more unconditionally than those who still have the 
chance of retreat.”40 All that Germany could do was fight on to the bit-
ter end, thereby delaying the inevitable.
But fight is not all that they did. A document from the German Postal 
Censor’s Office in Ukraine, which surveilled all private correspondence, 
warned that the Nazi perk for Germans stationed in the east to purchase 
then post-cheap local goods back home had spiraled out of control. This 
undated report, probably written soon after the defeat at Stalingrad, 
elaborates on “the only thing about Ukraine that interests the majority 
of the authors”—black marketeering41:
The illegal trade is not just aimed at acquiring personal family necessities. 
It is becoming a “business,” carried out on a commercial basis. People are 
investing and earning money. The letters promise that money grows on 
trees in Ukraine and that people can get rich there quickly. “Here, you 
can become a rich woman overnight.” Ordinary people are in a position 
to write home that they have already “earned” thousands. Others want to 
convert profits made in Ukraine into cars and property in the Reich. In 
nouveau rich fashion, jewels and expensive furs are purchased for house-
wives. […] All of this supports the harsh conclusion that is often drawn in 
the letters: Ukraine is a black market paradise.
The report ends in a statement that supports Heinrich Böll’s earlier 
observation that Germans’ stockpiling of goods in the occupied territo-
ries reminded him of robbing a corpse: “People often refer to Germans 
working in business and civilian administration in Ukraine as ‘East hye-
nas.’”42 Instead of black market trading, other Germans preferred the 
more direct “shopping with a pistol…”43 For example, in Lithuania, the 
company commander of Police Battalion 105 spent “a day and night” 
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packing “crates of loot” to send back home to Bremen.44 Many saw 
stealing as a well-deserved perk in exchange for having undertaking 
their emotionally taxing genocidal tasks.45 And anyway, so these men no 
doubt told themselves, if they didn’t keep the stolen goods, someone 
probably “less deserving” than themselves would. Such rampant corrup-
tion was common in the East because the risk of the Nazi authorities 
prosecuting them was slim—an inherently criminal regime was not in the 
strongest position to accuse others of criminality. Consequently, many 
ordinary Germans sensed they could engage in such personally beneficial 
acts with total impunity.46
This kind of corruption spread to much of the civilian population 
back home in Germany. As Jews from all over Western and Central 
Europe were increasingly rounded up and sent to places like Auschwitz-
Birkenau, the Nazis confiscated millions of cubic meters of their house-
hold effects and then redistributed them to German bombing raid 
victims, young newlyweds, large families, and war widows. Occasionally, 
the recipients were distinguished members of the SS and military.47 In 
the heavily bombed working-class districts of Hamburg, for example, 
librarian Gertrud Seydelmann recollected:
Ordinary housewives suddenly wore fur coats, traded coffee, and jewelry, 
and had imported antique furniture and rugs from Holland and France. 
… Some of our regular readers were always telling me to go down to the 
harbor if I wanted to get hold of rugs, carpets, furniture, jewelry, and furs. 
It was property stolen from Dutch Jews who, as I learned after the war, 
had been taken away to the death camps. I wanted nothing to do with this. 
But in refusing, I had to be careful around those greedy people, especially 
the women, who were busily enriching themselves. I couldn’t let my true 
feelings show.48
These housewives never killed any Jews, and as aerial bombardment of 
German housing increased in the last few years of the war, their emo-
tional universes were all consumed by their victimization. And anyway, 
so these housewives likely told themselves, if they refused to capitalize on 
this influx of property, (again) some other less deserving German than 
themselves no doubt would. After such rationalizations sufficiently dis-
armed their guilty conscience, a competition of who among them could 
successfully acquire the most prized possessions of a murdered people 
ensued.
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Back at Auschwitz-Birkenau, from mid-1943, the camp’s multiple 
gas chambers and crematoria facilities, managed by the organizational 
talents of Eichmann and Höss, were capable of efficiently killing and 
hygienically disposing of more human beings than any of the Operation 
Reinhard camps. All that was needed was an opportunity to prove it. 
That opportunity came on 19 March 1944 when the German armed 
forces invaded Hungary, which the Nazis (correctly) suspected was about 
to desert the Axis alliance in favor of the allies.49 Germany’s successful 
invasion of Hungary occurred as elsewhere the Nazis were losing enor-
mous tracts of land. Germany might lose the war, but there was still 
an opportunity for Hitler to win his personal battle with the European 
Jews.50 With hegemony over Hungary and the loaded gun of Auschwitz-
Birkenau, the Nazi leadership decided to exterminate the Hungarian 
Jews.
Although several months before the Hungarian invasion Höss had left 
Auschwitz for a higher administrative position in Berlin,51 he returned 
to his old job to do what he did best. As Hilberg puts it, “Hungary was 
going to lift Auschwitz to the top.”52 To have any chance of achieving 
“Aktion Höss,”53 the energetic commandant needed to act with celer-
ity and unprecedented levels of efficiency. He had a three-track railway 
siding laid inside the Birkenau complex—an innovation that enabled 
three trains to enter the camp perimeter at any one time.54 From mid-
May 1944, Höss expected from Eichmann an average delivery of about 
12–14,000 Hungarian Jews a day.55 Because most of the arrivals were 
young and old, only about 10–30% were selected as workers.56 The rest 
were sent on-foot to Crematoria II, III, and V, while smaller groups 
were gassed in Bunker II, which had been re-commissioned for the spe-
cial action.57
However, it soon became apparent that Auschwitz-Birkenau’s maxi-
mum incineration capacity could not keep up with such a massive and 
continuous influx of victims. The inventive Höss therefore devised a 
combination of old and new techniques. These included the construc-
tion of several massive outdoor incineration pits, the biggest of which 
measured around 45 m long by 8 m wide and 2 m deep.58 There about 
5000 bodies a day could be incinerated.59 Another technique Höss 
deployed included over-filling the industrial crematoria and then hav-
ing a Jewish work detail use hammers to crush the partially incinerated 
bodies into ash. This solution came with the attendant risk of damaging 
the crematoria. Nonetheless, both strategies greatly increased Birkenau’s 
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maximum incineration capacity to around 800060 or even 10,000 bod-
ies per day.61 Therefore, after the selections of workers from non-work-
ers, Auschwitz-Birkenau could keep up with the daily influx of around 
12–14,000 Jews.
Reflecting on Höss’ “assembly-line operation,”62 camp worker 
SS-Unterscharführer Pery Broad recalled, “There was never a break. 
Hardly had the last corpse been dragged out of the chamber to the cre-
mation ditch in the corpse-covered yard behind the crematorium, than 
the next batch was already undressing.”63 This blitzkrieg against the 
Hungarian Jews—which took place across a seven-week period between 
15 May and 9 July 1944—ended in the deportation of nearly 440,000 
people to Auschwitz-Birkenau, most of whom were gassed on arrival.64 
According to van Pelt and Dwork, “At no other time was Auschwitz 
more efficient as a killing center.”65 Indeed, Höss, with the constant 
flow of Eichmann’s trains, had taken Auschwitz-Birkenau to the top. 
But because the camp reached its full body-consuming stride so late into 
the war, it ended up killing “only” between 1,100,000 and 1,500,000 
civilians.66 Although Auschwitz never got to demonstrate its long-term 
destructive potential, it still became what Hilberg termed “the largest 
death center the world had ever seen.”67 In light of the rapid decimation 
of the Hungarian Jews, one can only imagine the number of people the 
Nazi regime would have killed had Auschwitz-Birkenau remained open 
for just a few more years. Hayes actually estimates that had the war con-
tinued and the Nazis were able to round up and transport the remain-
ing European Jews to Auschwitz-Birkenau, all could have been killed and 
their bodies cremated by the end of 1946.68
ausChwitz-birkenau: formaL rationaLity and the most 
effiCient means to the end
In terms of the four main components of formal rationality—efficiency, 
predictability, control, and calculability—Auschwitz-Birkenau took 
resolving the Jewish question to a new and even higher level. Trains from 
all over Europe packed with several thousand Jews each entered a heavily 
guarded, electrified, and basically inescapable camp perimeter. With the 
selection of non-workers from workers complete, efficiency required the 
key ingredient of victim docility, as had been the case during Operation 
Reinhard. Once again, the T4’s usual tricks appeared. “Very politely, 
very amiably, a little speech was made to [those selected for immediate 
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death],” noted French physician André Lettich. A German would tell 
them, “You’ve arrived after a trip; you’re dirty; you’re going to have a 
bath. Undress quickly!” To further bolster the pretext, on some occa-
sions Lettich claims, “towels and soap were distributed.”69 If the pro-
cess moved too slowly, German camp workers might capitalize on the 
fact that the victims were likely thirsty after having endured a three- 
to four-day train journey. They might promise a drink of water or coffee, 
but only after the new arrivals had taken a delousing shower. This offer, 
which the Jews frequently applauded, helped ensure a calm, smooth, and 
continuous flow of bodies through the system.70
By offering the strongest prisoners a chance for survival in exchange 
for their labor, the camp guards also managed to diffuse the most threat-
ening source of Jewish resistance. Those selected as workers had an 
identification number tattooed on the inside of their wrist to track their 
movements within and beyond the camp, and their gradual demise from 
living to dead. The promise of false hope helped to motivate the slowly 
starving Jews to work hard: Auschwitz I’s camp gate (mis)informed all 
that “Arbeit Macht Frei”—“Work will set you free.” Prisoners not only 
worked hard for free but also did so in return for barely any food. When 
their productivity dropped below a certain level or they were deemed 
surplus to requirements, like their unproductive relatives before them, 
they too were sent to the gas chambers. Even if these workers eventu-
ally realized their fate, there was no time left to organize a revolt and 
they were often too weak to resist anyway. After these workers had been 
killed, they were replaced by healthier new arrivals. Trapped within the 
highly secure and largely inescapable enclosure, these new slaves typically 
shared the same fate as those before them.71
Alice Lok Cahana’s account of the gassing process at Auschwitz-
Birkenau (which was essentially the same for both non-workers and 
worn-out workers) illustrates more of the Nazis’ tricks of deception. 
On 7 October 1944, Cahana and her sister were selected to go to a new 
barrack but on the way they were instructed to first take a shower for 
hygiene purposes. They were sent to “a nice building with flowers at the 
windows.”
I see flowers in a window—reminding you of home. Reminding you that 
mother went out when the Germans came into Hungary, and instead of 
being scared or crying or hysterical she went to the market and bought 
violets. And it made me so calm. If Mother buys flowers it can’t be so bad. 
They will not hurt us.72
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With the flowers having set Cahana’s worst fears at ease, she willingly 
entered the changing room where “an SS woman said, ‘Everyone put 
their shoes nicely together, your clothes on the floor.’”73 But were they 
really about to take a shower? More props suggested so. “The ‘chang-
ing rooms’, the anterooms to the gas chambers [were]…overt stage sets, 
with their numbered pegs for clothing (‘Remember your number!’) and 
the signs in various languages advertising the benefits of hygiene.”74 
Next, Cahana notes, “we were taken into a room—naked.”75 After 
entering, a solid door quickly closed behind them. Before they could 
establish what was happening, the door suddenly swung open and they 
were quickly ushered out of the so-called showers. Cahana and those 
with her had, by the narrowest of margins, avoided certain death because 
the Jewish work detail had staged a revolt.
Had there not been a revolt, a van with the markings of the Red 
Cross would have pulled up outside. The van’s markings were, accord-
ing to Auschwitz bookkeeper Oskar Gröning, designed to “create the 
impression” to all those who could see from near and far that, in line 
with the pretense, this facility was indeed a delousing station—“peo-
ple had nothing to fear.”76 A couple of Germans would exit the van 
and, donning gas masks, climb on top of the semi-underground gas 
chamber. The two “disinfecting operators,” as they were euphemisti-
cally termed, would then await a signal from a higher authority figure 
(sometimes a medical doctor) to pour carefully measured quantities of 
Zyklon-B crystals into the roof vents.77 Then, the two operators would 
close and seal the lids behind them,78 return to their van, and drive off. 
And because they drove off, they remained perceptually oblivious to the 
pandemonium and terror left in their wake.79 It took about 10–12 min-
utes to kill all the victims,80 upon which the industrial-strength air vents 
would expediently remove the gas from the chamber. Next, the Jewish 
Sonderkommando entered the chamber and stripped the two, perhaps 
two and a half, thousand or so, victims81 of anything valuable—hair, hid-
den items, gold teeth. The stripping process took about four hours.82 
The bodies were then dragged into the adjacent lift and transferred to 
one of the crematoria where they were incinerated. The German overse-
ers or even their Eastern European collaborators need not engage in any 
of this horrific labor. In an action, reminiscent of Milgram’s processing 
blocks (one hour per participant), Clendinnen notes about Auschwitz-
Birkenau’s highly rationalized system, “When the episode was over and 
the rooms emptied, there would be a frantic rush to remove all traces of 
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the last audience and to reset the scene for the next intake and the next 
performance.”83 A single performance at Auschwitz—the start-to-finish 
conversion of a single convoy into ash—took on average 72 hours.84
Because many workers required close supervision over fairly long 
periods of time, Auschwitz’s system of “extermination through work” 
was dependent on far more (relatively expensive) German guards than 
the Operation Reinhard camps—2500 on average.85 Having said this, 
like Operation Reinhard but so different from the mass shootings, few 
Germans were required to run Auschwitz’s extermination facilities. With 
a large Jewish slave labor workforce and Jewish kapo enforcers, as Rees 
says of Auschwitz’s Crematoria II and III,
The whole horrific operation was often supervised by as few as two SS 
men. Even when the killing process was stretched to the limit there were 
only ever a handful of SS members around. This, of course, limited to a 
minimum the number of Germans who might be subjected to the kind of 
psychological damage that members of the killing squads in the East had 
suffered.86
Auschwitz-Birkenau, like Operation Reinhard, could kill a set max-
imum number of victims per day, thus enabling the calculation of 
monthly or even yearly genocidal mortality rates. As a result, predict-
ing how long it would take to “disappear” Europe’s entire population 
of Jews became technically possible. Indeed, in terms of calculability and 
predictability, Auschwitz exceeded Operation Reinhard for two main rea-
sons. First, Auschwitz’s indoor crematoria ensured that unpredictable 
rainy weather did not reduce the camp’s normal body-burning capacity. 
Second, the diesel motors used in Operation Reinhard frequently broke 
down,87 regularly causing major bottlenecks in the system. At Auschwitz, 
Zyklon-B posed no such risk because packing humans into a hermetically 
sealed and insulated chamber reliably and predictably saw the room tem-
perature rise over the requisite 25.7 degrees Celsius.
Auschwitz had another advantage. Although all prisoners who 
entered were, as in Operation Reinhard and the mass shootings, robbed 
of all their valuables, over the long term the system of “extermination 
through work” was a potentially more profitable form of extortion. To 
feed, clothe, and lodge a worker in Auschwitz cost 1.34 Reichsmarks per 
day, but to hire the least skilled laborers, the Nazis charged employers 
3–4 Reichsmarks.88 Between 1940 and 1945, the Nazi state earned 60 
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million Reichsmarks from Auschwitz’s slave labor system.89 The longer 
the Auschwitz stayed open, the more profit the Nazis could accrue. 
Operation Reinhard and the mass shootings, however, could—for obvi-
ous reasons—only generate high profits over the short term. Quite sim-
ply the system at Auschwitz became the Nazi regime’s model solution to 
its European-wide Jewish question because of its efficiency and longer-
term profitability.
In 2001, I visited Auschwitz during a backpacking tour across Eastern 
Europe. Afterward, I, like most visitors, was left wondering what kind 
of cold, calculated, and cunning person could envisage, design, and 
then build such a monstrous factory of death. But the answer that has 
emerged from my subsequent research sees this singular monstrous per-
son disappear into the collective mass. Instead, I found numerous per-
petrators who independently and together suggested and tested a wide 
variety of potential “improvements.” The ideas that proved most effec-
tive—for example, to utilize Eastern European collaborators and Jewish 
labor for the most difficult positions, to install air ventilation systems in a 
morgue, to use faster-acting Zyklon-B gas, to construct a contiguous gas 
chamber and crematorium, to convert Crematorium II’s basement-level 
morgues into an undressing room and gas chamber, and finally to 
increase the scale of everything—were retained. And all the ideas that, 
with time, proved ineffective were dropped. Eventually, the most effec-
tive means accumulated until an ugly beast emerged—one increasingly 
capable of converting the preconceived goal discussed at Wannsee into a 
reality.
Auschwitz-Birkenau stood at the end of a long journey of ad hoc 
experimentation that chipped away at the numerous and varied problems 
associated with exterminating millions of unwanted civilians. The inven-
tion of Auschwitz cannot be attributed to any one person. The result-
ing responsibility ambiguity at every link in the organizational chain only 
made it psychologically easier for all involved to play a part in the per-
petrator collective that, “only in small ways,” contributed to the camp’s 
invention. And it was Auschwitz’s disjointed invention that probably 
explains why, after the war, perpetrators could not pinpoint who exactly 
invented the ghoulish yet undeniably clever process of extermination. 
For the perpetrators—but also for victims, survivors, and postwar observ-
ers—the end result that was Auschwitz-Birkenau became an incompre-
hensible enigma beyond rational explanation.
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But, it is here that a centrally important Milgram-Holocaust linkage 
is found. Consider, for example, Milgram’s discovery that substituting 
a translucent screen separating the participant from learner with a solid 
partition could greatly increase the completion rate—an idea actually 
stimulated from the bottom-up by his participants’ avoidance behav-
ior. Milgram did not know why exactly this small innovation increased 
the completion rate, he just knew it did. And when discoveries like this 
moved him closer to his preconceived goal, he retained them. Over time, 
these kinds of innovations accumulated until a “devilishly ingenious”90 
procedure emerged and he achieved his goal—maximization of the base-
line completion rate. And afterward, Milgram, the main but not only 
inventive force behind the Obedience experiments, could not explain the 
disturbing results he had obtained.
ConCLusion
Auschwitz was the terminus of the “twisted road” to the Holocaust. 
It represents the Nazis’ most preferred solution to their self-defined 
“Jewish problem.” As in Operation Reinhard, staff at Auschwitz collec-
tively found ways to extend a little more all four components of a for-
mally rational organizational system—greater efficiency, predictability, 
calculability, and control. Just some of the key ideas that advanced formal 
rationality included the use of tracking tattoos, industrial-sized, weath-
erproof, indoor crematoria, a gas dependent on body heat, new tricks of 
deception, and railway tracks of sufficient capacity. Auschwitz’s innova-
tions saw the killing and cremation of humans on a greater scale and in 
a shorter amount of time than any earlier system they had developed. 
On top of all this, the program of extermination through work was less 
wasteful (of slave labor), and therefore, the system overall was far more 
profitable than Operation Reinhard. As Bauman argues:
Considered as a complex purposeful operation, the Holocaust may serve 
as a paradigm of modern bureaucratic rationality. Almost everything was 
done to achieve maximum results with minimum costs and efforts. Almost 
everything (within the realm of the possible) was done to deploy the skills 
and resources of everybody involved, including those who were to become 
the victims of the successful operation. Almost all pressures irrelevant or 
adversary to the purpose of the operation were neutralized or put out of 
action altogether. Indeed, the story of the organization of the Holocaust 
could be made into a textbook of scientific management.91
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Without a doubt, there were many examples of great inefficiency during 
the Holocaust—for one, the Nazi management system with its overlap-
ping jurisdictions stimulated the duplication of tasks as different factions 
independently vied to resolve whatever it was they thought the Führer 
wished. Having said this, it was still a management system that went on 
to produce more efficient winners and less efficient losers. Once the pro-
cess took its course, the leadership was able to pick and choose from a 
range of options the best available solution to any one problem. And 
from this perspective, Höss’ Auschwitz was the winner among a wide 
range of competitors. In terms of developing the most rational solution 
to a seemingly intractable problem—in conjunction with business acu-
men and entrepreneurial capitalism where the pursuit of profit was taken 
to its unregulated natural extreme—nothing competes with Auschwitz.
However, as the next chapter will show, the clear presence in 
Auschwitz of an ever-advancing form of Weberian formal rational-
ity provides an incomplete picture. The extermination machine had to 
be as efficient and profitable as possible, but it also had to ensure that 
those Germans most directly involved could avoid experiencing any 
“burdening of the soul”—any feelings of shame, guilt, or (most com-
monly) repugnance that killing civilians could stimulate. The Germans 
most directly involved had to be able to avoid the conclusion that they 
had become mass executioners of defenseless men, women, children, and 
babies. The killing process at Auschwitz extended previous boundaries 
of formal rationality and did so in a way that German perpetrators in and 
beyond the camps were able to call “humane.”
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When Nazis from a wide variety of ranks, whether lowly Rolf-Heinz 
Höppner in Lódź or Auschwitz Commandant Rudolf Höss, Wilhelm 
Kube, Karl Brandt, or even those of the heights of Heinrich Himmler 
spoke of a “humane” method of killing other human beings, what 
exactly did they mean? One outcome of this book is a tentative outline 
of the key characteristics—a Weberian Ideal-Type—of what the Nazis 
regarded as the most humane method of killing. As this chapter will 
argue, when these and other Nazis spoke of such matters, what they 
seemed to desire was a method of killing that rated highly on four main 
conditions. First, victims should remain totally unaware that they are 
about to die. Second, perpetrators need not touch, see, or hear their vic-
tims as they die. Third, the death blow should avoid leaving any visual 
indications of harm on the victims’ bodies. And finally, the death blow 
should be instantaneous. At the start of the Holocaust, the Nazis did not 
have a cheap and efficient method of killing civilians that came remotely 
close to meeting all four of these conditions. Over time, however, and 
with much competitive trial-and-error experimentation, certain innova-
tors in places like Auschwitz inched their way ever closer to this ideal.
no antiCiPation of death
Most Nazis strongly preferred that their many civilian victims not expe-
rience the stress of knowing they were about to die. To secure such a 
condition, the Nazis relied most often on elaborate props of deception. 
CHAPTER 8
The Nazi’s Pursuit for a “Humane”  
Method of Killing
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These included, for example, promises of water, food, and work after 
taking a quick shower, fake railway stations, pleasantly painted gas cham-
bers with flowers and a carefully placed Star of David—all to trick victims 
into thinking they had not arrived at a place of death. So why was it so 
important to the perpetrators that the victims not anticipate their own 
deaths? One explanation is that such props encouraged victim docility, 
which helped to secure a smooth and efficient flow of victims through 
the killing process. There is certainly much truth to this explanation; 
however, a closer look reveals other, more subtle but equally important 
motives.
A strong indicator that the “overt stage sets” were not only about 
securing an efficient killing process comes from an example near the end 
of the war. At the Stutthof camp between August and November 1944, 
camp commandant Paul Werner Hoppe instructed his subordinates to 
kill all Jews who were old, sick, and unable to work.1 To deal with sim-
ilar requests in the past, a railway car was converted into a hermetically 
sealed Zyklon-B gas chamber. In this case, a group of Jewish women 
were told they were to go to a stocking and darning shop—easy indoor 
work—and had to be transported there by train:
One of the SS men put on a railroad employee’s uniform and whistled, 
as is usually done in marshaling yards. To make the subterfuge complete, 
an ordinary car was placed next to the gassing car […] The SS staff of the 
camp urged the twenty or thirty victims to hurry: it was time to leave; they 
had to go clear to Danzig. As soon as everybody was in the car, the doors 
were closed. Then the gas was thrown through the opening in the roof.2
Why did this SS man go to such inefficient lengths—putting on a spe-
cial uniform, blowing a whistle, arranging another carriage, and putting 
on such a big show? Did he simply wish to avoid the display of force 
and physical intimidation that would have more efficiently resulted in 
the women doing as they were told? In fact, he seems to have tried to 
tempt the women into willingly, perhaps even cheerfully, entering the gas 
chamber of their own accord. It seems that such elaborate and inefficient 
deception likely grew out of a concern for the reaction victims might 
have had to knowledge of their impending deaths. If they were oblivious 
to their fate, then the victims could be expected to avoid the reactions 
of terror likely to accompany such knowledge. Thus, for the victims, the 
elaborate deception would make for a less stressful and therefore more 
8 THE NAZI’S PURSUIT FOR A “HUMANE” METHOD OF KILLING  243
“humane” dying experience. This is no doubt part of the explanation, as 
the following admission by SS-Mann Heinrich Hesse makes clear:
One of the Jewish people killed by me was a Jewish woman aged between 
twenty and thirty, I cannot remember exactly. She was a beautiful woman. 
I was glad to be able to shoot her so that she did not fall into the hands 
of the Untersturmführer. But please don’t take that to mean that I 
enjoyed it. I said to the Jewess when I brought her from the cellar that the 
Untersturmführer wanted to speak to her, or something to that effect. My 
only thought was that if I had to do something I should cause the person 
as little pain as possible. I did not want the Jewess to suffer fear of death. I 
then made her come out of the cellar. She went in front of me. On the way 
to the grave or graves, which had already been dug, I suddenly shot her 
from behind.3
Here, again the perpetrator’s sole concern seems to have been the 
stress generated by the victim’s “fear of death.” The same concern led 
to a refinement to the Zyklon-B killing method. The SS preferred using 
Zyklon-B that had its distinctive nutty smell removed, which the man-
ufacturers added to provide humans with an early warning of the gas’s 
lethal presence.4 Even after deceiving their victims into entering the 
“shower,” the SS preferred they remain incapable of identifying the mys-
terious “delousing” gas. This deception, however, fooled nobody—the 
victims could immediately feel that the gas was nocuous. Therefore, it 
appears that the purpose behind removing the smell was a Milgram-like 
“balm to the…conscience”5 whereby although the victims still ended up 
dying, the perpetrators could tell themselves that they never saw death 
coming. That is, the removal of the nutty smell was a strain resolving 
technique of self-deception where the perpetrators made a slight change 
to the killing method that really did little more than making them feel a 
lot better about their extermination of other human beings.
Another closely related explanation for the preference to deceive vic-
tims is that perpetrators hoped to avoid having to deal with their vic-
tims’ guilt-inducing reactions to suddenly realizing they were about to 
die. Having to encounter potentially emotional victims just before kill-
ing them—the begging, sobbing, crying, screaming, and expressions of 
absolute horror—would have probably made the perpetrators feel like 
the ruthless executioners they had become. Keeping victims oblivious 
to their fate arguably resulted in much less stress for the perpetrators. 
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When, as survivor Ada Lichtman noted, the props of deception encour-
aged victims to dance, sing, and applauded on their way to the grave, 
perpetrators would have found the psychological stress associated 
with being an executioner much easier to bear. Certainly, these acts of 
deception made for a relatively less stressful and more tolerable work 
environment.
The importance of subterfuge for easing perpetrators’ guilty con-
sciences is perhaps best illustrated in the powerful emotional sting kill-
ers often experienced when their victims saw through the techniques 
of deception. With just a few words, powerless people were capable of 
inflicting deep wounds on the guilty consciences of the most efficient 
Nazi killers. Consider, for example, the recollections of Rudolf Höss, in 
regards to a “shattering” event that he believed he would “never forget:”
One woman approached me as she walked past and, pointing to her four 
children who were manfully helping the smallest ones over the rough 
ground, whispered: ‘How can you bring yourself to kill such beauti-
ful, darling children? Have you no heart at all?’ […] I remember, too, a 
woman who tried to throw her children out of the gas-chamber, just as the 
door was closing. Weeping she called out: ‘At least let my precious chil-
dren live.’ There were many such shattering scenes, which affected all who 
witnessed them.6
For Höss, there were other events:
On one occasion two small children were so absorbed in some game that 
they quite refused to let their mother tear them away from it. Even the 
Jews of the Special Detachment were reluctant to pick the children up. 
The imploring look in the eyes of the mother, who certainly knew what 
was happening, is something I shall never forget. The people were already 
in the gas-chamber and becoming restive, and I had to act. Everyone was 
looking at me. I nodded to the junior non-commissioned officer on duty 
and he picked up the screaming, struggling children in his arms and car-
ried them into the gas-chamber, accompanied by their mother who was 
weeping in the most heart-rending fashion. My pity was so great that I 
longed to vanish from the scene: yet I might not show the slightest trace 
of emotion.7
In the most sophisticated of killing centers like Auschwitz, elabo-
rate acts of deception could secure victim docility and greatly aided in 
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maintaining killing efficiency. But it was equally important that such 
techniques also enabled perpetrators to generally avoid the great psycho-
logical stress that they were killers of defenseless civilians. For the most 
directly involved Germans, techniques of victim deception also served as 
tools of self-deception so that the killing of other human beings felt to 
them like a humane and gentle experience.
touChing, seeing, or hearing
The Nazi regime’s pursuit of a method of killing capable of destroying 
large numbers of civilians gradually moved in a direction that allowed 
German perpetrators to emotionally distance themselves from their vic-
tims. By the time Crematorium II was completed at Auschwitz, the 
Germans most directly involved in the killing process need not touch, 
see, or hear their victims die. According to German political prisoner 
Karl Lil, once victims of Auschwitz were trapped in the hermetically 
sealed gas chambers, little of their fate could be detected by those out-
side. “A few seconds later a cry, muffled, stifled by the concrete walls. 
And then, a few minutes afterward, a brownish-yellow vapor poured out 
of the chimney.”8 Because the most directly involved Germans could be, 
if they so chose, physically and emotionally distant from the act of kill-
ing, they tended to perceive this method as a more humane and gentle 
experience (again, for them).
How could the Germans regard a method of killing that barely stimu-
lated their sensory systems as humane? The more perceptually benign the 
method of killing, the greater the disconnect between cause and effect. 
And the greater the disconnect between cause and effect, the greater 
the responsibility ambiguity. And it was this responsibility ambiguity 
that helped those Germans working in the camps to perceive themselves 
only indirectly involved. This distinction made no difference to the lethal 
outcome, but it did wonders for German perpetrators’ self-perceptions. 
When Germans in Auschwitz killed, the separation of cause from effect 
inherent in the process ensured that the end result did not feel grue-
some or beastly, like say, killing with their bare hands. For Höss, the 
Zyklon-B method was, as he put it himself, more “humane.”9 Much like 
the desk murderers in Berlin, or those that rounded up victims, or drove 
the trains, partaking in the killing process for Höss and his men was not 
gruesome because none of them were “directly” involved. The indi-
rectness of the entire operation seductively ensured that their essential 
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contributions to the wider organizational process resembled the structur-
ally disconnected and perceptually benign contributions of all the other 
specialist functionary links further up the organizational chain.
As the perceptual distance between cause and effect increased, 
Germans in the camps became more and more able to avoid encoun-
tering the consequences of their lethal contributions. Avoidance was an 
option for the German camp staff because, much like Milgram’s partici-
pants, they were in a position of power to control what they were willing 
to know (or not know). It had become possible for all Germans involved 
to engage in “intentional ignorance”10—all could look away and then 
continue to contribute and benefit from that contribution. This is why 
Stangl was able to say, “unless one was actually working in the forest, 
one could live without actually seeing; most of us [Germans] never saw 
anybody dying or dead.”11 As Hayes notes, this occurred in the ghettos 
as well: “the Germans were adept at insulating themselves from the worst 
aspects of the killing processes […] they often made the Jewish police 
forces do their dirty work of rounding up people who did not appear 
for deportation when scheduled to do so.”12 If Germans never saw any-
thing, how could they be directly responsible? Stangl, for one, went to 
great lengths to make sure he was unlikely to experience anything that 
might upset him. For example, when asked after the war where the 
worst place in the extermination camps was for him, his response sug-
gests he put great effort into shielding himself from the realities sur-
rounding him. “‘The undressing barracks,’ he said at once. ‘I avoided 
it from my innermost being; I couldn’t confront them; I couldn’t lie to 
them; I avoided at any price talking to those who were about to die: I 
couldn’t stand it’” [italics added].13 Stangl’s self-centered viewpoint 
which skirted over his victims’ actually horrific experiences was not only 
very common among the German perpetrators,14 it shares some similar-
ity to Mrs. Rosenblum’s sole concern with her terrible experience dur-
ing the Obedience studies. What Stangl failed to consider was that it was 
his selective avoidance of personal encounters with his approximately 
one million victims that ensured that he was indeed able to “stand it.” 
Höss conceded, “My inner scruples about remaining in the concen-
tration camp, despite my unsuitability for such work, receded into the 
background now that I no longer came into such direct contact with 
the prisoners as I had done in Dachau.” As Wistrich said of both Höss 
and Stangl, “Their sleep was never disturbed since they rarely saw any 
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suffering faces, concentrating as they did solely on the organizational 
task at hand.”15 As Primo Levi perceptively put it:
The best way to defend oneself against the invasion of burdensome mem-
ories is to impede their entry, to extend a cordon sanitaire. It is easier 
to deny entry to a memory than to free oneself from it after it has been 
recorded. This, in substance, was the purpose of many of the artifices 
thought up by the Nazi commanders in order to protect the consciences of 
those assigned to do the dirty work and to ensure their services, disagreea-
ble even for the most hardened cutthroats.16
It transpires that the Führer often informed those like Himmler tasked 
with implementing the Holocaust that extermination should be imple-
mented as “humanely” as possible.17 And what it seems he meant by 
this was that killing should be “done impersonally.” For Hitler, killing 
“impersonally” was, according to John Toland, synonymous with doing 
so “without cruelty.”18 This is why during Himmler’s second visit to 
Sobibor in 1943, the camp guards were instructed not to wear their 
whips and truncheons19—the leadership desperately needed to hold on 
to the belief that (where possible) their goal was a generally cruelty-free 
and humane enterprise. Cruelty was, however, as Goldhagen so convinc-
ing shows, endemic.20 But this tactile “hands on”-type cruelty—often 
physical beatings—was, as Levi implied at the end of Volume 1, usually 
not lethal (and often—although certainly not always—it had a “rational” 
organizational purpose).21 Violence during the roundups and in the con-
centration camps was, generally speaking, only lethal when Germans had 
ready access to means of killing that enabled them to (at least) avoid hav-
ing to touch their victims.22 And when Germans were more intimately 
connected to the deaths of their victims, they often—although again cer-
tainly not always23—had quite different experiences to the more indirect 
perpetrators like Stangl and Höss. Consider, for example, the postwar 
admission by one elderly German to his son:
the brown eyes of a six-year-old girl had never let him rest. He was a 
Wehrmacht soldier in Warsaw during the ghetto uprising. They were clearing 
the bunkers, and one morning a six-year-old girl came out of one of these 
bunkers and ran over to hug him. He could still remember the look in her 
eyes, both fearful and trusting. Then his commander ordered him to stab 
her with his bayonet—which he did. He killed her. But the look in her eyes 
followed him all those years. […] He had never told it to anyone before.24
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Of course, technocrats concentrating on step-by-step organizational 
tasks—timetables, transports, supplies, disposal—while others suffer, 
shares much in common with the Obedience Studies. As one participant 
in the Remote condition stated, “It’s funny how you really begin to for-
get that there’s a guy out there, even though you can hear him. For a 
long time I just concentrated on pressing the switches and reading the 
words.”25 Unlike the above Wehrmacht soldier, technocrats were, with 
varying degrees of success, able to “forget,” because the technology is 
structurally divorced from the moral.
As long as Höss, Stangl, and most other Germans in the more 
advanced gassing camps received no (or only a few) perceptual cues, it 
seems they could avoid thinking about the implications of their contri-
butions. For the vast majority of Germans working within Auschwitz, 
the camp’s structural compartmentalization—its many different sectors—
greatly aided in separating cause from effect. Auschwitz bookkeeper 
Oskar Gröning, for example, took great comfort in the fact that he 
worked in the much larger “living” section of the camp; he could claim 
to have nothing to do with the remotely located, compartmentalized, 
and relatively tiny gas chamber sector. As Gröning said himself:
Part of living in Auschwitz was perfectly normal. […] It was like a small 
city. I had my unit, and gas chambers were irrelevant in that unit. There 
was one side of life in Auschwitz, and there was another, and the two were 
more or less separate.26
For the vast majority of German perpetrators who worked within the 
camp, it was almost as if the mass killing of human beings was not even 
happening. Such mind games were easier to maintain in Auschwitz than 
in the Operation Reinhard camps because the former, unlike the lat-
ter, was first and foremost a work (not extermination) camp.27 Unlike 
at Auschwitz, in the Operation Reinhard camps every worker, strategy, 
objective, and building was much more closely connected to the sole 
task of extermination. Thus, the Germans based in Belzec, Sobibor, and 
Treblinka had to be more proficient than those at Auschwitz in the art of 
self-deception and delusional thinking.
Even at Auschwitz, however, there were occasions when, even for the 
most determined of officers, confronting death was unavoidable. Höss, 
for example, saw things he wished he had not. But he relied on cer-
tain strategies to deal with such encounters. When upset, he “found it 
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impossible to go back to my home and my family.” Instead, “I would 
mount my horse and ride, until I had chased the terrible picture away.”28 
Germans at Auschwitz able to control how much perceptual information 
they were exposed to lived, as Willem A. Visser’t Hooft put it, “in a twi-
light between knowing and not knowing.”29
The power to know what was happening in concept but not in per-
ceptual reality was even greater for the leadership comfortably based 
in Berlin. Walther Funk, the Nazi Minister of Economic Affairs, said 
of the atrocities after the war: “That was just the trouble; we were all 
blinded.”30 Funk is largely right, except that during the war (even after 
it; see below footnote) he actively chose not to look in fear of what he 
might see. After the war and at the Nuremberg trials, the Allied forces 
used their greater power to reverse the Nazi leadership’s earlier option 
to engage in avoidance by forcing them to view the chilling liberation 
film footage of the insides of Nazi concentration camps. Suddenly unable 
to so easily avoid the perceptually intense reality, some of these leading 
Nazis reacted by trying to look away from the footage playing before 
them, many looked stunned, shocked, and, for the most part, shameful. 
One of them—again the “blinded” Funk—could not help sobbing and 
crying.31
If, as Stangl said, the Germans in the camps rarely ever saw any death, 
such purposeful avoidance powerfully aided in reducing their feelings of 
responsibility for the end result. Much like those in the Peer Administers 
Shock condition, all those indirectly involved could argue that they 
were not responsible because they never directly hurt anybody. Stangl 
was keen to point out, “Of course, I wasn’t ‘involved’ in that sense… 
Not in the operational sense.”32 This seemingly trivial difference was of 
great importance to Stangl—as perhaps best illustrated by how upset he 
became when accused of being more directly involved:
Stangl, insisting that he had never shot into a crowd of people, appeared to 
be more indignant about this accusation than about anything else, and to 
find irrelevant the fact that, whether he shot into the group or not, these 
very same people died anyway, less than two hours later, through actions 
ultimately under his control.33
After the war, Eichmann became equally indignant when he was accused 
of beating a boy to death.34 A similar reaction might have been expected 
had participants who completed Milgram’s Peer Administers Shock 
250  N. RUSSELL
condition been accused of directly inflicting shocks on the learner. 
Actually, every German perpetrator right up to Hitler not involved in 
the “operational sense” could rely on Stangl’s strain resolving logic. 
Eichmann, for one, repeatedly argued, “I never killed a single one. 
[…] I never killed anyone and I never gave the order to kill anyone.”35 
Eichmann said that after the Wannsee Conference he:
felt something of the satisfaction of Pilate, because I felt entirely innocent 
of any guilt. The leading figures of the Reich at the time had spoken at the 
Wannsee Conference, the “Popes” had given their orders; it was up to me 
to obey, and that is what I bore in mind over the future years.36
The problem for Eichmann was that he was willing to admit (or 
could not deny) that he was, in his own words, guilty of “aiding and 
abetting…”37 Although he was purposefully (and, in terms of his 
career, opportunistically) lost in the fog of responsibility ambiguity, 
this admission directly connected him to the Holocaust. So, in the 
sense that he knew without knowing, Eichmann, irrespective of all 
his strain resolving coping mechanisms, was guilty. No matter how 
he spun the mind games in his head, he (like Milgram) was responsi-
ble for his harmful contributions, and he knew it. “I created a situa-
tion for myself in which I could find a spark of inner calm. The main 
medicament was: I have nothing to do with it all personally. They are 
not my people. […] But my nervousness got worse. I had no rest at 
night.”38
The reason Eichmann never personally killed anyone was that, in all 
likelihood, he was no killer. To be clear, from his desk Eichmann proved 
more than capable of sending millions of people to their deaths. But, 
remove the distancing factors offered by bureaucracy and technology, 
Eichmann—intense anti-semite or not, evil monster or not—was impo-
tent, squeamish, and likely harmless.39 Consider, for example, his timid 
reaction to someone describing the gassing procedure: “I was horrified. 
My nerves aren’t strong enough…I can’t listen to such things…with-
out their affecting me. Even today, if I see someone with a deep cut, I 
have to look away.”40 As mentioned, during the winter of 1941–1942, 
the meek Eichmann was sent to Chełmno to gather a detailed account 
of the camp’s extermination process. The experience left him so shaken 
that he both forgot to time the operation with his stopwatch and politely 
declined an offer to observe, through a peephole, the victims in their 
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death throes.41 For Eichmann, worse was to come. Asked to record the 
Chełmno process, he felt obliged to observe the visually intense end 
result. He saw:
the most horrifying thing I had ever seen in my life. The gassing van drove 
up to a somewhat long pit, the doors were opened, and the corpses were 
tossed out. It was as if they were still alive, their limbs were so supple. […] 
and I can still picture the way a civilian pulled teeth out with a pair of pli-
ers. Then I cleared out.42
Even the Germans most directly involved in operations at Auschwitz-
Birkenau could hold on to the strain resolving logic that, like Höss, 
Stangl, and even the more distant Eichmann, they too were only indi-
rectly involved. They merely dropped Zyklon-B crystals or switched on 
a diesel motor—they were just technicians. They never killed anybody, 
not personally anyway. If such coping mechanisms failed to salve their 
consciences, they, much like Milgram’s “obedient” participants, could 
tell themselves or others that they would never have done such things of 
their own accord. They were just following orders. As said, the German 
gas chamber supervisor Werner Karl Dubois, who participated in both 
the T4 program and Operation Reinhard:
What should be taken into account is that we did not act on our own 
initiative, but in the context of the Reich’s Final Solution to the Jewish 
problem.43
Similarly, Höss was keen to point out, “I must obey, since I was a 
soldier.”44 But, again, like many of Milgram’s participants, he also con-
tinued under the sneaking suspicion that he could probably act with 
impunity. “You see, in Germany it was understood that if something 
went wrong, then the man who gave the orders was responsible.”45 
Eichmann was no different. Despite the occasional nervous feelings of 
responsibility, he suspected that because he did not appear responsi-
ble for directly killing anyone, he too (opportunistically) believed him-
self “covered…”46 Hidden within the fog of responsibility ambiguity, 
Eichmann knew that he could (and did) blame the Nazi Popes. Höss’s 
men no doubt blamed him, he blamed Himmler, and Himmler blamed 
Hitler. But, again, Hitler never killed any Jews, not directly anyway. 
Perhaps Milgram was right when he argued that the same psychological 
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process inherent within modern bureaucratic organizations influenced 
both his “obedient” participants and the Nazi perpetrators.47 That is, 
when goal achievement is, as it was in both these cases, divided between 
groups of specialists, fragmentation of the overall process enables the dis-
placement of personal responsibility. Under such a system, the person 
ultimately responsible for the evil act seems to disappear.
If displacing responsibility for one’s actions did not ease the “bur-
dening of the soul,” another technique capable of subduing such feel-
ings was to concede that all involved were a little bit responsible. As the 
bookkeeper Oskar Gröning, for example, claimed, he was only a “small 
cog in the gears.” But if all perpetrators are a little bit responsible, no 
single person is ultimately responsible. This kind of thinking can reduce 
personal feelings of responsibility because everyone is just a little bit 
guilty of what Eichmann earlier called “aiding and abetting…”—a rel-
atively minor infraction during the Holocaust (so they liked to tell 
themselves). Most certainly, at no other point or place during the entire 
Holocaust did responsibility ambiguity at every link in the organizational 
chain reach the heights it did at Auschwitz.
Because Germans working in the most advanced gassing camps could 
all argue that they had neither heard, seen, nor touched the end result 
of the extermination process, all could claim that they were not person-
ally responsible. And if, to some extent, they could convince themselves 
they were not personally responsible, then the vast majority felt little or 
no “burdening of the soul,” and thus they were at a much lower risk than 
members of the shooting squads of becoming “neurotics” or “savages.” 
Because the camp workers had the option of perceptually circumventing 
the frightful consequences of their contributions, they were comparatively 
more capable of carrying on, of contributing to the apparently “necessary” 
yet “humane” murder of other human beings on an unimaginable scale.
a PeaCefuL and gentLe death
Another factor of the “humane death” that many Nazi perpetrators val-
ued highly was that the method of killing civilians should leave no post-
mortem indications of pain or violence. Preferably, victims’ bodies would 
show no bloody wounds or other signs of physical trauma like bruising. 
Also, no signs of defecation, vomiting, or frothing at the mouth or nose. 
Finally, a victim’s postmortem countenance should appear calm and neu-
tral as if to suggest they were peacefully sleeping. It was the T4 chemist 
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August Becker who perhaps best captured all this when, as mentioned, 
he complained to his superiors about certain gas van operators: “In order 
to get the Aktion finished as quickly as possible the driver presses down 
on the accelerator as far as it will go. As a result the persons to be exe-
cuted die of suffocation and do not doze off as was planned.” He then 
added, “It has proved that if my instructions are followed and the levers 
are properly adjusted death comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep 
peacefully. Distorted faces and excretions, such as were observed before, 
no longer occur.”48 On the measure of eliminating postmortem indica-
tors of a violent death, gassing was clearly preferable to using firearms 
because it did not leave the horrific wounds produced by the early mass 
shootings. But different types of gas produced different results. Kurt 
Gerstein (the Chief Disinfection Officer) argued that carbon monoxide 
gassing left a greater mess than Zyklon-B. When the doors of the car-
bon monoxide chamber opened, “the bodies were thrown out blue, wet 
with sweat and urine, the legs covered with excrement and menstrual 
blood.”49 For this reason, Höss preferred Zyklon-B:
There was no noticeable change in the bodies and no sign of convulsions or 
discolorations. Only after the bodies had been left lying for some time, that is 
to say after several hours, did the usual death stains appear in the places where 
they had lain. Soiling through opening of the bowels was also rare. There 
were no signs of wounding of any kind. The faces showed no distortion.50
Even if Höss’s impression was an exaggeration (and it probably was),51 
because Germans at Auschwitz were able to purposefully avoid encoun-
tering what actually took place in the gas chamber, the untested belief 
that Zyklon-B left no signs of a painful death fulfilled the strain resolving 
role of another Milgram-like “balm to the…conscience.”
instantaneous death
The final characteristic the Nazi’s most “humane” means of killing was 
that it killed instantaneously. The victim should be dead before he or 
she could register any pain. As Browning, clearly astounded, notes, “a 
quick death without agony of anticipation was considered an example of 
human compassion!”52 On this measure, no method could compete with 
a bullet in the back of the neck (but, of course, killing with guns failed in 
other ways, most notably, the anticipation of death and the infliction of 
visually disturbing wounds).
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Although Zyklon-B performed well on most of the four conditions, 
when compared with a bullet in the back of the neck, it still killed slowly. 
It could be argued that the introduction of the numerous techniques 
of deception (one of which applied after the docile victims were locked 
inside the chamber) was, at least in part, introduced with the purpose of 
addressing this weakness. Again, it was preferable that the victims never 
saw death coming. But clearly such measures were not enough because 
the Nazi planners attempted to directly increase the speed with which 
Zyklon-B killed. For example, on one rare occasion when Höss chose to 
observe the gassings through a peephole in the gas chamber door, he 
noticed:
those who were standing nearest to the induction vents were killed at 
once. It can be said that about one-third died straightaway. The remain-
der staggered about and began to scream and struggle for air. The scream-
ing, however, soon changed to the death rattle and in a few minutes  
all lay still.53
Just as Milgram would later tweak his procedure, Höss’s observation 
appears to have stimulated a subtle change to the design of the gas 
chamber. While Crematoria II and III were, as mentioned, designed as 
mirror images of one another, the link to the Allied aerial photo pre-
sented in the previous chapter revealed one slight difference:
gas introduction columns of crematorium II were arrayed in a straight line, 
roughly along the longitudinal axis of the gas chamber, whereas in crema-
torium III they were spaced in pairs on both sides of the axis. This place-
ment was meant to ensure rapid and uniform spread of the poison inside 
the chamber.54
This innovation ensured that more victims died, as Höss put it, “straight-
away.” Although Zyklon-B still killed slower than a shot to the neck, it 
did its work faster than any other type of gas available to the Nazis. Höss 
elaborated:
The doctors explained to me that the prussic acid had a paralysing effect 
on the lungs, but its action was so quick and strong that death came before 
the convulsions could set in, and in this its effects differed from those pro-
duced by carbon monoxide or by a general oxygen deficiency.55
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As we have seen, Wirth had tried to remedy the relative sluggishness of 
carbon monoxide by lowering the height of the ceiling in Treblinka’s 
second set of gas chambers. But even with this innovation, his method 
could not compete with Zyklon-B. As Wellers notes:
Gerhard Peters, the general manager of Degesch, the firm that devel-
oped Zyclon B and delivered it to Auschwitz, was able to establish sci-
entifically that hydrocyanic acid is six times more toxic than chlorine, 
thirty-four times more than carbon monoxide, and 750 times more than 
chloroform.56
Without a doubt, the carbon monoxide exhaust fumes used during 
Operation Reinhard could be an efficient means of killing large numbers 
of humans (as was leaving freight cars full of Jews outside Treblinka for 
too long in the intense summer heat, as Eberl did), but concerns lin-
gered about celerity. These concerns explain why Pfannenstiel went to 
Belzec armed with a stopwatch. It is interesting to note in this con-
text that a month after Himmler’s July 1942 visit to Auschwitz where 
he observed Bunker II in action, Kurt Gerstein and Rolf Günther were 
instructed (probably by the SS-Reichsführer himself) to pay Wirth a visit 
at Belzec. As Hilberg points out:
They had about 200 pounds of Zyklon with them and were about to con-
vert the carbon monoxide chambers to the hydrogen cyanide method. The 
unwelcome guests stayed to watch a gassing which took an especially long 
time (over three hours) because the diesel engine had failed. To Wirth’s 
great embarrassment and mortification, Gerstein timed the operation with 
a stopwatch. Facing the greatest crisis of his career, Wirth dropped his 
pride and asked Gerstein “not to propose any other type of gas chamber in 
Berlin.” Gerstein obliged, ordering the Zyklon to be buried on the pretext 
that it had spoiled. Höss and Wirth were henceforth enemies.57
The two men were enemies because the delivery of Zyklon-B clearly 
signaled to Wirth that he had lost to Höss in the fierce competition to 
discover a more perfect solution to the seemingly unresolvable “Jewish 
problem”: the most “humane” means of converting the Führer’s wish 
into reality. According to Konrad Morgen, after the regime dumped 
him, all that was left to Wirth before he was killed in an ambush in Italy 
near the war’s end was invidious bragging rights: Höss (who had no T4 
Euthanasia experience) was his “untalented pupil.”58
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An interesting question remains. If only work Jews had to face the 
horrific realities of the insides of the gas chambers, why were Germans 
who could, and typically did, avoid such spectacles, so concerned about 
finding a method of extermination that killed quickly, cleanly, imper-
ceptibly, and covertly? Put simply, many Nazis believed extermination 
to be necessary, and for the German camp staff Zyklon-B helped deac-
tivate the censuring gaze of their guilty conscience.59 If they were some-
what involved in the killing process, at least they could tell themselves it 
was humane.60 As Hans Mommsen notes: “Inhumanity had first to be 
declared as ‘humanity’ before it could be put into technocratic practice, 
with moral inhibitions thereafter reduced to a minimum.”61
After the war, Höss tried to explain all this to the Allied forces when 
he “spoke proudly of his ‘improvements.’”62 But his indignant audience 
could not comprehend his logic—his words were surely the ramblings 
of a madman. Höss then tried to bridge their understanding by adding 
that if not for him, many of the victims would have died more horrifi-
cally. But a frightful flaw remained in Höss’s logic. If he and the other 
Nazi innovators had never introduced their “humane improvements,” 
killing by other, more gruesome, methods likely would have stimulated 
defiance among the ranks (much as it did when the SS Cavalry Brigade 
refused to implement Himmler’s direct orders in 1941 to shoot women 
and children in the Pripet marshes using a more traditional military-style 
execution technique). Thus, without the “humane” enhancements, the 
number of victims would have been much lower (and Himmler and 
Heydrich’s little experiment would probably have been abandoned in 
favor of other more “realistic” solutions).63 But instead, innovators and 
problem-solvers like Höss provided the remote and blinkered Nazi lead-
ership with ever-greater capacity to eliminate an ever-expanding array of 
so-called inferiors.
Some of the above quotations capture why, for the Nazi leadership, 
Höss was more than just the most efficient of Nazi mass murderers. He 
was really the epitome of the perfect Nazi in the (killing) field—the kind 
of executioner genocidal managers like Himmler and Heydrich greatly 
desired and heavily relied upon. In terms of efficiency, Höss was crea-
tive, determined, and ambitious. But he was also controlled, outwardly 
unemotional, and thus sufficiently “hard,” as they termed it.64 Despite 
his masked performance of “hardness,” during the implementation of 
his difficult duties, Höss also managed to remain what Himmler termed 
“decent…” As the SS-Reichsführer said himself on 4 October 1943 
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during a speech where, to an audience of high ranking SS officers, he 
touched on the Holocaust:
Most of you must know what it means to see a hundred corpses lie side by 
side, or five hundred, or a thousand. To have stuck this out and—excepting 
cases of human weakness—to have kept our integrity, that is what has made 
us hard. In our history, this is an unwritten and never-to-be-written page of 
glory…65
During the Holocaust some Germans had, as Himmler notes, fallen prey 
to human weakness: They were too “soft” and could not do what (appar-
ently) needed to be done. Or worse, they abused their positions of power 
by opportunistically gratifying their pathological proclivity for sadism or 
penchant—perhaps stimulated by feelings of boredom—for unnecessary 
cruelty.66 Decent Germans, according to Himmler, were never unneces-
sarily cruel. As he said in the same speech: “We shall never be rough and 
heartless when it is not necessary, that is clear. We Germans, who are the 
only people in the world who have a decent attitude towards animals, 
will also assume a decent attitude towards these human animals.”67 What 
could Himmler possibly have meant by such words? He was alluding to 
Jewish Kosher animal slaughter techniques which Himmler, like Hitler, 
believed to be inherently cruel and inhumane. In 1944, as Clemens 
Giese and Waldemar Kahler (both involved in the introduction of the 
November 1933 Nazi animal protection laws) noted:
The animals protection movement, strongly promoted by the National 
Socialist government, has long demanded that animals be given anesthe-
sia before being killed. The overwhelming majority of the German peo-
ple have long condemned killing without anesthesia, a practice universal 
among Jews though not confined to them, …as against the cultivated sen-
sitivities of our society.68
When the sensitive Himmler instructed that “human animals” be 
killed—much like with other animals—it was preferable these acts 
be undertaken without cruelty—all were gently to go to sleep. 
Unlike the “weak” Germans who inflicted extraneous cruelties on their 
human victims, Höss had no interest in or time for such base pursuits. 
Thus, always with his eye fixed firmly on achieving the bureaucratic goal 
at hand, Höss proved to be a far deadlier executioner than the pathologi-
cal and tyrannical killers.
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Therefore, what Himmler—and clearly Hitler—liked about execution-
ers like Höss was that he was the kind of person who would “carry out 
mass murder with self-control and ‘decency’ rather than with sadism” 
(the last of which the Nazis deemed a crime for which some Germans 
faced prosecution).69 Höss, the consummate professional, was what the 
Nazi leadership believed to be an efficient yet, were possible, civilized 
killer. This is why, as mentioned, Höss could say with a straight face:
I find it incredible that human beings could ever turn into such beasts. The 
way the ‘greens’ [conventional criminals] knocked the French Jewesses 
about, tearing them to pieces, killing them with axes, and throttling 
them—it was simply gruesome.70
Such interpersonal violence was barbaric, cruel, and unbecoming of a 
professional, rational, sensitive, humane, and thus civilized Nazi execu-
tioner.71 To use these adjectives in the same sentence as the noun Nazi 
may cause an incredulous snicker among many readers. But to do so 
perhaps risks missing something which, in my view, is crucial yet so fre-
quently misunderstood when it comes to the Holocaust: For the most 
expert of Nazi genocidaires like Höss, the distasteful duty of killing was 
a higher calling because, as Hayes observes, the Nazis genuinely believed 
“that the Reich’s expansion to the east was part of a civilizing process 
that expanded European culture at the expense of supposedly barbaric 
Asia.”72 Of course, for many years now undefeated Europeans (and their 
descendants) of all stripes have relied on this “Nazi”-like logic to justify 
the expansion of their settler colonies. And with reference to the word 
“humane,” as Neitzel and Welzer incisively observe:
Ideologists of annihilation like Himmler or practitioners like Rudolf Höss 
continually stressed that destroying human lives was an unpleasant task 
that ran contrary to their “humane” instincts. But the ability to overcome 
such scruples was seen as a measure of one’s character. It was the coupling 
of murder and morality – the realization that unpleasant acts were neces-
sary and the will to carry out those acts in defiance of feelings of human 
sympathy – that allowed the perpetrators of genocide to see themselves as 
“respectable” people, as people whose hearts, in Höss’ words, “were not 
bad.”73
Perhaps there is a little more to the sociology of Norbert Elias than pre-
viously imagined.
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As Bauman notes, extermination through work, the Zyklon-B station-
ary gas chamber, and the industrialized cremation process finished the 
war as “the most perfect” solution to the Jewish problem that “the Nazis 
had time to invent…”74 It was cheap, profitable, highly efficient, and the 
most “humane” method they could find (thus suggesting there might 
exist a dialectical link between the apparently incompatible Bauman on 
rationalization and Elias on civility).75 In the end, Höss beat out people 
like Jeckeln, Lange, and Wirth to win the competition to fulfill Hitler’s 
wish mainly because his method of killing rated highest on the most 
important of the four characteristics discussed above: Zyklon-B did not 
require Germans to touch, see, or (barely) hear the killing of their vic-
tims. And as a result, these Germans could convincingly engage in strain 
resolving acts of self-deception, telling themselves that the gassings 
“probably” killed without any anticipation of death, killed without leav-
ing any marks indicative of a painful death, and killed quickly, even if, in 
reality, this was not true.
But despite Höss’s success in this competition, the leading Nazis 
never found his methods completely satisfactory. As Bauman implies in 
the above quotation, the method of killing at Auschwitz was not per-
fect per se: In reality, it did not eliminate the anticipation of death, it 
did not kill instantaneously, and it did leave marks indicative of a painful 
death. What the Nazis ultimately desired was a method of eliminating 
unwanted civilians that did not necessitate killing. Even before the start 
of the Soviet invasion, Nazi realists had pursued and almost discovered 
what the Chief Doctor of the SS, Ernst-Robert von Grawitz, termed the 
“perfect solution to the problem”76—sterilization.
the searCh for the most effiCient, ProfitabLe, 
and humane method of kiLLing (without kiLLing)
As Höss and others competed to kill more efficiently, a group of Nazi 
scientists undertook a variety of experiments to invent a cheap, rapid, 
and surreptitious technique of mass sterilization. It was believed that by 
sterilizing those deemed inferior, large categories of people like Jews, 
Gypsies, and other groups could be eliminated through natural death. 
Moreover, by eliminating the ability of these “inferiors” to procreate, all 
could safely be retained as a long-term source of slave labor, thereby pro-
viding the opportunity for all Germans “to pursue higher pleasures.”77 
260  N. RUSSELL
The search for a solution started in March 1941 as the Soviet invasion 
was being planned. After corresponding with the T4’s Victor Brack, 
Himmler became interested in mass sterilization as it might be applied to 
the expanding Jewish problem. Hilberg outlines the general contents of 
Brack’s correspondence with Himmler:
It started as a sober account of the possibilities of X-rays in the field of 
sterilization and castration. Preliminary investigations by medical experts 
of the chancellery, wrote Brack, had indicated that small doses of X-rays 
achieved only temporary sterilization; large doses caused burns. Having 
come to this conclusion, Brack ignored it completely and continued with 
the following fantastic scheme: The persons to be “processed”…would 
step up to a counter to be asked some questions or to fill out forms. Thus 
occupied, the unsuspecting candidate for sterilization would face the win-
dow for two or three minutes while the official sitting behind the coun-
ter would throw a switch which would release X-rays through two tubes 
pointing at the victim. With twenty such counters (cost: 20,000-30,000 
marks apiece) 3000-4000 persons could be sterilized daily.78
Also in March 1941, Himmler expressed interest in Professor Carl 
Clauberg’s nonsurgical attempts at female sterilization. The technique 
called for circumventing conception by injecting an irritant into the 
uterus. Himmler requested Clauberg’s transfer to the women’s concen-
tration camp at Ravensbrück where he could perfect his method. At the 
time, however, Clauberg held no interest in relocating and negotiations 
between the two ceased. Perhaps because Hitler initially disapproved of 
this potential solution, Himmler’s interest in sterilization waned.79
In October 1941, however, Adolf Pokorny, a retired army medial practi-
tioner, contacted Himmler in regards to another possible mass sterilization 
technique. Pokorny informed Himmler about a Dr. Madaus at Radebeul-
Dresden who had apparently sterilized mice and rats with a serum extracted 
from a South American plant called Caladium seguinum.80 In reference to 
Himmler’s preferred source of slave labor, Pokorny pointed out:
If, on the basis of this research, it were possible to produce a drug which, 
after a relatively short time, effects an imperceptible sterilization on human 
beings, then we would have a powerful new weapon at our disposal. 
The thought alone that the three million Bolsheviks, who are at present 
German prisoners, could be sterilized so that they could be used as lab-
orers but be prevented from reproduction, opens the most far-reaching 
perspectives.81
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Despite the Führer’s disapproval of this strategy, on 10 March 1942 
Himmler ordered Pohl to offer Madaus a research contract to undertake 
experiments on concentration camp prisoners, and within six months 
Madaus had agreed to the transfer.82
A few months later, in June of 1942, Brack felt it important to 
remind Himmler of the potential advantages of sterilization over kill-
ing. “Castration by X-rays…is not only relatively cheap but can also be 
performed on many thousands in the shortest time.”83 He also pointed 
out that Chief Reichsleiter Philipp Bouhler had been able to set up an 
experimental research program. Soon after, ex-T4 employee and medi-
cal doctor Horst Schumann began experiments on men and women at 
Auschwitz.84 Around the same time, on 7 July 1942, Clauberg finally 
accepted Himmler’s offer to move to Auschwitz to start an experimental 
program on who Clauberg termed “unworthy women…”85
All of these programs ended in failure, the only outcome being the 
misery and misfortune of all those unfortunately selected as research sub-
jects. Had just one of these programs succeeded in producing a perfect 
method of killing without killing, Hilberg is convinced the net of poten-
tial human targets would have widened:
In the very conception of these explorations, the destruction process 
threatened to escape from its narrowly defined channel and to engulf 
everyone within reach who might be branded as “inferior.” Already, the 
fate of Mischlinge of the first degree hung in the balance while the Interior 
Ministry waited for the perfection of mass sterilization techniques. In con-
sequence of the failure of these experiments a development was arrested 
which had spelled in its dim outlines the doom of large sections of the 
population of Europe.86
As Ernst Kaltenbrunner (Heydrich’s replacement) said in 1944, “Germany 
must see to it…that the populations of eastern Europe and most of the 
Balkan and Danubian countries are forced to die out as a result of sterili-
zation and the destruction of the ruling class in these countries.”87
By the end of the same year, even those Himmler believed to be ugly 
were being lined up for extermination.88 Clearly, the less the method 
psychologically burdened the most direct perpetrators’ conscience, 
the easier it would be for them to perform their tasks. And the eas-
ier the task, the wider the potential pool of targets. Interestingly (or 
disturbingly):
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When Clauberg returned from Russia to Germany in October, 1951, he 
had the first opportunity in ten years to tell interviewing reporters that just 
prior to his capture he had perfected his sterilization method after all. The 
new method consisted of a simple injection, and he was now looking for-
ward to its application, albeit only in “special cases.”89
If Clauberg had perfected his method of sterilization before the end of 
the war and then used it on “inferior” populations, it is likely that he 
would have surpassed Höss in the rationionally driven competition to 
discover the most “humane” method of converting the Führer’s wish 
into reality. But, of course, these Nazi scientists failed, leaving the regime 
with the next best option: the most advanced gassing systems at Belzec, 
Sobibor, Treblinka, and finally Auschwitz-Birkenau.90
ConCLusion
Although implementing an efficient (formally rational) system of mass 
murder was of great importance to the Nazi regime, it was equally 
important for the perpetrators across the division of labor to find a 
method of killing perceived to be “humane.” Four main factors were 
involved: Optimally victims had (1) no anticipation of death; (2) need 
not be touched, seen, or heard when being killed; (3) died gently; and 
(4) instantaneously. As the victims’ horrific experiences clearly illustrate, 
in reality the most popular methods of killing in places like Auschwitz 
were not “humane” experiences at all. “Humane killing,” as the perpe-
trators saw it, was probably a contradiction. A method of killing only had 
to feel sufficiently humane to them to act as a strain resolving mecha-
nism. That is, much like the all-important responsibility ambiguity, these 
kinds of perpetrator beliefs played a crucial role in reducing the so-called 
burdening of the soul. And the less the soul was burdened, the easier it 
became for the leadership to persuade, tempt, or coerce the most directly 
involved ordinary Germans into inflicting harm on others.
Perpetrator perceptions over “humane” methods of killing might help 
increase our understanding of what it was that was so moderate about 
German anti-semitism. That is, unlike the Eastern Europeans and their 
barbaric pogroms where Jews were clubbed to death by the “Death-
dealer of Kovno,” most “moderately antisemitic” Germans would only 
kill Jews with more “humane”—clean, emotionally distant, and civi-
lized—methods. Although many ordinary Germans had come to agree 
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that something needed to be done about the “Jewish problem”—thus 
indisputably rendering them anti-semitic—their more sensitive consti-
tutions rendered the Eastern European pogrom an offensive final solu-
tion. The Wehrmacht colonel who observed the death-dealer in action 
believed it “probably the most frightful event that I had seen during the 
course of two world wars,” and aroused in him and other Germans pres-
ent a similar feeling of “horror and outrage.” And when offended like 
this, Germans were commonly observed to behave in ways that sharply 
conflicted with the popular perception of the cruel and sadistic Nazi 
killer. As Arendt observed:
in Rumania even the S.S. were taken aback, and occasionally frightened, 
by the horrors of old-fashioned, spontaneous pogroms on a gigantic scale; 
they often intervened to save Jews from sheer butchery, so that the killing 
could be done in what, according to them, was a civilized way.91
Thus, from this perspective, the anti-semitism common among Germans 
was, relatively speaking, much more moderate compared to that found 
in some Eastern European countries. The problem, however, with this 
moderate anti-semitism was that it stimulated a demand for a more 
“humane” and “civilized” method of killing that happened also to 
advance killing efficiency enormously.
Thus, in places like Auschwitz, it became possible for only mod-
erately anti-semitic or even indifferent Germans to easily and repeat-
edly participate in a killing process capable of exterminating Jews on 
an unprecedented scale. And because the most advanced killing meth-
ods hardly “burdened the soul” (unlike the less organized and more 
repulsive pogroms where intense feelings of hatred quickly fizzled out), 
the German’s seemingly banal machinery of destruction could continue 
consuming the lives of victims with no end in sight. It would seem 
to me that this is how and why moderate anti-semitism so common 
among Hitler’s willing executioners ended up being so much more 
deadly and destructive. It is here that I believe we find an answer to 
Bauer’s “real question” of how during the Holocaust so many mod-
erately anti-semitic Germans were so quickly converted into willing 
executioners.
After the war when Germans were bombarded with the horrifying 
evidence of the Holocaust, many Nazi sympathizers rejected the Final 
Solution’s methods, but in many cases the moderate anti-semitism 
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remained. Consider, for example, one German architect’s rather defen-
sive, candid, and no doubt common postwar reaction to the Holocaust:
[T]he Jews … were a problem. They came from the east. You should see 
them in Poland; the lowest class of people, full of lice, dirty and poor, run-
ning about in their Ghettos in filthy caftans. They came here, and got rich 
by unbelievable methods after the first war. They occupied all the good 
places … in medicine and law and government posts! … [What the Nazis 
did] of course … was no way to settle the Jewish problem. But there was a 
problem and it had to be settled some way.92
As Koonz points out, after the war the conscience of many respectable 
yet clearly Nazified Germans (like that above) remained untroubled, 
“because they could forget their passivity in the face of white-collar per-
secution and simultaneously express moral outrage about the violent 
attacks and coarse language common in the hardcore Nazi subculture.”93 
Somewhat like the architect, one German POW said to another during 
a bugged conversation: “I quite agree that the Jews had to be turned 
out, that was obvious, but the manner in which it was done was abso-
lutely wrong, and the present hatred [directed at post-war Germany] is 
the result.”94 From such evidence, Felix Römer concludes (much like 
during the Obedience studies where Milgram’s application of greater 
power typically trumped the participants’ more benign individual pref-
erences) that even when Germans in the armed forces professed their 
belief that “extreme violence against defenseless civilians…cross[ed] 
a line, they were” still, far more often than not, “capable of such vio-
lence, the minute group pressure of the circumstances demanded it.”95 
All this aside, perhaps these moderately anti-semitic Germans would have 
been more amenable to the Nazi’s preferred but unperfected final solu-
tion of mass sterilization: the most “humane” method of killing (without 
killing). Maybe Norbert Elias was right after all, “if humanity can sur-
vive the violence of our age, [our descendants] might consider us as late 
barbarians.”96
notes
 1.  Quoted in Pingel (1993, p. 192).
 2.  Pingel (1993, pp. 192–193).
 3.  Quoted in Klee et al. (1988, p. 201).
8 THE NAZI’S PURSUIT FOR A “HUMANE” METHOD OF KILLING  265
 4.  Gutman (1990d, p. 1750, as cited in Berger 2002, p. 68).
 5.  Milgram (1974, p. 159).
 6.  Höss (2001, pp. 149–150).
 7.  Höss (2001, p. 154). In conflict with this, Wistrich (2001, p. 228) argues 
that Höss “never personally attended mass executions….”
 8.  Quoted in Naumann (1966, p. 249).
 9.  Quoted in Wistrich (2001, p. 28).
 10.  Seibel (2005, p. 351).
 11.  Quoted in Sereny (1974, p. 157). Those Germans in the forest indeed 
saw a great deal. In the Maiden forest (Chełmno), for example, one SS 
guard was noted for standing on the edge of a mass grave where the 
Jewish work detail was busy stacking adult victims head-to-toe. The 
guard then used a stick to identify small gaps in the stacked bodies where 
Jewish workers were to stuff children’s corpses (Cesarani 2016, p. 462).
 12.  Hayes (2017, pp. 143–144).
 13.  Quoted in Sereny (1974, p. 203).
 14.  As Hayes (2017, p. 144) notes, “among the camp guards, as in the shoot-
ing squads, a fateful element was self-centeredness, a preoccupation with 
one’s own challenges rather than the pain being inflicted.”
 15.  Wistrich (2001, p. 231).
 16.  Levi (1988, p. 31).
 17.  Quoted in Toland (1976, p. 703). For another example of Hitler using 
the term “humane” in relation to the Holocaust, see Mommsen (1986, 
pp. 109–110).
 18.  Toland (1976, p. 703).
 19.  See Schelvis (2007, p. 94).
 20.  Goldhagen (1996).
 21.  According to Kühl, cruelty could serve a variety of functions. For exam-
ple, partaking in acts of cruelty can strengthen perpetrator solidarity 
(2016, p. 112). It can also help perpetrators convince themselves about 
the righteousness of their decision to start and remain working within 
a genocidal organization (pp. 110–111). And in the macho world of 
Nazism, had a German from the start presented themselves to their com-
rades as a “hard man,” then to maintain presentational consistency, they 
could not then go “soft” on state enemies as the violence escalated (pp. 
111, 120–121). Perpetrators might also inflict nonfatal blows on some 
victims to push the wider group more quickly through the extermination 
system, thereby reducing the formation of what their boss’s feared most: 
“tie ups” (quoted in Angrick and Klein 2009, p. 149). As mentioned, 
it was not unusual during the Obedience studies for Williams to impa-
tiently push participants who failed to move at a brisk pace during the 
allocated one-hour time slots (see Milgram 1965). Finally, during what 
266  N. RUSSELL
can become a repetitive and routinized task, acts of cruelty can also aid 
in relieving perpetrators’ feelings of boredom (e.g., see Goldhagen 1996, 
p. 259 and Schelvis 2007, p. 113). This arguably occurred during the 
Obedience studies when, as mentioned, the experimenter occasionally 
broke out of his usual robotic delivery and would—seemingly playing a 
game of cat and mouse—invent his own rhetorical prod-like devices in an 
attempt to entrap participants into inflicting further shocks.
 22.  One quite destructive method of killing during the Holocaust that did 
necessitate the establishment of a tactile connection between German 
perpetrators and their victims was death by lethal injection. This fairly 
common method of killing is probably the present study’s most sali-
ent counterfactual example. For example, in his postwar interrogation 
the German doctor Wilhelm Gustav Schueppe admitted that between 
September 1941 and March 1942 a score of physicians and SD dis-
guised as medics working under his supervision at the Kiev Pathological 
Institute killed more than 100,000 civilians using lethal injections—a 
method of killing where cause is directly connected to effect (Friedlander 
1995, p. 142). Lethal injection was also used at Auschwitz, killing sev-
eral tens of thousands of victims (see Lifton 1986, pp. 254–268). During 
Auschwitz’s 14f13 killing program, it was established that fast-acting 
phenol injections were a cheaper means of killing unproductive laborers 
than, say, transporting them all the way back to Germany to be gassed 
in the T4 gas chambers (p. 255). Early on the injection site was changed 
from just below the elbow to the fifth rib space (thereby requiring the use 
of a long needle) because the latter technique killed much more quickly 
(p. 258). Having said this, Auschwitz’s advancing gassing technique sup-
planted the lethal injection technique (p. 257).
 23.  Again, see, for example, Friedlander (1995, p. 142) and Lifton (1986, pp. 
254–268).
 24.  Quoted in Bar-On (1989, p. 196).
 25.  Quoted in Milgram (1974, p. 38).
 26.  Quoted in Geyer (2005).
 27.  See Mommsen (1986, p. 126).
 28.  Höss (2001, p. 155).
 29.  Quoted in Sereny (1995, p. 335).
 30.  Quoted in Gilbert (1947, p. 406).
 31.  According to Gilbert’s notebook (1947, p. 45, as cited in Schwan 2001, 
pp. 70–71): “Schacht objects to being made to look at the film as I ask 
him to move over; turns away, folds arms, gazes into gallery…(Film 
starts). Frank nods at authentication at introduction of film […] Fritzsche 
(who had not seen any part of film before) already looks pale and sits 
aghast as it starts with scenes of prisoners burned alive in a barn […] 
8 THE NAZI’S PURSUIT FOR A “HUMANE” METHOD OF KILLING  267
Keitel wipes brow, takes off headphones […] Hess glares at screen look-
ing like a ghoul with sunken eyes over the footlamp […] Keitel puts 
on headphone, glares at screen out of the corner of his eye […] von 
Neurath has head bowed, doesn’t look […] Funk covers his eyes, looks 
away […] Sauckel mops brow […] Frank swallows hard, blinks eyes, 
trying to stifle tears […] Fritzsche watches intensely with knitted brow, 
cramped at the end of his seat, evidently in agony […] Goering keeps 
leaning on balustrade, not watching most of the time, looking droopy 
[…] Funk mumbles something under his breath […] Streicher keeps 
watching, immobile except for an occasional squint […] Funk now in 
tears, blows nose, wipes eyes, looks down […] Frick shakes head at illus-
tration of “violent death.”—Frank mutters “Horrible!” […] Rosenberg 
fidgets, peeks at screen, bows head, looks to see how others are react-
ing […] Seyss-Inquart stoic throughout […] Speer looks very sad, 
swallows hard […] Defense attorneys are now muttering, “for God’s 
sake—terrible.” Raeder watches without budging […] von Papen sits 
with hand over brow, looking down, has not looked at screen yet […] 
Hess keeps looking bewildered…piles of dead are shown in a slave labor 
camp […] von Schirach watching intently, gasps, whispers to Sauckel 
[…] Funk crying now […] Goering looks sad, leaning on elbow […] 
Doenitz has head bowed, no longer watching […] Sauckel shudders at 
picture of Buchenwald crematorium oven…as human skin lampshade 
is shown, Streicher says, “I don’t believe that” […] Goering coughing 
[…] Attorneys gasping […] Now Dachau […] Schacht still not looking 
[…] Frank nods his head bitterly and says, “Horrible!” […] Rosenberg 
still fidgeting, leans forward, looks around, leans back, hangs head […] 
Fritzsche, pale biting lips, really seems in agony […] Doenitz has head 
buried in his hands […] Keitel now bowing head […] Ribbentrop looks 
up at screen as British officer starts to speak, saying he has already bur-
ied 17,000 corpses […] Frank biting his nails […] Frick shakes his head 
incredulously at speech of female doctor describing treatment and exper-
iments on female prisoners at Belsen […] As Kramer is shown, Funk says 
with a choking voice, “The dirty swine!” […] Ribbentrop sitting with 
pursed lips and blinking eyes, not looking at screen […] Funk crying bit-
terly, claps [sic] hand over mouth as women’s naked corpses are thrown 
into pit […] Keitel and Ribbentrop look up at mention of tractor clear-
ing corpses, see it, then hang their heads […] Streicher shows signs of 
disturbance for the first time […] Film ends. After the showing of the 
film, Hess remarks, “I don’t believe it.” Goering whispers to him to keep 
quiet, his own cockiness quite gone. Streicher says something about “per-
haps in the last days.” Fritzsche retorts mournfully, “Million? In the last 
268  N. RUSSELL
days—No.” Otherwise there is gloomy silence as the prisoners file out of 
the courtroom.”
 32.  Quoted in Sereny (1974, p. 57).
 33.  Sereny (1974, p. 124).
 34.  See Arendt (1984, p. 109).
 35.  Quoted in Todorov (1999, p. 152, as cited in Wistrich 2001, p. 231). See 
also Arendt (1984, p. 22). That Eichmann never gave orders to kill is cer-
tainly questionable (see Cesarani 2016, p. 445).
 36.  Cesarani (2004, p. 277). Cesarani continues, “If Eichmann had been con-
sistent, and stood by his Pontius Pilate defence, he could have admitted 
many acts and simply washed his hands of them. Instead, he continued to 
deny and evade responsibility, day after day. Such tactics begged the ques-
tion of why he should have felt absolved of guilt if he did hardly anything 
to justify a bad conscience.”
 37.  Quoted in Arendt (1984, p. 246).
 38.  Quoted in Kulcsar et al. (1966, p. 39).
 39.  De Swaan (2015, pp. 22–23) argues, “Were the perpetrators banal? 
Arendt’s thesis on the ‘banality of evil’ does not stand critical scrutiny, 
certainly not as applied to Adolf Eichmann or other Nazi leaders, nor 
for that matter to the rank-and-file killers. Her model might, however, 
fit the countless minor middle men of the Holocaust: the administrators 
in the civil service registry who passed on the names of the prospective 
victims, the local police who rounded them up, the engineers who trans-
ported them in cattle cars, the contractors who built the gas chambers 
and supplied the extermination camps…most of them, indeed, were in 
some sense banal.” An important point De Swaan overlooks—and he is 
not alone in doing so (see Lozowick 2002, pp. 1–5, 270–275)—is that 
the Nazi’s methods of extermination, with time, moved towards the 
optimal goal of ensuring that every German link in the wider organiza-
tional chain became seemingly banal “minor middle men.” The greater 
every Germans’ structural “remoteness from reality”—the horrific per-
ceptual consequences of their contributions—the more likely they could 
or would argue they “never realized” in reality “what [they were] doing” 
(Arendt 1992, pp. 287–288, as cited in Lozowick 2002, p. 4). Armed 
with this excuse, all knew, as Eichmann himself put it, they were “cov-
ered.” This, it seems to me, is the insightful meaning behind Arendt’s 
controversial phrase the banality of evil.
 40.  Quoted in von Lang and Sibyll (1983, p. 76, as cited in Winters 2010, p. 59).
 41.  Browning (2004, p. 419).
 42.  Quoted in Fleming (1984, p. 74).
 43.  Quoted in Schelvis (2007, p. 246).
 44.  Höss (2001, p. 69).
8 THE NAZI’S PURSUIT FOR A “HUMANE” METHOD OF KILLING  269
 45.  Quoted in Porpora (1990, p. 17).
 46.  Quoted in Arendt (1984, p. 135).
 47.  Milgram (1974, pp. 175, 11).
 48.  Quoted in Arad et al. (1999, p. 420).
 49.  Quoted in Hilberg (1961a, p. 628).
 50.  Höss (2001, p. 198).
 51.  Some descriptions conflict with Höss’s. For example, one surviving mem-
ber of the Jewish Sonderkommando, Filip Müller, argued, “The gas took 
about ten to fifteen minutes to kill. The most horrible thing was when 
the doors of the gas chambers were opened—the unbearable sight: peo-
ple were packed together like basalt, like blocks of stone. […] But near 
the Zyklon gas, there was a void. There was no one where the gas crys-
tals went in. An empty space. Probably the victims realized that the gas 
worked strongest there. The people were battered. They struggled and 
fought in the darkness. They were covered in excrement, in blood, from 
ears and noses. […] It was awful. Vomit. Blood—from the ears and noses, 
probably even menstrual fluid. I’m sure of it” (quoted in Lanzmann 
1995, p. 125). Based on the affidavit of a person named Nyiszli, “The 
corpses were pink in color, with green spots. Some had foam on their 
lips; other bled through the nose” (quoted in Hilberg 1961a, p. 627).
 52.  Browning (1998, p. 155).
 53.  Quoted in Piper (1998, p. 170).
 54.  Piper (1998, p. 167).
 55.  Höss (2001, p. 147). It is no coincidence that the leading Nazi’s pre-
ferred and most “humane” methods of killing civilians coincided with 
their most preferred methods of suicide: Cyanide capsules and firearm 
wounds to the head. More research on this similarity is required.
 56.  Wellers (1993, p. 207).
 57.  Hilberg (1961a, pp. 571–572).
 58.  Quoted in Hilberg (1961a, p. 572).
 59.  Hilberg (1961a, p. 649).
 60.  Hilberg (1961a, p. 649). As Headland so perceptively observes, “The 
killings […] had to be disguised. Disguised—but for whose benefit? No 
outsider would ever see the reports (or so it was believed). And so if the 
obscuring and justification were there only for the Germans themselves, 
for the Einsatzgruppen officials, the Kommando leaders, for the RSHA 
officials, for the typists who typed the reports, and for the recipients of 
the reports, one still must ask certain questions” (1992, p. 77).
 61.  Mommsen (1997, p. 31).
 62.  Hilberg (1961a, p. 572).
 63.  The logic of Bernhard Lösener, who helped frame the 1935 Nuremberg 
Race Laws, was similarly flawed. In 1950, he argued that these laws 
270  N. RUSSELL
“were meant to bring order into what had become a chaotic situation and 
to mark the end of the persecution of the Jews” (Lösener 1961, pp. 262–
313, as cited in Koonz 2003, p. 190). Although these laws likely reduced 
violent attacks on German Jews and seemed to usher in a new period of 
civility, they also made possible this enemy’s disenfranchisement, impov-
erishment, and eventual extermination. As Koonz (2003, p. 224) argued 
with respect to all Germans: they “found it hard to grasp the reality that 
lawful, orderly persecution would turn out to be more deadly than ran-
dom cruelty.”
 64.  For Höss, it seems his hardness came by way of desensitization: “Flogging, 
too, was to be exercised in front of and under the control of the com-
rades.” As Rudolf Höss recalled, “Eicke had issued orders that a minimum 
of one company of troops must be present during the infliction of these 
corporal punishments.” Initially Höss felt “compelled to watch the whole 
procedure” and to listen to the screaming prisoner. “When the man began 
to scream, I went hot and cold all over.” However, he managed to rid 
himself of empathy. “Later on, at the beginning of the war, I attended 
my first execution, but it did not affect me nearly so much as witnessing 
this corporal punishment.” Afraid of being shamed for being a “weak-
ling,” Höss would never have admitted any “sympathy” for prisoners. 
“Outwardly cold and even stony, but with most deeply disturbed inner 
feelings,” he fulfilled his duties no matter what. Precisely this dutifulness 
made him an exemplary SS man. “My stony mask” convinced the superior 
“that there was no need to ‘toughen me up’” (Kühne 2010, pp. 67–68).
 65.  Quoted in Dawidowicz (1976, p. 133).
 66.  Goldhagen (1996, pp. 259, 307) and Schelvis (2007, p. 113).
 67.  Quoted in O’Reilly (2008, p. 165).
 68.  Quoted in Arluke and Sax (1992, p. 20).
 69.  Kühne (2010, p. 127). Kühne (2010, p. 67) continues: “‘Decent’ torture 
and murder were required, not torture with relish. Obvious sadism was 
even prosecuted, although only rarely. […] Never, though, was murder 
to be justified as a consequence of ‘hate, blindness, or ambition’—that is, 
of individual dispositions. Establishing a culture of brutality did not mean 
satisfying the needs of psychological pathologies but engineering a totali-
tarian community.”
 70.  Höss (2001, p. 135).
 71.  Having said all this, Himmler was not always able to find a Höss-
type figure for every gruesome yet “necessary” task. As a result, the 
SS-Reichsführer was always open to lowering his bar and hiring a sadistic 
psychopath and convicted pedophile like Oskar Dirlewanger.
 72.  Hayes (2017, p. 148).
 73.  Neitzel and Welzer (2012, p. 149).
8 THE NAZI’S PURSUIT FOR A “HUMANE” METHOD OF KILLING  271
 74.  Bauman (1989, p. 26).
 75.  After Elias (2000) [1939] wrote about civilizing processes across the 
early modern era in Western Europe, “In later work, Elias (1996) intro-
duced the idea of a ‘decivilizing process’ with which he explained the 
Nazi period and its regression from civilization into barbarism. […] 
the concept of ‘decivilization’ emphasizes the contingent and reversible 
nature of the process…” However, as Ray also notes, “there would be 
... problems if it could be shown that the Holocaust presupposed not 
so much a decivilizing process but”—as Volume 2 of the present book 
would suggest—“the very attributes of civilized habitus—planning, fore-
thought, technical sophistication and a state monopoly over the means 
of violence.” (Ray 2011: 52–53). Thus, Ray adds, “The question for 
Elias, then, is whether civilization overcomes violent passions or whether 
they metamorphose into more calculated forms.” (2011, p. 57). More 
research is required to tease out this potentially fruitful yet no doubt 
complicated dialectical link between Elias (long-term civilizational pro-
cesses), Bauman (rationalization and modernity), and the Holocaust.
 76.  Padfield (1990, p. 333).
 77.  Weitz (2003, p. 110, as cited in Kühne 2010, p. 34). See also Aly (2006, 
pp. 156–164).
 78.  Hilberg (1961a, p. 606).
 79.  According to Breitman (1991, p. 153) in December 1941 Theo Lang, 
a Swiss doctor working in Germany, told a British Secret Service agent 
“that Himmler’s staff had been considering ‘for a long time’ the steri-
lization of all adult Poles. Himmler’s later expression of interest in the 
process was not for a solution to the Jewish question; Hitler had already 
refused to consider it for that purpose, according to Brack.”
 80.  Hilberg (1961a, p. 604).
 81.  Quoted in Berenbaum (1997, pp. 347–348).
 82.  Hilberg (1961a, p. 604).
 83.  Quoted in Trial of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunal, 1949–1952 (p. 50, as cited in Glass 1997, p. 91).
 84.  Rees (2005, p. 178) and Hilberg (1961a, p. 607).
 85.  Quoted in Hilberg (1961a, p. 605).
 86.  Hilberg (1961a, p. 607).
 87.  Quoted in Aly and Heim (2002, p. 269).
 88.  According to Hilberg (1961b): “In consequence of an agreement between 
Himmler and Justice Minister Thierack, so-called asocials were transferred 
from prisons to concentration camps. On November 16, 1944, after the 
transfer of the ‘asocials’ had largely been completed, the judiciary met to 
discuss a weird subject: ugliness. The phrase on the agenda was ‘gallery 
of outwardly asocial prisoners [Museum äusserlich asozialer Gerfangener].” 
272  N. RUSSELL
The summary of that conference states: “During various visits to the pen-
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They should have thought of a different solution” (quoted in Schelvis 
2007, p. 254). Many Germans, even decades after the war, continued to 
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This book set out by asking a question that has perplexed Holocaust 
historians for many years: How did an only moderately antisemitic soci-
ety in Germany end up killing millions of European Jews? I suggested 
one way to shed new light on this question might be to explore Stanley 
Milgram’s Obedience studies, concentrating particularly on their inven-
tion. I reasoned that Milgram’s invention of his experiments and the 
Nazis’ invention of the Holocaust share a key similarity: Both successfully 
transformed large numbers of “ordinary” and arguably indifferent people 
into willing inflictors of harm. Therefore, if it were possible to deline-
ate Milgram’s start-to-finish journey in transforming most of his partic-
ipants into inflictors of harm on a likeable person, perhaps my findings 
might offer some insight into how only moderately antisemitic Germans 
so quickly became willing executioners. Volume 1 revealed that when 
inventing and then collecting his data, Milgram relied heavily on formally 
rational techniques of discovery and organization.
In terms of the invention of the Obedience experiments, after hear-
ing many Nazi war criminals plead that during the Holocaust they only 
followed higher orders, Milgram wondered if ordinary people in a social 
psychology experiment would also follow orders to inflict harm on an 
innocent person. He set out with a preconceived goal: run a harm-in-
flicting experiment that would “maximize obedience…” Because 
Milgram did not have a procedure capable of generating such a result, 
he had to invent one. Then, relying on forces he suspected caused the 




© The Author(s) 2019 
N. Russell, Understanding Willing Participants, Volume 2, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97999-1_9
278  N. RUSSELL
orders, and little steps toward a radical outcome—he envisioned a rather 
rudimentary basic experimental procedure where participants accepted a 
pledge to obey orders to engage in an escalating physical assault. Soon 
realizing this idea would unlikely achieve his goal to maximize obedi-
ence, Milgram started applying his intuitive feel and drew on his pre-
vious experiences as a social psychologist to envision what he thought 
might better move him toward preconceived goal achievement. Two 
key innovations emerged: Instead of a physical assault, Milgram sensed 
participants might more likely inflict “harm” if they were instructed to 
deploy fake shocks from an emotionally and physically distancing electri-
cal device (effectively substituting human labor with a more predictable, 
controllable, calculable, and efficient source of non-human technology). 
Also, he envisioned a more efficacious institutional justification for 
inflicting the shocks: By hurting the learner, the participant would help 
establish whether or not punishment improved learning. Rather power-
fully, this procedural change morally inverted the infliction of harm on 
an innocent person into a commendable social good.
Although this emerging procedure started to appear a little less like 
the Holocaust captured in the laboratory setting, to test its potential to 
achieve his desired end result, Milgram had his students run a series of 
pilot studies. Not only did the first pilots demonstrate the basic research 
idea held enormous potential—about 60% of participants inflicted every 
shock—Milgram also observed them engage in unanticipated behav-
iors that inspired new procedural innovations that he thought might 
move him even closer to converting his preconceived goal into a real-
ity. Importantly, these improvements were beyond his intuitive feel and 
past experiences of what he imagined might generate a high completion 
rate. For example, in the first pilot series participants could see an out-
line of the learner through a translucent screen. For many participants, 
the image of a pained learner clearly caused discomfort—seeing a con-
nection between cause and effect likely made them feel too personally 
responsible for their actions. To Milgram’s surprise, however, some of 
the distressed participants resolved the weighty dilemma before them 
by turning away from the pained learner and then continued to inflict 
further shocks. Thus, instead of Milgram from the top-down adding his 
own manipulative innovations to the basic procedure, these participants 
from the bottom-up invented their own such techniques. Inadvertently, 
these self-initiated actions helped move Milgram toward preconceived 
goal achievement. They did so because when some participants turned 
9 CONCLUSION—THE MILGRAM-HOLOCAUST LINKAGE AND BEYOND  279
away from the pained learner, Milgram’s observation of this behavior 
caused him to wonder if introducing a solid wall to subsequent pilots 
might cause the completion rate to increase beyond 60%. If Milgram was 
right, then introducing a wall into the standard procedure would bring 
him even closer to goal achievement. Milgram’s suspicions proved cor-
rect: During the next pilots, a wall was introduced and in the final trial 
run termed the Truly Remote Pilot, “virtually all” participants inflicted 
every shock asked of them. This trial saw Milgram achieve his precon-
ceived goal and signaled that he was finally ready to run his first official 
baseline—an experiment he was confident would obtain a surprisingly 
high completion rate.
Thus, with time the “rules and regulations” surrounding Milgram’s 
gradually improving procedure became the most efficient and predict-
able “one best way” for the experimenter (an actor) to control par-
ticipants into doing what he (Milgram) wanted: to (ostensibly) inflict 
harm on an innocent person. And it was past history—Milgram’s intu-
itive feel, past experiences, and close observations of the pilot stud-
ies—that had, through a process of trial-and-error discovery, gradually 
led him to a procedure that could push and pull nearly all into doing 
what he wanted. If he wanted to achieve his preconceived goal dur-
ing the first official baseline condition, all Milgram’s helpers—research 
assistants, actors, and participants—just needed to follow his latest and 
most effective “rules and regulations.”1 This, I would argue, was the 
rationally driven and somewhat circuitous learning process that guided 
Milgram toward the invention of his “one best way” to preconceived 
goal achievement.
The key to the success of the Obedience research was that, as best 
illustrated by the Truly Remote Pilot, every specialist task across the 
study’s organizational chain—from the National Science Foundation 
funders, the participant “processing” team, to the shock-inflicting par-
ticipants—felt or appeared sufficiently banal and thus adequately devoid 
of personal responsibility for any harm inflicted. It was critical that every 
functionary involved came to suspect that, because of the division of 
labor inherent within any bureaucratic process, all could blame someone 
else for their morally dubious yet personally (financially, materially, and/
or socially) beneficial contributions to a harmful process. All needed to 
suspect that they could contribute to the infliction of intense stress or, in 
the case of the participants, physical harm with probable impunity. None 
could feel and appear to be most responsible. Such conditions made it 
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much easier for Milgram (and the experimenter)  to persuade, tempt, 
and (if needed) coerce all helpers into fulfilling their specialist role.
In summary, Milgram’s biggest leaps toward goal achievement came 
after he substituted a Nazi-like pledge to obey with the socially more 
acceptable pursuit of “scientific” discovery and a direct physical assault 
with the non-human technology of the “shock” machine, introduced 
the non-human technology of a wall, and (inadvertently) constructed the 
non-human participant-processing technology of bureaucracy. These inno-
vations, in particular, ensured that by the time Milgram ran his first official 
baseline condition, most ordinary people at the end of his participant- 
processing assembly line willingly inflicted “harm” on an innocent  person. 
During the invention of the baseline experiment, it is therefore fair to 
 conclude, firstly, that Milgram behaved less like a social scientist and more 
like a goal-orientated project manager trying to socially engineer a precon-
ceived result. Secondly, Weberian formally rational techniques of discov-
ery, organization, and non-human technologies played a central role in the 
invention and production of the Obedience study’s surprising results.
In Volume 2 of this book, I illustrated how certain innovators within 
the Nazi regime relied on the same Milgram-like formally rational tech-
niques of discovery and non-human organizational technologies to 
achieve their preconceived goals. This shared reliance on Weberian for-
mal rationality, I argue, forms the most important Milgram-Holocaust 
linkage—it played the key role in transforming so many ordinary and 
only moderately antisemitic Germans into willing inflictors of harm.
Inspired by the extermination of Indigenous North Americans and 
Armenians, Hitler rationally drew on past experience and an intuitive 
feel to envision initially rudimentary strategies of eliminating German 
and later European Jews—a group whom he despised. Throughout the 
1930s, however, there was neither a strategy, nor the organizational 
infrastructure or technology—no procedure—to render the German state 
capable of exterminating such massive numbers of mostly women and 
children. Despite the Nazis’ unrelenting and intensifying propaganda 
campaign, which morally inverted the removal of all Jews from the Reich 
into a social good, Hitler’s personal preference remained unachieva-
ble. As a result, the Führer moved on to other apparently more realistic 
solutions to his most urgent problem—the Jews were to be shipped to 
Madagascar.
It could be argued that Hitler’s desire, in conjunction with ordinary 
Germans’ increasing capability to kill fairly large numbers of civilians 
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after September 1939, stimulated a rational search for a technically feasi-
ble method of extermination. And, as apparently more realistic solutions 
like deportation were rendered unrealistic, powerful, and ambitious, pro-
ject managers like Himmler and Heydrich started to sense merit in the 
once unrealistic solution of extermination—particularly mass shooting. 
The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 offered a unique oppor-
tunity to pilot test various shooting techniques that at least aimed to 
work toward the so-called Führer’s wish. Despite some “promising” dis-
coveries and “auspicious” results by innovators like Jäger and especially 
Jeckeln that interactively (from both top-down and bottom-up forces 
within the execution hierarchy) emerged with increasing time and obser-
vational experience, major limitations remained with firearms as a means 
of mass extermination. Not least of which was that ordinary German exe-
cutioners were forced to witness an undeniable connection between their 
causal contributions and the lethal effects. That is, guns made those most 
directly involved feel and appear too responsible for their actions. Little 
or no responsibility ambiguity remained at the last link in the organ-
izational chain (just as Milgram would later discover). The resulting 
responsibility clarity often stimulated intense feelings of guilt and, most 
commonly, repugnance. Thus, Himmler (like Milgram) concluded that 
another way had to be found.
As this realization settled in, innovators across the organizational 
machinery of destruction independently pursued other exploratory pilot 
studies, trialing the viability of potentially more compartmentalized 
yet efficient killing techniques that could be attached to the last link in 
Eichmann’s people-moving organizational process. The most “success-
ful” of these killing experiments involved different logistical and tech-
nical means of gassing civilians. Over time, and building on previous 
experience (particularly the T4 Euthanasia project), certain front line 
innovators made increasingly destructive discoveries—Lange’s gas vans at 
Chełmno, Wirth during Operation Reinhard, and finally Höss and his 
men at Auschwitz-Birkenau.
Indeed, when Höss’s advanced, highly efficient, relatively impersonal 
and apparently more “humane,” gassing and body-incineration tech-
nique was attached as the last link in Eichmann’s people-moving chain, 
ambiguity over responsibility for the end result increased, rendering 
frontline German perpetrators largely unaffected by their contributions 
(especially considering Jewish prisoners disposed of the victims’ bod-
ies). Consequently, the violent capabilities of German executioners in 
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places like Auschwitz increased enormously. Unlike the shooting squads 
who sometimes balked over killing certain types of victims, Höss’s men 
showed an uncanny ability to kill without complaint truly massive num-
bers of civilians: Gypsies, Reich Jews, the elderly, mentally ill, women, 
children, even babies.
Throughout, this journey of discovery achieved sustained increases 
across all four of Ritzer’s components of a formally rational system. 
This pattern was particularly evident as less predictable human labor was 
substituted for more controlling, predictable, calculable, and efficient 
non-human technologies. I therefore argue that the Nazi regime gradu-
ally evolved an ever-improving formally rational genocidal infrastructure, 
which, lying behind the executioners’ individual actions, greatly contrib-
uted to the destructive end result. With time, the Nazis discovered that 
(much like with the Truly Remote Pilot) the less the touching, seeing, 
and hearing associated with harm infliction, the greater the “banality of 
evil” at the last, and thus every, point along the genocidal chain. And the 
more “banal” the process felt and appeared to all those involved, the 
more ambiguous the issue of responsibility and, as a result, the easier it 
became for authority figures (even peers) to persuade, tempt, and coerce 
ordinary and only moderately antisemitic Germans into killing. At each 
link across the organizational chain, every functionary helper had to be 
able to blame someone or something else as more responsible for their 
harmful contributions to the process—thus, the theory of responsibility 
ambiguity.2 It is here that I believe we find the answer to Bauer’s “real 
question” of how so many only moderately antisemitic Germans were 
quickly converted into willing executioners. Moreover, it is here that we 
come to recognize what Milgram actually uncovered in his laboratory—
not people “just following orders” but the deployment of an inherently 
problem-solving, malevolent organizational process that—from the top-
down and bottom-up—socially engineered the leadership’s preferred 
preconceived goal into a terrifying reality.
Theories proclaiming, as I just have, a strong Milgram-Holocaust 
linkage have, however, been vigorously critiqued in the more contem-
porary literature, largely because the Obedience studies have been 
shown to conflict in many ways with the Holocaust’s finer historical 
details. Indeed, the current consensus in the Obedience studies liter-
ature is that Milgram’s research provides few, if any, insights into how 
during the Holocaust the undoable became doable. Consequently, all 
attempts to advance linkages between the Obedience studies and the 
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Holocaust—including Milgram’s own—have encountered stern criticism. 
Lutsky perhaps best summarizes these authors’ criticisms when they 
dismiss all previous attempts to link the perpetration of the Holocaust 
with Milgram’s experiments: “What an emphasis on obedience slights, 
however, are voluntary individual and group contributions to Nazi ide-
ology, policy, bureaucracy, technology, and ultimately, inhumanity” [ital-
ics added].3 As I’ve shown, however, the Obedience studies were not 
about obedience per se, which (despite Milgram’s beliefs) constituted 
more of an excuse that helped participants displace elsewhere responsi-
bility for their actions. Instead, as the last three chapters of Volume 1 
illustrate, the “Obedience” studies actually revealed the impact of volun-
tary individual and group contributions to an (albeit scientific) ideology, 
goal-orientated organizational policy (maximizing the completion rate), 
coercive bureaucracy, and strain resolving technology. And in Milgram’s 
laboratory, I argue that all these factors contributed enormously to the 
generation of inhumane behavior. So in conflict with the present con-
sensus even among Milgram’s strongest advocates that the Obedience 
studies have at best only minor explanatory power when applied to the 
Holocaust, I suggest this primary similarity (formal rationality)  advances 
a strong Milgram-Holocaust linkage along new lines.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that Milgram accurately simu-
lated the Holocaust in the laboratory setting. To ensure his baseline pro-
cedure was both workable and capable of achieving a high completion 
rate, Milgram frequently added his own (non-Holocaust-related) strain 
resolving and binding techniques (e.g., his substituting the “pledge to 
obey” with the infliction of harm in the name of science). Major differ-
ences like this, however, mean that my list of commonalities between 
the Obedience studies and the Holocaust itself could be invalidated by 
an equal and perhaps even longer list of differences in historical facts. 
Milgram himself faced such criticism. Despite advancing numerous and 
initially convincing linkages, his critics were quick to remind him that 
unlike his experiments, German perpetrators were exposed to an intense 
propaganda campaign, despised their victims, acted with enthusiasm, vol-
unteered to harm their victims, engaged in excesses, and afterward rarely 
expressed remorse. In short, my critics could also argue that much like 
Milgram, I too have fallen prey to the Conformation Bias: The tendency 
to only present evidence that confirms my preconceived beliefs (my 
above Milgram-Holocaust linkages), followed by a failure to mention 
any conflicting facts.
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There is, in fact, one historical difference between Milgram’s partici-
pants and the Nazi executioners that, perhaps more than any other, con-
flicts sharply with my Milgram-Holocaust linkage. That is, most Germans 
who refused to, for example, shoot Jews did so because of sheer physi-
cal revulsion.4 Nearly all of Milgram’s participants, on the other hand, 
refused to harm their victim on ethical grounds: “I don’t think it’s 
right.”5 Thus, before Milgram’s participants and Hitler’s execution-
ers decided whether or not to harm another person, there was a moral 
dimension inherent in the former’s dilemma that was absent from the lat-
ter’s.6 Put simply, Milgram’s participants and Hitler’s ordinary Germans 
were faced with resolving a completely different type of dilemma, thus 
generating at the base of their respective decision-making process a foun-
dational difference in kind and not degree. Because of this substantive 
difference, it could be argued that the Holocaust and the Obedience 
studies are incomparable events, therefore invalidating all attempts to 
advance any Milgram-Holocaust linkage. As logically compelling as this 
argument might sound, I disagree.
Instead, I suspect the Obedience studies and the Holocaust share 
a certain commonality that is so important that it is capable of negat-
ing the technical historical differences that separate them. That is, both 
Milgram and the most “successful” Nazi innovators applied formally 
rational techniques of discovery, bureaucratic organization, and other 
non-human technologies to overcome any obstacles that got in the 
way of goal achievement. For example, during Operation Barbarossa, 
Himmler’s goal was for his men to shoot every Jewish person they 
encountered. Initially, however, many Germans struggled and even 
refused to shoot all Jews because they found it revolting. Consequently, 
certain Nazi innovators used rational techniques of discovery, organi-
zational processes, and other non-human technologies in an attempt to 
scale this obstacle interfering with goal achievement. Milgram, on the 
other hand, had a conceptually similar although technically different 
goal: to ensure that most participants inflicted excruciating “shocks” on 
an innocent person, thus maximizing his baseline experiment’s comple-
tion rate. However, during the pilot studies, many of Milgram’s partici-
pants refused to shock the learner because they thought it was unethical 
to do so. As shown, Milgram used rational techniques of discovery, 
organizational processes, and other non-human technologies to scale this 
obstacle interfering with goal achievement. Therefore, it may not mat-
ter that different obstacles were encountered—or even different paths 
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pursued—during their quest to arrive at similar (although technically dif-
ferent) destinations. What is most important is that both Milgram and 
the most “successful” Nazi innovators used the same formally rational 
tools—techniques of discovery, organizational processes, and other 
non-human technologies—to find a way—any way—of arriving at goal 
achievement.7 And with more time and greater experience, the most 
innovative among them found increasingly more efficient, predictable, 
calculable, and controlling solutions. Thus, again, the single most impor-
tant Milgram-Holocaust linkage of all is Weberian formal rationality.
Because basically all people in contemporary society rely on formally 
rational problem-solving techniques for personal goal achievement, could 
it not be argued that the generalization of my above conclusion is rather 
useless because it could be shaped to explain just about any malevolent 
social outcome? While we all may rely on formal rationality, it is impor-
tant to note that only the most powerful people in society are able to 
use it as a tool to achieve macrocosmic goals that can, on a grand scale, 
adversely affect the lives of many other beings. Only the powerful have 
the wherewithal to procure the services of an army of problem-solving 
specialist helpers, to build enormous bureaucratic organizations, and to 
source and then insert other efficacious non-human technologies. In fact, 
it could be argued that the powerful are so because, more than others, 
they have the resources to deploy the most effective formally rational 
tools with which to try to secure their large-scale personal goals. Milgram 
(as a fully funded professor at Yale University) and the Nazi leader-
ship are examples of such powerful people. Well-resourced government 
and corporate leaders, along with particularly persuasive individuals, are 
other examples. Armed with preconceived goals, these societal leaders are 
more capable of securing the help and expertize of a second group, less 
powerful functionaries, who fill specialist organizational posts across an 
emerging division of labor. This second group has (with varying degrees) 
some power because they too have a choice, albeit a more modest one, 
to either agree or refuse to help the powerful achieve their precon-
ceived goals. It is a modest choice because, as we have seen, the powerful 
often have top-down means of motivating—pushing and pulling—help-
ers into doing what they want. Examples of this second group include 
Milgram’s research assistants, his actors and, had the experiment been 
real, the participants (all of whom had the choice to refuse or agree to 
perform their specialist roles in the wider organizational process). During 
the Holocaust, this second group included all of those Germans below 
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the Nazi leadership—those working within the perpetrator infrastruc-
ture, along with the consenting or indifferent German public. Other 
examples include functionary bureaucrats working in government or 
corporate posts. And the way the powerful use specialist helpers within a 
problem-solving bureaucratic organization can indirectly or directly cost 
a third group, the powerless, dearly, as happened both in the Obedience 
studies and in the Holocaust. The powerless are those whom the choices 
of the powerful leave, for the most part, without any choice at all. 
Examples include, again had the Obedience studies been real, the learner, 
the Jews, and other civilian victims of Nazi hegemony.
So, it could be argued that in the case of both the Holocaust and the 
Obedience studies the powerful used the expertize of functionary help-
ers, access to bureaucratic organization, and other non-human tech-
nologies to advance their own self-interests and did so at the expense 
of the powerless. Thus, if we assume that during the Obedience studies 
the learner was genuinely harmed, what Milgram captured in the labo-
ratory setting was the application of goal-directed formal rationality by 
the powerful as a means of devising an unequal social structure from 
which, at enormous cost to the powerless, the powerful ultimately ben-
efited. And because the powerless can do little to resist predation, the 
Obedience studies captured in the laboratory the use and abuse of for-
mal rationality as a self-serving and unethical tool of power, oppression, 
and inequality. And when viewed through this lens, what the Obedience 
studies actually captured on a relatively small scale, as other scholars 
of Milgram’s research have long suggested, can be generalized to the 
Holocaust, as well as to multiple other examples of organizational malev-
olence so common in modern society.
Consider the following examples wherein to achieve their own per-
sonal “Rational Goal/s” and extend their power, financial/business, 
political, and/or social leaders (the “Powerful”) have applied the tool of 
formal rationality—bureaucracy—to achieve their personally beneficial 
goals, which, in some shape or form, directly or indirectly generated an 
“Externality”  paid for by the “Powerless” (Table 9.1).
Much like in the Obedience studies, powerful people constructed/
maintained the above organizations by offering functionary helpers some 
kind of personal benefit in exchange for their participation (typically in 
the form of financial reimbursement, non-financial benefits, prestige, or 
job security). Because it is in their interests to do so, most functionaries 
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Table 9.1 Some destructive organizational processes in modern society
Powerful Rational goal/s Externality Powerless
Law and order 
politicians
Maintain capital punishment 
(pleasing “law and order” 
voters, and thus perpetuating 
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military weapons to violators 
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working in unsafe working 
conditions)








Profit maximization (by 









nomic car buyers 
in the USA
Tyson Foods Profit maximization (by way of 





Joseph Stalin and 
the Soviet govern-
ment authorities
Forcefully collecting and then 
diverting the Ukrainian grain 
harvest to the rest of the Soviet 
Union/satellite states
Mass starvation People of Ukraine
naturally accept the offer. When, as in all the above examples, a full con-
tingent of specialists agree to fulfill their roles, their collective actions 
immediately or eventually end up directly or indirectly costing a particu-
lar powerless group dearly. The division of labor, along with other avoid-
ance-enabling non-human technologies, allows the powerful and their 
specialist helpers to avoid directly experiencing (or be affected by) the 
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potentially disturbing perceptual consequences that their contributions 
end up having on the powerless.
Beyond the division of labor, an important non-human technology 
relied upon by many of the powerful and their functionary helpers in the 
above examples was geographical distance (the harm occurred far away 
in the sweatshop factory, on the mysterious kill floor, somewhere in the 
Middle East or Soviet hinterland). For powerful people and their spe-
cialist functionaries, however, this kind of structural compartmentaliza-
tion detracts from their level of awareness. And this lack of awareness, 
coupled by the involvement of many functionary contributors, can, as 
mentioned, stimulate “responsibility ambiguity”: general confusion over 
who is totally, mostly, partially, or not at all responsible for a harmful 
end result. The presence of responsibility ambiguity across a totally com-
partmentalized organizational chain (much like the Truly Remote Pilot) 
can, as mentioned in Volume 1, encourage the emergence of two types 
of functionaries. The first type of functionary can make their eventually 
harmful contributions to the wider process because they are genuinely 
unaware of and do not realize the consequences of their actions (e.g., the 
technician who built Milgram’s shock machine, but presumably never 
saw what Milgram did with it). Compartmentalization and responsi-
bility ambiguity throughout an organizational chain can, however, also 
encourage the emergence of a second type of functionary. Quite differ-
ently, this second type of functionary comes to sense opportunity amid 
the confusion: Despite secretly knowing (in concept) about the negative 
effects their contributions will have on the powerless, they nonetheless 
sense that they can continue contributing to, and personally benefit-
ing from, the infliction of harm on the powerless safe in the knowledge 
that they can probably do so with impunity (e.g., Milgram who pub-
licly claimed he believed his experiments were harmless, but just in case 
they weren’t, he earlier also attempted to protect himself by ensuring 
all participants signed a legal waiver). This second type of functionary 
can probably act with impunity because should, in the unlikely case, 
they ever be held to account for making their contributions, they know 
that thanks to compartmentalization, they can (disingenuously) claim to 
have been the first type of functionary: They were (apparently) unaware 
of the harmful consequences of their actions. And if that doesn’t work, 
they can simply blame someone else as more responsible than themselves 
or diffuse (dilute) personal responsibility across all the other contribu-
tors. This organizational loophole exists because the presence of other 
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contributors and various avoidance-promoting non-human technolo-
gies makes denying responsibility easy and localizing it difficult. Thus, 
bureaucratic organization provides a fertile environment for a metaphor-
ical haze or fog to rather conveniently descend over the issue of aware-
ness and responsibility. So, even when the powerful and their functionary 
helpers know (in concept) that their collective contributions to goal 
achievement will end up directly or indirectly costing some powerless 
group dearly, because they appear or feel sufficiently “covered,” many are 
willing to prioritize their relatively trivial desires (salaries, enormous prof-
its, employee benefits, promotions, medals, prestige, and other perks), 
over the more important needs of the powerless (avoiding death, illness, 
and misery).8
In fact, the wider organizational structures surrounding helpers 
actually discourage them from doing otherwise because the system is 
geared toward ensuring that engaging in wrongdoing is easy and con-
venient, and resisting unethical goal achievement is both difficult and 
personally burdensome (as whistle-blowers and resisters—a third type 
of bureaucrat—in some of the above examples know only too well). 
Thus, formal rationality, as Milgram inadvertently illustrated on a rel-
atively microcosmic scale, can be a very effective tool for the powerful 
and their functionary helpers to pursue a personally beneficial yet iniqui-
tous organizational goal. And within that organizational system, it is the 
inherent murkiness surrounding the issue of awareness and responsibil-
ity that enables all involved to abuse their greater power with probable 
impunity.
The “powerful” and their helpers in the above examples would likely 
dispute my associating their behavior with that of Milgram and his help-
ers during the Obedience studies, and especially with what I hope con-
tributes to a better understanding of the Holocaust. Their intentions, 
they would no doubt argue, were to variously protect their electorates 
from murderous criminals, generate jobs in a poor Indian city, bring 
freedom to Iraqis living under tyranny, promote international trade with 
an ally, generate jobs in a poor Bangladeshi city, produce affordable cars 
for struggling Americans, supply affordable food to all Americans, and 
distribute grain fairly throughout a union. However, two points should 
be kept in mind. First, it is the powerful who control the initial fram-
ing of their rational goals—the powerful control the script and have 
an influential say in socially constructing their formally rational goal/s 
as a moral “good.” Consequently, they have the power to present goal 
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achievement to their functionary helpers (and potential critics) in the 
form of a noble task (as Milgram did). And in a “yes-man” functionary 
environment, where all helpers are likely to personally benefit in some 
way, who is going to challenge the boss’s account? Although the pow-
erful may genuinely believe their goals to be noble, it is rare that they 
do not have vested interests in their own success. Milgram, for exam-
ple, likely believed in all earnestness that his experiments would provide 
new insights into how the Nazis perpetrated the Holocaust. But at the 
same time, he also seems to have sensed that whether or not his exper-
iments achieved this outcome, he would benefit financially and profes-
sionally from his conversion of innocent people into stuttering wrecks. 
And because Milgram was in a relatively stronger position of power, he 
also knew there was probably nothing his “subjects” could do about 
it—recalling the unemployed Fred Prozi’s undisguised starring role 
in Milgram’s documentary, despite Prozi’s reservations about his face 
being shown, as he said, “nationwide or something…”9 Milgram assured 
him the video recording would only be shown to psychologists. What 
Milgram failed to anticipate was that after publishing his first baseline 
experiment, someone with equal or even greater power might come after 
him. Indeed, a year after this publication, Berkeley University’s Diana 
Baumrind attacked Milgram with her searing ethical critique and the 
then untenured Milgram thereafter failed, in another broken promise, to 
publish the results of his incomparably unethical Relationship condition. 
Ironically, Milgram’s Asch Conformity experiment-like actions to “con-
ceal” this “purely private” “secret” arguably revealed the order of his pri-
orities: His academic career came before the dissemination of scientific 
knowledge—results that might reveal insights into the Holocaust. The 
powerful may espouse grand and what they believe to be moral inten-
tions (much as Hitler did in his quest to bring Germany to greatness), 
but would an independent audience (with no vested interest in goal 
achievement) come to the same conclusion? And if the goal is indeed so 
grand and noble, would the powerful continue perceiving that goal as 
a moral good if they suddenly found themselves in the position of the 
powerless?
Although the comparison is far from perfect in every case, each of the 
examples in the above table involves formally rational decision-making 
as a means of bringing about a predetermined end, in which function-
ary helpers used techniques of discovery, bureaucratic organization, and 
other non-human technologies to find the one best way of overcoming 
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any obstacles impeding goal achievement. And thus, they all share key 
elements with the Obedience studies: a division of labor, responsibil-
ity ambiguity, displacement/diffusion of responsibility, bureaucratic 
momentum, moral disengagement, perceptual avoidance for all or most 
links in the organizational chain, self-interested benefits, and, because of 
the disparity in power inherent to their iniquitous systems, the option for 
all to contribute to goal achievement with probable impunity.
Making contributions to iniquitous systems rarely feels all that bad 
to those involved because engaging in wrongdoing becomes norma-
tive—everyone around them is doing it. And in such an environment, 
anybody with any power is unlikely to draw critical attention to the iniq-
uity experienced by powerless groups, because they in some way are 
likely benefiting from that inequity. All therefore have a vested interest 
in maintaining a consensual silence. Should anyone feel a pinch of guilt, 
they can remind themselves of the boss’s morally inverted noble cause. 
And should any outsider mention the things that all would prefer, for 
personal comfort, remain unsaid—whistle-blowers, activists, investigative 
journalists, regulatory watchdogs—all functionaries can self-invent their 
own whitewashing and guilt-neutralizing coping mechanisms: “I’m just 
following orders, what can I do?” “I’m just trying to make ends meet,” 
and in a brutal world sometimes “shit happens” (but mysteriously rarely 
to me).
It is for these reasons that I believe formal rationality provides the 
most compelling way to generalize Milgram’s laboratory findings to the 
outside world. Milgram himself sensed this connection, arguing that 
bureaucratic organization was perhaps “the most common characteristic 
of socially organized evil in modern society.”10 It is even tempting to go 
a little further and argue that what the Obedience experiments captured 
on a relatively small scale is the cold, calculated, and ignominious abuse 
of power that has become common practice in our increasingly unequal 
neoliberal societies wherein, with the time and necessary experience to 
find the “one best way” to goal achievement, the powerful can imple-
ment ever more efficient, predictable, calculable, controlling ways to 
advance their own interests, while the poor (and now increasingly mid-
dle class) must suffer the consequences. This is a point worth ponder-
ing when one considers the popularity of neoliberalism among social 
elites—free international trade, increasing privatization, strong property 
rights, deregulation, fiscal austerity, and the promise of so-called trick-
le-down wealth advancing the well-being of all peoples. All that seems 
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to have objectively increased, however, is income inequality.11 No won-
der after World War Two German war criminals fitted back so quickly 
and easily into contemporary society: This was exactly the kind of iniq-
uitous political system the Nazi leadership took to unnatural extremes. 
It is almost tempting to argue the Nazis were quite simply ahead of 
their time. As Omer Bartov uncomfortably reminds us, “…Western rep-
resentations of the Holocaust fail to recognize that this extreme instance 
of industrial killing was generated by a society, economic system, and civ-
ilization of which our contemporary society is a direct continuation.”12
Formal rationality is so applicable to modern life that it extends to 
what are probably the two greatest threats to life on earth today: nuclear 
holocaust and climate catastrophe.13 In terms of the first, just before the 
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, Raul Hilberg ominously alluded 
to the new world powers’ formally rational pursuit of what is a far more 
efficient, predictable, calculable, and controlling method of genocide 
than Auschwitz’s gassing system:
The bureaucrat of tomorrow… is better equipped than the German Nazis 
were. Killing is not as difficult as it used to be. The modern administrative 
apparatus has facilities for rapid, concerted movements and for efficient 
massive killings. These devices not only trap a larger number of victims; 
they also require a greater degree of specialization, and with that division 
of labor the moral burden too is fragmented among the participants. The 
perpetrator can now kill his victims without touching them, without hear-
ing them, without seeing them.14
It is certain that at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, neither the 
American nor the Soviet leadership would have had any difficulty in find-
ing bureaucratic compliance with commands to push the buttons that 
would have killed tens, perhaps hundreds, of millions of civilians.15
The moral dilemma at the end of the Obedience studies’ organi-
zational chain may not sit perfectly with the Holocaust. But it may fit 
better with what is arguably the second other greatest threat to life on 
earth: climate catastrophe.16 In our “golden age of low-cost energy,”17 
greenhouse gas emissions are the consequence of worldwide economic 
and population growth. But for some time now the scientific commu-
nity has warned increasing carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane 
emissions, and the higher global temperatures they cause, will precipitate 
a worldwide environmental catastrophe. Independent audiences (those 
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without any vested interests) presented with this moral dilemma would 
very likely conclude that choosing to increase instead of significantly 
decreasing greenhouse gas emissions would be the morally wrong course 
of action. So is it possible that, given worldwide greenhouse gas emis-
sions continue to increase despite much talk of “planned reductions,” 
humankind has started to fall into an insidiously regressive and seem-
ingly inescapable Milgram-like trap? Certainly, it seems that almost no 
one among the most powerful—Security Council politicians, Fortune 
500 CEOs, rank-and-file (functionary) corporate/government employ-
ees, the middle and working classes, developed world consumers, inves-
tors, and voters—are prepared to address the issue seriously. Collectively, 
we refuse to sincerely confront an issue likely to bring about “civilization 
collapse” because of what are perceived to be far more pressing, imme-
diate, interests—the promise of a higher standard of living, greater eco-
nomic growth, more jobs, and the prioritization of convenience over 
sustainability. As Jarod Diamond convincingly argues, the risk of societal 
collapse increases when “there’s a conflict of interest between the short-
term interests of the decision-making elites and the long-term interests 
of the society as a whole, especially if the elites are able to insulate them-
selves from the consequences of their actions. Where what’s good in the 
short term for the elite is bad for the society as a whole, there’s a real risk 
of the elite doing things that will bring society down.”18 As we climb the 
metaphorical carbon parts per million (ppm) “shock board”—320 ppm 
in 1965; 330 ppm in 1975; 345 ppm in 1985; 360 ppm in 1995; 
380 ppm in 2005; 400 ppm in 201519—is it possible we have already 
entered the Obedience study’s dreaded post-capitulation phase where 
no one breaks off? Do we refuse to reduce our carbon footprint because 
secretly we all know that across the oil economy’s division of labor there 
is always someone else to blame for our personally beneficial yet even-
tually destructive contributions to the wider process? Those ultimately 
responsible for climate catastrophe can disappear because developed 
world consumers can blame weak government, government can blame 
intransigent voters, corporations can blame insatiable consumer demand, 
and developed world citizens can blame greedy corporations. And do we 
also continue to do nothing (except assiduously contribute to and ben-
efit from climate catastrophe) because privately we all know that by the 
time life on earth starts getting really nasty—say by 2100 when south-
ern Spain has turned into a desert—we’ll all be dead.20 That is, is the 
cause of our inaction that we all secretly know we are unlikely to become 
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victims—this is only going to be a real problem for our descendants—
thus freeing us to act with impunity? Climate catastrophe—along with 
the national debt, oceans of plastic, polluted “fracked” groundwater—is 
what our children will inherit from us.
When I think about climate catastrophe, I cannot help sense a con-
nection between developed world peoples and Germans who lived 
in, and benefited from, the Nazi regime. This is, for me, inadvertently 
best captured by Götz Aly. At the start of his fascinating book Hitler’s 
Beneficiaries: Plunder, racial war and the Nazi welfare state, he points 
out that what he discovered:
belies the optimistic conviction that we today would have behaved much 
better than the average person did back then. Readers of these pages will 
encounter not Nazi monsters but rather people who are not as different 
from us as we might like them to be. The culprits here are people striving 
for prosperity and material security for themselves and their children. They 
are people dreaming of owning a house with a garden, of buying a car of 
their own, or of taking a vacation. And they are people not tremendously 
interested in the potential costs of their short-term welfare to their neigh-
bors or to future generations.21
Clearly, we, as links in this chain of destruction, are all responsible for 
our harmful contributions, and thus every one of us must shoulder the 
obligation to do our fair bit to substantively reduce our carbon foot-
prints. This is true, but one important caveat remains. When it comes 
to climate catastrophe, it is the most powerful people—like the “carbon 
capital elite”22—and the organizational infrastructures they control that 
have the greatest chance of encouraging—instead of furtively block-
ing—progressive change. For example, although across the late 1970s to 
the mid-1980s Exxon scientists, managers, and executives developed a 
“sophisticated understanding of the potential effects of rising CO2 con-
centrations,”23 for some years after this awareness—particularly under 
the leadership of Lee Raymond and Rex Tillerson—one of the world’s 
largest oil companies,
…ExxonMobil has embarked on a deliberate campaign of confusion and 
disinformation producing a counter-science to manufacture public uncer-
tainty by funding a diffuse network of ideologically driven advocacy organ-
izations, as well as other issues management, public relations, lobbying, 
and legal tactics.24
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Yet in light of this “broadly successful”25 attempt to manipulate and 
control the social and informational field in favor of the oil industry’s 
self-interested desires, Tillerson, who strongly supports extracting the 
Arctic’s now (thanks to climate catastrophe) increasingly accessible vast 
oil reserves,26 then has the nerve to blame climate catastrophe on inter-
national consumers and their demand for more oil: “It’s back to that 
insatiable appetite that the world has for energy. Oil demand is going 
to continue to grow.”27 So Tillerson has actively attempted to manip-
ulate public opinion to the point it aligns with his own self-interested 
desires, but then blames climate catastrophe on the choices of those 
people he has effectively manipulated. This is somewhat like Milgram 
who invented a manipulative experiment that he could only envision 
personally benefiting from, going on to accuse those who completed it 
of being “moral imbeciles…”28 Again, we are all personally  responsible 
for our harmful actions, but the leadership with the greatest ability to 
control the wider infrastructure has an even greater responsibility to 
promote progressive and ethical change. As this book’s journey into 
both the Obedience studies and the Holocaust illustrates, the fish rots 
from the head down.
In conclusion, when I watch Milgram’s 45-minute documentary film 
with my students, I do not see “obedience to authority,” and I’d go so 
far as to call anyone who does a fool. Looking beyond his laboratory 
walls, I instead see climate catastrophe, nuclear war, and untold other 
examples of organizational malevolence so common in modern society. It 
is interesting to note that although Milgram was never confident about 
what he’d captured in his laboratory, he was certain that whatever it 
was, it did not bode well for the longevity of humankind. With a variety 
of disasters looming, it is not difficult to sense Milgram’s concern over 
the strong propensity for powerful people and their functionary help-
ers to prioritize relatively trivial personal interests over the need to act 
in response to more urgent moral demands. His words of warning may 
prove to be prophetic:
The behavior revealed in the experiments reported here is normal human 
behavior but revealed under conditions that show with particular clarity 
the danger to human survival inherent in our makeup… This is a fatal flaw 
nature has designed into us, and which in the long run gives our species 
only a modest chance of survival.29
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notes
 1.  Russell (2017).
 2.  Similar to the theory of responsibility ambiguity, Kühl (2016, p. 141) pre-
sents his “gray zone theory…” He argues that “when it comes to the use 
of violence by police officers and soldiers, there is a ‘gray zone’ in which 
it is not clear whether an order is legal or not. […] When moving within 
this gray zone, the organization – and, ultimately, the organization’s 
members – must carefully weigh up which acts of violence are covered by 
the state’s laws and which are not” (p. 141). [italics added] I support 
much of this theory except, unlike the theory of responsibility ambigu-
ity, it fails to recognize that the dilemma these Germans encountered 
need not revolve around the law—dilemmas can (much like during the 
Obedience studies) center around a non-legal moral issue. The focus of 
Kühl’s theory on the content of the law thereby fails to place the issue of 
personal responsibility front and center when functionaries are weighing 
up how to act when within this gray zone. Interestingly, when presenting 
his theory Kühl alludes to the central importance of responsibility: “in 
democracies and dictatorships alike, police officers know from experience 
which of their actions they could legally justify if required and which they 
could not. Knowing that acts of violence in a legal gray zone can quickly 
be attributed to the person instead of their role, they make sure that noth-
ing will happen to them even if something happens” (p. 141). [italics added] 
Put more directly, before engaging in acts of violence, police, and sol-
diers (much like Milgram’s ‘obedient’ participants) first ensured they 
were, as Kühl says, sufficiently “covered…” If Germany won the war, 
the executioners were, of course, “covered” because as Hitler reminded 
them, nobody would dare question their methods—might makes right. 
And if Germany lost the war, the police officers, for example, could evade 
or diminish their personal responsibility by blaming their superiors. The 
key goal for any link who decides to contribute to a malevolent organiza-
tional goal is to try and avoid personal responsibility, and they are to do so 
by any means possible.
 3.  Lutsky (1995, p. 63).
 4.  Browning (1992, pp. 74–75). See also Beorn (2014, pp. 72, 82).
 5.  SMP, Box 153, Audiotape #2305.
 6.  Consider, for example, Martin Mundschütz, a member of Einsatzgruppe 
D, who requested in a letter to his superior officer that he be transferred 
out of the extermination campaign and back to Austria: “My nerves have 
failed. That they have failed is only a result of my nervous breakdown 
three weeks ago which makes me suffer day and night from obsessions 
that drive me almost mad. Although it seems as if I now manage to 
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handle these obsessions, I apparently still have lost completely the con-
trol over my nerves and am no longer able to manage my willpower. I 
can’t suppress my tears.” So Mundschütz had lost control of his will-
power (that was obviously in favor of participating in the executions) 
and was apologizing to his superior for failing to have “performed as a 
man.” Because of his nervous breakdown, Mundschütz was simply reas-
signed to other ancillary (non-shooting) duties. However, Mundschütz 
remained unsatisfied by this reassignment and requested a transfer out 
of Einsatzgruppe D completely. As he explained: “Now I am supposed 
to drive around shopping. I am asking you to save me from this charge, 
because I don’t want to bother my comrades nor other people with the 
unhappy performance of a crying soldier. … If you, sir, have a heart and 
understanding for one of your subordinates, who wishes nothing more 
than to sacrifice himself for Germany but does not want to stage the 
drama of a supposed wimp, please do remove me from here” (quoted 
in Kühne 2010, p. 86). As Kühne notes, those Germans who pulled out 
of the shootings like Mundschütz “did not question the morality of the 
community, but instead interpreted their own psychological constitution 
as abnormal” (2010, p. 87)—he was a weakling.
 7.  Actually, in terms of the squeamishness versus ethics obstacles, both Nazi 
innovators and Milgram arrived at a very similar solution: At the last link 
in their respective organizational chains, both inserted a wall to separate 
cause from effect.
 8.  Holocaust historian Yaacov Lozowick (2002, p. 274) found the Nazi per-
petrators’ “rational explanations” for their behavior (clearly trivial motives 
like peer pressure and career advancement among others) “shallow and 
unpersuasive…” Surely, there had to be more to their destructive behav-
ior than this! But as Milgram’s psychological trap illustrated, for many 
participants, motivational forces as pathetic as a fear of having to engage 
in a confrontation with the experimenter can be genuine when a pow-
erless victim’s miseries have, for the most part, been diverted by certain 
non-human technologies (like a wall) so that they cannot affect a harm 
doer’s emotional universe.
 9.  Quoted in Perry (2012, p. 367).
 10.  Milgram (1974, p. 11).
 11.  Harvey (2005).
 12.  Bartov (1996, p. 9).
 13.  Chomsky and Polk (2013).
 14.  Hilberg (1961, p. 760).
 15.  Hilberg (1961, p. 760).
 16.  Worthy (2013).
 17.  Simmons (1976, p. 5).
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 18.  See https://www.ted.com/talks/jared_diamond_on_why_societies_col-
lapse. Accessed 21 September 2017.
 19.  See ftp://aftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/products/trends/co2/co2_mm_mlo.txt. 
Accessed 22 September 2017.
 20.  See Guiot and Cramer (2016, pp. 467–468).
 21.  Aly (2006, p. 4).
 22.  Carroll (2017, p. 229).
 23.  Banerjee et al. (2015).
 24.  MacKay and Munro (2012, p. 1530).
 25.  MacKay and Munro (2012, p. 1529).
 26.  Brown (2017).
 27.  Brown (2017).
 28.  Quoted in Blass (2004, p. 100).
 29.  Milgram (1974, p. 188).
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